COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT

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COLD WAR CRISES

POLAND, 1956

Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the "Polish October"

POLAND, 1980-81

Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis

by Mark Kramer

by L.W. Gluchowski

Eastern Europe was central to Soviet foreign and defence policy throughout the Cold War. After World War II, and especially from 1947 onward, the Soviet military and security forces, together with local communist elites, constructed the most integrated alliance system of the Cold War period. Soviet state institutions of control

also helped to reconstruct the military and security forces of states devastated by World War II. Their aim was to secure communist regimes in postwar Eastern Europe dedicated to defend the Soviet Union's western frontier. To ensure loyalty, uniformity, and quality, Soviet military and security officers were recruited to staff or to advise the East European military and security forces.1 This pattern applied in particular to

continued on page 38

HUNGARY AND POLAND, 1956

Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956

Introduction, Translation, and Annotation by Mark Kramer

The document below has been translated from a 19page Czech manuscript entitled "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Maďarsku" ("Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, 24 October 1956, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary"). The manuscript, which is stored in Fond 07/16, Svazek 3, at the Central State Archive in Prague (Statni ustredni archiv, or SUA), is one of many items in the Czech archives that shed valuable new light on the Soviet Union's response to the crises in Poland and Hungary in

continued on page 50

The prolonged crisis in Poland in 1980-81 was one of the most intriguing episodes of the Cold War, but until very recently almost no primary sources relating to the crisis were available. That problem has greatly diminished over the past few years. This article will draw on new archival materials and memoirs from Russia,

> Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia to provide a reassessment of the Soviet Union's role in the Polish crisis. The article will begin with a brief review of some of the most important new sources, and will then analyze the decision-making calculus in Moscow in 1980-81. The third part will take up the controversial question of whether, and under what circumstances, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies might have invaded Poland in December 1981.

> The discussion here is based in part on a longer chapter about the Polish crisis in my forthcoming book on Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, 1945-1991. Further coverage of the

> > continued on page 116

SUDOPLATOV RESPONDS: The Authors of Special Tasks Reply to Critics—see page 155

KOREA, 1949-50

To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War

by Kathryn Weathersby

The historical record of the Korean War has recently been greatly enriched by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's presentation to President Kim Young-Sam of South Korea, during the latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994, of 216 previously classified high level Soviet documents on the war from Russian archives. The collection totals 548 pages and includes documents from the period 1949-1953. Most of the documents are ciphered telegrams between

continued on page 2

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N/	Тш	IC	cer	112.4
TIN.			BBIL	

1953 GDR Uprising		
1956 Hungarian Crisis	22	
The Yeltsin Dossier	22	
Imre Nagy Reassessed	23	
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis	58	
KGB Documents	58	
Diplomatic Cables	58	
Soviet-Cuban Talks	59	
Warsaw Pact "Lessons"	59	
1980-81 Polish Crisis		
Soviet Documents	- 110	
Honecker's Appeal	124	
Carter-Brezhnev		
Correspondence	140	
Response		

CUBA, 1962

The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech

by Philip Brenner and James G. Blight

On 25 and 26 January 1968, Cuban leader Fidel Castro gave an extraordinary 12-hour speech before the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party on the history of Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union. It is well known that the relationship in the six years after the Cuban Missile Crisis was turbulent. But the disclosure of this speech, kept secret at the time, helps clarify how important the Missile Crisis was in setting the stage for the turbulence.

The Cuban government recently declassified

continued on page 81