240 10 3355 https://dh.scu.edu/exhibits/files/original/90/2941/30032389.pdf 8f58cbe5cb77750a0b261b2358124e31 PDF Text Text Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States Author(s): Gordon H. Hanson Source: Journal of Economic Literature , Dec., 2006, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 869924 Published by: American Economic Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/30032389 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Economic Literature This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XLIV (December 2006), pp. 869-924 Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States GORDON H. HANSON* In this paper, I selectively review recent literature on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States. I begin by discussing methods for estimating stocks and flows of illegal migrants. While there is uncertainty about the size of the unauthorized population, new data sources make it possible to examine the composition of legal and illegal populations and the time-series covariates of illegal labor flows. I then consider the supply of and demand for illegal migrants. Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico are hardly a new phenomenon, yet illegal migration from Mexico did not reach high levels until recently. An increase in the relative size of Mexico's working-age population, greater volatility in U.S.-Mexico relative wages, and changes in U.S. immigration policies are all candidate explanations for increasing labor flows from Mexico. Finally, I consider policies that regulate the cross-border flow of illegal migrants. While U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent illegal entry and punish firms that hire unauthorized immigrants, these laws are imperfectly enforced. Lax enforcement may reflect political pressure by employers and other interests that favor open borders. 1. Introduction percent of the U.S. foreign-born population There is increasing interest by academ- ics and policymakers in Mexican and equivalent to 10 percent of the total population of Mexico (see figure 1).1 The United States has not experienced a concen- migration to the United States. Mexico is trated immigration wave of this magnitude the most important source country for since the influxes from Germany and Ireland U.S. immigration, accounting for 34 perin the mid-nineteenth century.2 For Mexcent of total immigrant arrivals since 1990. In 2004, the 10.5 million Mexican immi- ico, the continuing population outflow is grants living in the United States were 31 * University of California, San Diego, and National Bureau of Economic Research. I thank Roger Gordon and seminar participants at the 2006 AEA meetings, Boston University, MIT, Syracuse University, and Tufts University for helpful comments and Jeff Lin and Maribel Pichardo for excellent research assistance. 1 Figure 1 reports the total number of Mexican immigrants in the United States (legal and illegal) as a share of Mexico's population, the total U.S. population, and the foreign-born U.S. population. 2 Over the period 1841 to 1860, Ireland accounted for 39 percent of U.S. immigration and over the period 1841 to 1890, Germany accounted for 30 percent of U.S. immigration (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2004). 869 This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �870 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) Figure 1. Mexican Immigrants in the U.S. unprecedented.3 In both countries, the cross-border flow of labor appears to have affected the structure of wages, the intrana- tional distribution of population, and the pattern of industrial specialization. Beyond its scale, the distinguishing feature of Mexican immigration is that most new arrivals enter the United States illegally. In 2004, there were an estimated 5.9 mil- lion unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the United States, among a total unauthorized population of 10.3 million (Jeffrey S. immigration in the United States is a rela- tively new phenomenon. It has provoked political debate about whether to provide public services to illegal immigrants, grant them status as legal residents, or militarize U.S. borders to prevent further illegal inflows. In Mexico, migration abroad has helped ease the country's adjustment to rapid growth in its working-age population and to macroeconomic shocks, though not without disrupting the families and communities whose members have moved to the Passel 2005). Thus, 56 percent of Mexican United States. immigrants appear to lack permission to be in the country, compared to 17 percent of There is an emerging body of economic research on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States. This literature has been all other immigrants. Large-scale illegal 3 The one episode that approaches the current outflow is the Mexican Revolution (1911-20). Between 1911 and 1925, 680,000 legal immigrants from Mexico (or 5 percent of Mexico's 1910 population) entered the United States (and were joined by a large number of illegal immigrants). By the late 1920s, many of these individuals had returned to Mexico. See Lawrence Cardoso (1980) and Fernando Alanis Enciso (1999). made possible by the recent availability of data sources on the cross-border move- ments of legal and illegal Mexican migrants. Also prompting attention is the realization that, with unauthorized entrants accounting for over half of Mexican immigrants and over three tenths of all U.S. immigrants, any This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 871 discussion of international migration in the United States or Mexico ends up confronting the issue of illegality either explicitly or implicitly. Much of the initial research on unautho- how prospective migrants respond to these policies. There is a large literature on U.S. immigration, which tends to focus on the labormarket consequences of immigrant inflows rized labor flows was done by nonecono- and the economic performance of immi- mists.4 The principal themes of this body of work resemble those in the economics liter- grants.6 This body of work examines, among ature on internal migration in developing other questions, whether immigration reduces wages for U.S. native workers; Hillel Rapoport and Fr6d6ric Docquier whether immigrants make relatively greater use of means-tested entitlement programs; countries (see Robert E. B. Lucas 1997; forthcoming). Early waves of illegal migration from Mexico appear to have originated in rural areas of the country (Wayne A. Cornelius 1992; Jorge Durand, Massey, and and whether earnings, education, fertility, or other outcomes for immigrants converge to native levels over time. Largely taken for granted in the U.S. liter- Rene Zenteno 2001), involved households financing the migration of one or more ature is why foreign residents migrate to the United States. One obvious reason is that members in return for remittances from the U.S. real wages far exceed those in many migrants (Durand, Emilio A. Parrado, and other countries. Large wage differentials, coupled with binding and slowly changing depended on family and community networks that helped migrants enter and find employment in the United States (Massey et quotas on U.S. legal immigration, create queues to enter the United States. Given extended delays in clearing such queues, al. 1994; Massey and Kristin E. Espinosa 1997). gration appears to be more or less insensitive Massey 1996; Durand et al. 1996), and Yet, internal migration and illegal interna- annual variation in the level of legal immi- to contemporaneous annual fluctuations in tional migration differ in important respects. U.S. or foreign econ-omies. Perhaps as a While policy barriers that restrict withincountry regional labor flows are rare, countries actively regulate the inflow of labor result, the quantity of literature on the con- from abroad. The United States determines sequences of U.S. legal immigration vastly exceeds that on its causes.7 With illegal immigration, the determi- the level of legal immigration through quo- nants of migrant flows and the hightas on entry visas, which change infrequent- frequency variation of these flows have ly over time.5 The country implicitly sets the level of illegal immigration through selecting the intensity with which it enforces bor- 6 For surveys of this literature, see James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston (1998) and George J. Borjas (1999a, ders against illegal entry. Key issues for the 1999b) and for recent work in the area see Borjas (2003) and David Card (2005). For analysis of these issues in the study of illegal migration are how countries context of Mexican immigration, see Smith (2003), choose their border regulation policies and Stephen J. Trejo (2003), Francise D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn (forthcoming), Borjas and Lawrence F. Katz (forthcoming), Card and Ethan Lewis (forthcoming), and 4 For reviews of this literature, see Douglas S. Massey Brian Duncan and Trejo (forthcoming). There is a smaller et al. (1994) and Thomas J. Espenshade (1995). literature on the consequences of emigration for Mexico. 5 The current U.S. immigration quota system was See Prachi Mishra (forthcoming) and Gordon H. Hanson established by the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 and amended (forthcoming). by the Immigration Act of 1990. The 1990 law set a flexi7 Exceptions include Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. ble cap for U.S. legal admissions at 675,000 individuals of Williamson (2004) and Anna Maria Mayda (2005), who which 480,000 are to be family-based, 140,000 are to be examine the correlates of international migration flows. In employment-based, and 55,000 are to be "diversity immi- research on internal migration, there is considerable work grants." Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not subject on the incentive to migrate. See Michael J. Greenwood (1997) and Lucas (1997) for reviews of the literature. to immigration quotas. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �872 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) attracted more attention. Geographic proximity allows unauthorized migrants from Mexico to move to the United States than tourism or foreign direct investment (Inter-American Development Bank 2004). In this paper, I selectively review recent relatively quickly. The existence ofliterature well- on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States. In section 2, I discuss established migration networks enables U.S. employers to communicate changes in methods their for estimating stocks and flows of demand for labor to prospective migrants illegalinmigrants. While there is uncertainty Mexico. Migrants use these same networks about the size of the unauthorized populato find jobs and housing in the United tion, new data sources make it possible to States. Shocks to either the Mexican or U.S. examine the composition of legal and illegal economies may be transmitted into changes populations and the time-series covariates of in cross-border labor flows with relatively illegal labor flows. In section 3, I consider the short time lags, making illegal migration supply of and demand for illegal migrants. potentially quite responsive to changes in Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico are hardly a new phenomenon, yet illegal migration from Mexico did not binational business-cycle conditions. Another feature that distinguishes legal and illegal migrant flows is their composition. While legal migrants face entry costs reach high levels until recently. An increase in the relative size of Mexico's working-age associated with queues in obtaining visas, population, greater volatility in U.S.-Mexico relative wages, and changes in U.S. immigraillegal migrants face costs associated with evading immigration authorities. Once in the tion policies are all candidate explanations for receiving country, the risk of detection may increasing labor flows from Mexico. In secmake some employers unwilling to hire ille- tion 4, I consider policies that regulate the gal migrants, limiting their occupational cross-border flow of illegal migrants. While prospects and reducing the returns to skill U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent they perceive. Variation in migration costs illegal entry and punish firms that hire unauand in receiving-country wage profiles thorized immigrants, these laws are imperbetween legal and illegal migration suggest fectly enforced. Lax enforcement may reflect the characteristics of illegal migrants may political pressure by employers and other differ from those of legal migrants. interests that favor open borders. In section Observed changes in the composition of 5, I discuss directions for further research. U.S. immigrants, which has received much My goal in this paper is not to conduct an attention in research on consequences of exhaustive survey of work on illegal migraU.S. immigration, could be partly a by- tion but rather to highlight major findings in product of the rising share of unauthorized the literature, assess the state of important entrants in immigrant inflows. For Mexico, debates, and identify unresolved issues, with an eye toward advancing questions to help the composition of migrant outflows matters not just for the labor-market effects of emi- guide future work. As much of the literature gration but also for the ties that migrants retain with the country. Illegal migrants appear to be more likely than legal migrants to send remittances to family members in is empirical, I will focus on this strand of research, with occasional forays into theory. One topic I will not discuss at much length is the economic consequences of illegal migra- Mexico. Rising illegal migration from tion, in part because literature on the conse- Mexico may be partly responsible for the recent surge in remittances in the country, which rose from 0.1 percent of GDP in 1990 to 2.2 percent of GDP in 2004 and now generate more foreign exchange in the country quences of immigration has been subject to several recent surveys (see note 6) and in part because there is little research on the specific aspects of these consequences that are attributable to illegal immigration. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 873 Though my focus is on the United States and Mexico, insights from the literature are relevant for other regions, as well. Unauthorized migration has become a glob- Knowing the overall share of immigrants who are unauthorized is not the same as knowing which specific immigrants in a given data source are unauthorized. al phenomenon. In the last two decades, there have been sizable flows of illegal migrants from North Africa and Eastern Fortunately, there are now several microlevel surveys that provide information on Europe to Western Europe, from Indonesia design or default, migrants from Mexico to elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and from neighboring countries to South Africa. The U.S.-Mexico experience may be instructive for these and other cases regarding how to measure unauthorized migration, estimate the causes and consequences of migration flows, and gauge the potential impacts of policy interventions. individual migration status. Either by account for a large fraction of those represented in these data sources. While each survey has limitations, their use in conjunc- tion with large public data sets from Mexico and the United States provides considerable detail on the population of legal and illegal migrants from Mexico who are living or have lived in the United States. 2. Stocks and Flows of Illegal Migrants Illegal immigrants account for a large and growing fraction of the U.S. foreign-born population.8 One may imagine that, as part of the underground economy, unauthorized migrants are not easily subject to measurement. However, there is now abundant evidence that illegal immigrants are represented in official household surveys, including the U.S. Census of Population and Housing and the U.S. Current Population Survey. Given known levels of U.S. legal immigration, the number of foreign-born individuals enumerated in these sources is far too large for them all to be legal. The most common method to estimate A third data source on unauthorized migration is a by-product of U.S. immigration policy. To prevent illegal immigration, the U.S. Border Patrol polices U.S. borders and ports of entry, attempting to apprehend those seeking to enter the country illegally. The Border Patrol compiles high-frequency data on apprehensions and enforcement, the vast majority of which occur along the U.S.-Mexico border. Data on border apprehensions and enforcement allow one to examine how attempts at illegal entry vary with economic conditions in the United States and Mexico and to see which factors are associated with the intensity of U.S. enforcement activities. the number of illegal immigrants is to take 2.1 The Residual Foreign-Born Population the difference between the measured immi- grant population and the sum of past legal immigrant inflows. Estimates using this residual approach suggest that stocks of illegal immigrants have risen sharply over time. However, there is considerable variability in In the United States, there are two classes of legal immigrants who appear in official data sources (i.e., are surveyed by the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), or other official entities). the estimates, associated with differing One is permanent legal immigrants, who assumptions about the magnitude of errors in enumerating legal and illegal immigrants in official data sources. 8 This also appears to be the case in Western Europe (Tito Boeri, Barry McCormick, and Hanson 2002). have the right to reside in the country indef- initely. Another is temporary legal immigrants, who have the right to reside in the country for a defined time period, as specified by an entry visa (such as those for stu- dents, specific skill classes of workers, diplomats, and family members of temporary This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �874 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) legal immigrants).9 Since government surveys do not screen individuals based on their immigration status, illegal immigrants also appear in official data, to the extent they make themselves available to be surveyed. The standard method to estimate the num- ber of illegal immigrants is to assume it is equal to the residualforeign-born population, which is given by (1) Ut,= mortality and emigration rates to each entry cohort and determine the fraction of tempo- rary immigrants admitted in previous years that are still in the country. In practice, most discrepancies evident in table 1 appear unrelated to differences in these assumptions. Of greater importance are assumptions about measurement error in F,. To simplify matters, I reexpress equation (1) in contemporaneous values as Ft = Lt + Ut, where Lt is the total legal foreign-born pop- ulation in year t. The U.S. Census Bureau (and other entities that conduct household where Ut is the unauthorized foreign-born population in year t, Ft is the total foreignsurveys) tends to undercount the total population (with undercount rates for low-income permanent legal immigrants that entered in year s < t, m, is the mortality rate between born population in year t, Ls is the number of year s and year t for legal immigrants enter- ing in year s, es is the emigration rate between year s and year t for legal immigrants entering in year s, and T, is temporary legal immigrants present in year t. Table 1 reports estimates of the unauthorized foreign-born population by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Joe Costanzo et al. 2001), Bean et al. (2001a, 2001b), Passel (2005), and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (2001).10 In the most recent projection, Passel (2005) esti- mates that between 2002 and 2004 the ille- gal immigrant population rose from 9.3 to 10.3 million, for an average annual net inflow of 500,000 migrants, with 57 percent of these individuals coming from Mexico. This compares to an average annual net illegal inflow during the 1990-2000 period of households, which would include many Mexican immigrants, believed to be relatively high), in which case the measured foreign- born population, F,, is less than the actual foreign-born population, Ft. The total legal- immigrant population, Lt, in contrast, appears to be measured with greater accura- cy, since immigration authorities have records on how many entry visas they award. Suppose the legal-immigrant population that is enumerated in the census is, (2) Lt where A, is the fr that go uncounted immigrant census (3) is, popul U, where p, is the 581,000 migrants (with 58 percent of net immigrants that new immigrants coming from Mexico), are mean zero iid based on U.S. Census Bureau estimates observed individ (Costanzo et al. 2001), and 350,000 migrants terms of their Census Bureau estimates that it under(with 79 percent coming from Mexico), based on INS (2001) estimates. counts the Hispanic population by 5 perObviously, there are a host of assumptions cent, Bean et al. (2001b) put the undercount involved in estimating (1). One must assign rate for legal Mexican immigrants at 2 percent to 4 percent. Similarly, while the U.S. 9 The Census Bureau does not survey individuals on Census Bureau estimates that it under- tourist or business visas or other short-term visitors. counts 10 See Bean et al. (1998) for a survey of the literature on estimating illegal immigrant populations. the illegal immigrant population by 15 percent, the INS assumes an undercount This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 875 TABLE 1 ESTIMATES OF THE U.S. ILLEGAL-IMMIGRANT POPULATION, 1990-2004 Total Population of Illegal Immigrants in the United States (millions) Costanzo et al. (2003) Bean et al. (2001a, 2001b) INS Undercount Rate Undercount Rate Passel Year (2001) 10% 15% 20% 15% Median 25% (2005) 1990 3.500 1991 3.766 4.025 4.430 -- -- -- 4.707 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1992 4,204 1993 4.492 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1994 4.750 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1995 5.146 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1996 5.581 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1997 5.862 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1998 6.098 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1999 6.488 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2000 7.000 2001 -- 2002 -- -- 2003 2004 8.705 -- -- 10.242 -- -- -- - -- -- 5.918 -- -- -- 10.882 7.751 -- -- -- --- -- 1996 2.040 -- 2000 2001 -- -- 4.808 -- 2002 2003 2004 -- --- -- 1.008 --- -- -- 1.524 3.872 --- -- -- 3.462 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9.300 -- -- 10.300 Illegal -- -- -- 2.543 3.706 -- -- -- -- 4.510 -- -- -- 5.765 --- -- -- -- Immig -- -- -- -- -- -- of -- -- 9.864 -- -- Population 1990 -- -- 5.300 -- -- 5.900 Notes: Costanzo et al. (2003) rep undercount rates for illegal imm undercount rate for illegal imm mates are based on undercount r grants or (b) 25 percent for ille estimates are based on undercou legal immigrants (2 percent for for all legal immigrants (4 perc 2001b) are for the full set of rep of 10 percent, and Bean representativ (see Bean et al. 1998). The U.S. Census undercount rates of 15 p cent. It is primarily the Bureau justifies its undercount assumptions assumptions based that account on results from its own postenumeraestimates in tion table 1. surveys, from which standard errors for fo Assumptions under populationabout estimates are derived (Costanzo based on comparisons et al. 2001). The INS (2001) justifies a 10 of population with the percent undercount rate based popul on a case postenumeration surveys study of Mexican immigrants in Los Angeles cific localities. requi County. Bean This et al. (2001a, 2001b) justify that underenumeration their range of undercount rates based on in This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �876 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) results in Bean and Jennifer Van Hook (1998). Given observed values of F, and L, and percent Mexico. to gauge of th Missing how th assumed values for k, or ,t, which I indicate tions by a tilde, the estimated value of the illegal- time. The poste conducted by o immigrant population in year t can be about Bureau approximated as or BL undercount (4) 1-ftI u small number of communities around the as time of the main survey. Since samples for If true undercount rates fall over time and postenumeration surveys differ across survey we fail to account for this, estimatesperiods, of the there is little basis for making timeillegal-migration population will be series biased comparisons in undercount rates. Until public surveys ask about individupwards (U, > U).11 Consider values large-scale for F, and L, in 1996 and 2001 in Bean al. ualet migration status directly, estimating the (2001a, 2001b). If we change the assumption size of the illegal-immigrant population will remain a speculative enterprise. for the 1996-2001 period from a constant illegal undercount rate of 25 percent (which 2.2 Churning in Legal and Illegal is at the upper end of the Bean et al. rates) Immigrant Populations to a reduction in the illegal undercount rate of the stock of illegal immifrom 25 percent to 15 percent (to the Estimates lower end of the Bean et al. rates),12 the estimated grants give little indication of how long unauthorized migrants are likely to remain annual illegal net inflow from Mexico would without fall by 112,000 migrants (from 432,000 to a legal resident visa. Each year, appears to be a large flow of individu320,000), which is 30 percent of the there average from the pool of illegal migrants to the annual estimated illegal inflow over thealsperiod. Since different authors tend to use difpool of permanent legal immigrants. Many ferent postenumeration surveys as the basis immigrants who obtain visas for legal permanent residence (green cards) are at the time for selecting undercount rates, there is little consensus in the literature about what has they obtain their visas residing in the United happened to the undercount of illegal immi- States illegally. Figure 2 shows the number grants over time, other than it exhibiting a of Mexican immigrants awarded legal permanent residence and the fraction of these downward trend. In table 1, the span of estimates for the individuals who are adjusting status. Over illegal-immigrant population in the United the period 1992-2002, status adjusters States is wide. Between 1990 and 2004, the accounted for 56 percent of new legal permanent immigrants from Mexico. Some of estimated average annual net inflow of unauthose adjusting their visa status are tempothorized immigrants ranges from 350,000 to 580,000 individuals, with 55 percent to 80 rary legal immigrants who have succeeded in obtaining permanent entry visas. However, 11 Ignoring interactions in undercount rates, for Mexican immigrants, the majority of those adjusting status to permanent legal residence appear to have been living in the U,-t When the assumed undercount rate United States as illegalwill immigrantsbe (U.S. n is low, this expression upward bias in Department the of estimated Homeland Security 2004). nu grants). This effect will be exagg Further evidence of churning in the pop- undercount 12 In legal this rate for legal ulation of legal exercise, I migrants immigran and illegal immigrants is assume the isavailable held constant at 2 in the New Immigrant Survey This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 877 Figure 2. U.S. Legal Immigration from Mexico (NIS), which in its pilot form includes a ran- of Mexican immigrants who obtained dom sample of 1,134 immigrants who U.S. green cards qualified under family- received U.S. legal permanent resident visas in 1996 (Guillermina Jasso, Massey, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000). Based on the reunification provisions of U.S. immigration law. Since 1965, the United States has granted unrestricted legal entry to the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and restricted legal entry, subject to annual immigration quotas, NIS data, Massey and Nolan J. Malone (2002) find that 54 percent of Mexican nationals who obtained a green card in 1996 reported having entered the United States illegally at an earlier date in time, either by crossing the U.S. border (41 percent) or overstaying a temporary entry visa (13 percent). Overall, 21 percent of U.S. green-card recipients in 1996 reported having crossed the U.S. border illegally and 11 percent reported having overstayed a temporary to more distant relatives of U.S. citizens and relatives of U.S. permanent legal residents. Most applicants take several years or more to clear the queue for a green card.13 While the United States periodically attempts to limit the granting of green cards to those applicants who either have valid temporary 13 Though immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not entry visa. Transitions from illegal to legal residence status indicate that many individuals queuing for U.S. green cards choose to do so as illegal immigrants, rather than waiting out the process as residents of their home coun- tries. Between 1992 and 2004, 90 percent subject to immigration quotas, to obtain a green card they still must screened by immigration authorities, a process that can take as long as two years. The screening process is more protracted for individuals who meet the qualifications for a green card but whose preference category is subject to immigration quotas (e.g., more distant relatives of U.S. citizens and relatives of U.S. legal residents) and can take five years or more (David A. Martin 2005). This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �878 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) entry visas or are residing abroad, the sheer volume of applications has made this provision difficult to enforce (Jessica Vaughan 2003). Consequently, the U.S. government routinely grants green cards to individuals who currently are residing in the country illegally. Massey and Malone (2002) report that prior illegality is more common among those who receive green cards under family- some unauthorized migrants (Hanson 2005). The prospect of a future amnesty is another factor that helps diminish distinctions between legal and illegal migrants. 2.3 Composition of the Legal and Illegal Immigrant Populations A longstanding conception of Mexico-toU.S. migration is that it is driven by the based immigration provisions than under needs and rhythms of agriculture. employment-based immigration provisions. The latter category requires sponsorship by a U.S. employer and applies mostly to highly skilled individuals. Churning in the illegal immigrant population suggests some unauthorized migrants According to this view, most migrants from Mexico are from the countryside, come to the United States to work as farm laborers may view their visa status as mutable. In rural in origin, relatively uneducated, and residing in the United States on an itinerant making the decision to migrate to the United States, individuals in Mexico who have rela- tives that are U.S. legal residents may internalize the prospect of obtaining a U.S. green card in the future. They may consider being an illegal immigrant as simply an intermediate step in becoming a legal permanent resident. The possibility of transitioning from illegal to legal status may blur differences in during peak agricultural months, and return to their families in Mexico for the winter off- season. Migrants would tend to be male, basis. While there is little doubt that at one time this view of Mexican migration was accurate, the Mexican immigrant population in the United States has since become more heterogeneous and more permanent. Large-scale emigration from Mexico began in the early twentieth century. Railroad construction in the late 1800s the expectations and behavior of legal and linked interior Mexico to the U.S. border, illegal migrants. giving U.S. employers improved access to Mexican labor (Cardoso 1980). In the early A second means by which prospective migrants might expect to obtain a U.S. green card is through a future amnesty for illegal aliens. In 1986, the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) awarded permanent legal residence visas to illegal immigrants who could demonstrate either (1) continuous U.S. residence since 1982 or (2) sixty days of employment in U.S. agriculture since 1985. Over the next eight years, 1.6 million illegal immigrants received green cards under the first provision and 1.1 million illegal agricul- tural workers received green cards under the second provision, with Mexican nationals accounting for 2 million of the 2.7 million IRCA legalizations (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 2001). While there is political opposition in the United States to another amnesty, there have been numerous recent legislative proposals to legalize at least 1900s, Texas farmers began to recruit laborers in Mexico. They followed the main rail line into the country, which ran southwest through agricultural states in Mexico's central and western regions. Early migrants from Mexico came primarily from nine Mexican states in this area (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001).14 Migration expanded further in the 1940s, after the U.S. Congress enacted the Bracero Program (1942-64), which allowed U.S. employers to bring in workers from Mexico (and the Caribbean) to fulfill short-term labor contracts (of less than 14 These nine states are Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacin, Nayarit, San Luis Potosi, and Zacatecas. During the period 1944 to 1964, this group of states accounted for 55 percent of migration from Mexico to the United States (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001). This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 879 a year in length). At the end of their contracts, workers were required to return to their home countries. The vast majority of Perhaps as a result of migration networks, current generations of Mexican immigrants in the United States tend to live near indi- braceros worked on U.S. farms (Kitty viduals from their home regions in Mexico. Calavita 1992). At its peak, from 1954 to For instance, Kaivan Munshi (2003) finds 1960, 300,000 to 450,000 migrant workers from Mexico entered the United States that immigrants from the state of Jalisco are much more likely to live in Los Angeles or annually. The end of the Bracero ProgramSan Diego than immigrants from the state marked the beginning of large-scale illegalof Guanajuato, who prefer Chicago or Dallas. Migrants reinforce networks by creimmigration from Mexico.15 ating home-town associations that help After working in the United States, many members of their communities in Mexico braceros returned to Mexico where they assisted later generations in migratingmake the transition to living north of the abroad. They helped establish informal net-border. Of 218 home-town associations works through which earlier migrants helpformed by Mexican immigrants enumerated new migrants enter the United States, findin a 2002 survey of such organizations in housing in U.S. cities, and obtain jobs withsouthern California, 87 percent were associU.S. employers. Networks are often embed-ated with one of the nine west-central states ded in relationships involving family, kin, or that dominated migration to the United community of birth, which gives them States a under the Bracero Program (Gustavo Cano 2004). regional component. Partly as a result, there is strong historical persistence in migration While migration networks are a consistent rates to the United States across Mexican feature of cross-border labor flows, the com- regions. Figure 3 plots emigration rates in position of these flows is not. Since the 1960s, the 1950s against those in the 1990s acrossMexico has urbanized, become a more eduMexico's thirty-two states. Data for the cated nation, and incorporated women into 1950s are from Woodruff and Zenteno the labor force in greater numbers. Cornelius (2001), who calculate the fraction of each (1992) and Cornelius and Enrico A. Marcelli Mexican state's population that migrated(2001) to suggest these changes have shifted the the United States between 1955 and 1959 composition of Mexican migrants in the under the U.S. Bracero Program. Data for United States from sojourners, who follow the 1990s, taken from the 2000 Mexico the harvest season through the rural United States and then return to Mexico at the end Census of Population and Housing, report the fraction of households in a state having aof the year, to settlers, who have a permanent member migrate to the United States presence in U.S. communities. Resisting this between 1995 and 2000. The correlation notion, Durand, Massey, and Zenteno (2001) between state migration rates in the suggest instead that migration to the United 1995-2000 and the 1955-59 periods is 0.73. States remains dominated by men from traFigure 4 shows that most high-migration ditionally agricultural states in Western states are located in central Mexico, which is Mexico. While migrants have become better neither close to the United States nor homeeducated and more urban, they retain strong to Mexico's poorest households. States on ties to Mexico, returning often and tending to the U.S.-Mexico border tend to have low avoid permanent U.S. settlement. emigration rates, as do states in low-income Until recently, it would have been difficult southern Mexico. to muster much more than case-study evidence to evaluate these claims. There are 15 On illegal immigration and guest-worker programs, see Gil S. Epstein, Arye L. Hillman, and Avi Weiss (1999). now several data sources on migrants from Mexico that give details on an individual's This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �880 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) Figure 3. Migration Rates to the U.S. by Mexican States, 1950s and 1990s Figure 4. Migration Rates to the U.S. by Mexican State and Distance to the U.S. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 881 TABLE 2 MIGRANT AND NONMIGRANT MEXICAN NATIONALS, MALES Mexico Migration Project, 1989-1991 In Mexico at Time of Survey 1990 1990 Currently In U.S. at U.S. Mexico All on Last Time of 1989 Census Census Respondents Migration Survey LPS Percent Male 56.2 48.0 48.7 64.7 55.9 57.2 Age 18 to 27 38.5 37.6 34.1 38.4 43.5 33.0 28 to 37 31.9 25.8 29.7 35.7 35.7 42.5 38 to 47 17.1 17.4 19.0 18.1 11.7 16.5 48 to 57 8.2 11.7 10.7 6.7 5.9 5.8 58 Males Years to 67 Aged of 4.4 18 None 7.5 to 6.4 47 9.6 9.2 5.2 1.1 3.8 3.2 2.3 2.1 4.0 Schooling 1 to 4 10.3 17.3 23.4 24.3 15.3 19.7 5 9 to to 12 8 28.0 11 to 17.2 15 30.1 32.5 24.7 31.7 41.4 18.5 11.1 34.3 19.4 12.9 9.3 39.1 23.8 18.4 19.1 18.3 16 plus 3.2 7.7 7.5 1.8 5.6 0.5 Live in Urban Area 91.9 74.8 80.6 74.5 89.2 -In Labor Force 91.0 85.2 95.8 98.6 94.1 95.2 Work in Agriculture 15.5 23.9 28.9 31.2 9.1 11.9 Has Migrated to U.S. -- -- 50.3 100.0 100.0 -Migrate U.S. Last Year -- -- 2.5 0.1 0.1 -Years in 0 U.S. to 6 11 to to 5 28.8 10 20 -- 23.4 35.7 65.6 45.2 36.9 -- 14.8 17.3 -- 15.2 28.2 13.9 20.2 36.3 19.4 6.7 20 plus 12.2 -- 4.5 9.3 6.6 59.9 Sample size, 18-67 96,487 196,729 5,370 722 375 1,670 Sample size, 18-47 83,703 158,917 4,448 666 341 1,535 Migration Project (MMP).17 The MMP is a migration status.16 Perhaps the best known and most utilized source is the Mexican household survey conducted in winter months (when seasonal migrants tend to to Mexico) in 1982 and over the 16A similar source is the National Surveyreturn of Demographic Dynamics (ENADID), conducted by the period 1987 to 1997 in several dozen rural government of Mexico in 1992 and 1997. The ENADID communities in western Mexico, chosen for asks households in Mexico whether any of its members have ever worked in or looked for work in the United States (and the year in which this occurred). In the 1997 ENADID, 9 percent of individuals report having been to the United States and 21 percent of households report having a member in the United States, up from 8 percent and 17 percent in 1992. As with the MMP, the ENADID having high rates of migration to the United States (Massey et al. 1994; Durand et al. 1996). In each community and in each year, the MMP surveyed a random sample of only includes households with at least one member remaining in Mexico. See Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 17 Recent papers using the MMP include Massey and (2001) and David McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) for work Espinosa (1997), Belinda I. Reyes (1997), Munshi (2003), using the ENADID and Cornelius and Marcelli (2001) Christina Gathmann (2004), Pia M. Orrenius and and Durand, Massey, and Zenteno (2001) for discussions of other surveys. Madeline Zavodny (2005), and McKenzie and Rapoport (2004). This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �882 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) several hundred households, collecting infor- mation on past migration behavior of each household member.18 An advantage of the MMP is that it allows one to construct retro- spective migration histories on a reasonably large sample of individuals.19 Among male household heads, 23 percent report having migrated to the United States within three years of being surveyed (during the period all respondents; (b) those who report residing in the United States but who are present in Mexico at the time of the MMP survey (seasonal migrants); and (c) those in the United States at the time of the MMP sur- vey (permanent migrants), whose responses are provided by other members of their household in Mexico. 1984 to 1996). Of those reporting hav- While Mexican immigrants in the United States (census immigrants) and MMP per- ing migrated over the period 1970 to 1990, 89 manent migrants have relatively similar percent state that on their first trip to the United States they entered without documents (McKenzie and Rapoport 2004). The MMP is subject to several potential problems associated with how migrants and communities are selected into the sample. Since communities included in the MMP characteristics, they differ considerably from MMP seasonal migrants. Males account for 65 percent of MMP seasonal migrants, but only 56 percent of census immigrants and MMP permanent immigrants. And, while age profiles are similar among the three groups, educational attainment is not. Males are chosen on the basis of being rural and with nine or more years of schooling account having residents with high migration for 52 percent of census immigrants and 48 propensities, they are unlikely to be reprepercent of MMP permanent migrants, but sentative of Mexico as a whole (McKenzie only 31 percent of MMP seasonal migrants. and Rapoport 2004). Within communities,Employment patterns also differ across the households surveyed are those with at groups. Among males, 16 percent of census immigrants and 9 percent of MMP permaleast one member remaining in Mexico, thus excluding households that have migrated to nent migrants work in agriculture, compared the United States in their entirety. And, to 31 percent of MMP seasonal migrants. within households, the migrants surveyed Seasonal migrants also appear to be less estab- directly are those who have returned to lished in the United States. For males, 55 perMexico, for at least part of the year. There cent of MMP seasonal migrants have spent more than five years in the United States, compared to 71 percent of census immigrants residing in the United States. One way to evaluate the issue of sampleand 63 percent of MMP permanent migrants. selection in the MMP is to compare individFor each of these comparisons, results are are no direct observations on individuals similar for females. uals in the survey with individuals in Mexico's Census of Population and Housing and with Over time, Mexican immigrants have Mexican immigrants in the U.S. Census ofshifted out of agriculture as a main industry Population and Housing. Tables 2 and 3 proof U.S. employment. Using data from the U.S. census, Card and Lewis (forthcoming) vide summary statistics for working-age adults in the 1990 U.S. and Mexico censuses show that between 1990 and 2000, among and in the 1989, 1990, and 1991 MMP sur-recent Mexican immigrants (0-5 years in the United States), the share working in agriculveys. I consider three MMP subsamples: (a) ture fell from 23 percent to 15 percent for men and from 13 percent to 7 percent for 18 Different households are surveyed in different years, such that the MMP is a repeated cross-sections of women. Among men, construction accounthouseholds and not a true panel. ed for the largest growth in employment 19 On measurement error in retrospective data, see shares, Megan Beckett et al. (2001) and Smith and Duncan Thomas (2003). while among women retail trade showed the largest increase. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 883 TABLE 3 MIGRANT AND NONMIGRANT MEXICAN NATIONALS, FEMALES Mexico Migration Project, 1989-1991 In Mexico at Time of Survey 1990 U.S. Census 1990 Mexico Census Respondents 43.8 52.0 51.3 35.3 44.1 42.8 Percent Female Age 18 to 27 All Currently In U.S. at Migration Survey on Last Time of 1989 LPS 33.0 38.0 35.0 35.5 43.2 31.9 28 to 37 31.4 26.1 29.3 37.1 33.5 42.0 38 to 47 18.9 17.0 18.6 21.3 16.6 16.8 48 to 57 10.4 11.5 10.7 5.6 4.4 6.6 58 to 67 6.3 7.6 6.5 0.5 2.4 2.7 Years of None 8.5 12.7 6.6 3.0 5.1 4.6 Schooling 1 to 4 9.8 18.8 25.9 18.7 13.8 18.7 Females Aged 18 to 47 5 to 8 28.3 31.4 35.4 56.2 35.5 43.0 9 to 11 16.2 24.8 16.8 12.4 23.8 18.4 12 to 15 34.0 8.0 11.9 7.6 28.3 15.9 3.3 4.4 3.5 2.2 2.2 0.6 92.7 75.8 80.6 70.8 88.8 56.7 26.6 28.8 35.7 47.5 61.3 7.9 2.3 2.4 2.2 6.6 4.1 2.6 3.3 1.7 1.6 2.1 16 plus Live in Urban Area In Labor Force Work in Agriculture Children Ever Born Own Children in HH Has Migrated to US Migrated U.S. Last Year Years in U.S. 0 to 5 _-_ -__ --_ 1.8 1.0 2.2 18.6 100.0 100.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 26.2 58.1 44.3 41.5 10.7 6 to 10 20.9 17.5 17.6 16.5 11.1 11 to 20 37.3 18.7 28.9 29.2 4.7 20 plus 15.6 5.7 9.2 12.7 73.5 Sample size, 18-67 Sample size, 18-47 76,518 212,912 5,658 63,278 172,458 4,688 394 296 1,248 370 276 1,132 Note: Table 2 gives summary statistics on working-age adult residents of Mexico (1990 Mexico Census of Population and States (1990 U.S. Census of Population and Housing); respond Survey (all respondents, those residing in United States but in in United States at the time of the survey whose responses illegal immigrants from Mexico in the United States who qu Reform and Control Act (1989 Legalized Persons Survey). Th than 2,500 inhabitants. Other surveys of illegal immigrants from legal granted permanent Mexico also suggest their characteristics arethe a United States under more similar to permanent migrants (whether of IRCA (eligibility for wh in the U.S. census or the than seasonof MMP) U.S. residence from 19 al migrants. The Legalized Persons Survey LPS consisted of an initial s (LPS) covered illegal immigrants who werein 199 a follow-up survey This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �884 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) qualifying for legalization.20 Among working-age adults in the LPS, shown in tables 2 and 3, 57 percent of Mexican immigrants are appears unrepresentative of Mexican immigrants in the United States. When examining results using the MMP, one should be mind- ful that they may apply only to seasonal migrants who return to Mexico with high ture. frequency and not to the general population of Mexican migrants. In sum, data sources that include illegal male, 37 percent had nine or more years of schooling, and 12 percent worked in agricul- immigrants are almost by definition subject to 2.4 Attempted Illegal Immigration sample-selection problems. Official sources, such as the population census, are likely to The majority of unauthorized immigrants undersample illegal immigrants, given theirfrom Mexico enter the United States by tendency to undercount low-income house-crossing the U.S.-Mexico border illegally.21 holds. Surveys that specifically target illegalThe U.S. government devotes vast resources immigrants, such as the MMP or the LPS, to policing U.S. borders, airports, and ports of explicitly select respondents on the basis ofentry. Between 1980 and 2004, real expendiobserved characteristics (e.g., residence in a ture on border enforcement increased by high-migration community, eligibility for an over six times and in 2005 will equal $2.2 bilamnesty). Yet, despite conflicting selectionlion (Hanson 2005). U.S. border-enforcement criteria, available data sources paint a con- activities provide a glimpse into the highsistent picture of Mexican immigrants in the frequency properties of illegal immigration. United States, suggesting they include aThe first line of defense against unauthorized high proportion of women, are overwhelm-entry is the U.S. Border Patrol. Border Patrol ingly employed outside agriculture, haveofficers on "linewatch" duty patrol the bor- high education levels (relative to nonmi-der, maintain electronic surveillance of major grants in Mexico), and have established acrossing points along the border, and staff long-term U.S. presence. traffic checkpoints along major highways this conclusion is the MMP sample of sea- Border Patrol officer hours devoted to One data source that is inconsistent with near the border. Figure 5 shows annual sonal migrants-individuals who reside in linewatch duty from 1964 to 2003. Officer the United States but return to Mexico in the winter months. Since MMP seasonal hours increased dramatically in the 1990s, rising from 2.5 million in 1994 to 9.8 million in 2001. This increase was due primarily to migrants are selected on the basis of having stepped up enforcement efforts at urban returned to Mexico, it is hardly surprising crossing points in California and Texas. that they fit the profile of itinerant migrant Concurrent with increased enforcement, laborers. Relative to other samples of legal apprehensions of those attempting illegal and illegal immigrants, MMP seasonal entry have increased, rising from 280,000 a migrants are disproportionately male, unedyear ucated, and agricultural. While much of the during the 1970s to 930,000 a year durliterature based on the MMP uses the inforing the 1990s. Individuals apprehended by mation on seasonal migrants to exam- Border Patrol officers on linewatch duty are ine Mexico-to-U.S. migration, this sample typically captured while trying to enter the United States or just after entering the country. Linewatch apprehensions are thus 20 The initial survey was of 6,193 respondents, of whom 5,691 had received amnesty by 1992 (with most of the rest awaiting decision). Of those granted amnesty, 82 percent were located for the follow-up interview. The LPS sample immigrants but more common among those from other Agricultural Worker provision of IRCA. countries, is to enter the United States on a temporary visa and then remain in the country after it expires. excluded those granted amnesty under the Special 21 A second strategy, less common among Mexican This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 885 Figure 5. Linewatch Apprehensions and Enforcement by the U.S. Border Patrol correlated with the contemporaneous level To gauge how apprehensions might be of attempted illegal immigration.22 However, related to illegal immigration, consider the apprehensions are likely to be a poor indica- level of apprehensions as a function of the average probability of apprehension tor of the actual level of illegal inflows (Espenshade 1995). Within a single month, one individual may be apprehended multiple times. Those apprehended who agree to be deported voluntarily are not processed by the U.S. justice system. For Mexican nationals, voluntary deportation often involves little more than a bus ride across the border, leav- ing them in position to attempt illegal entry again in the near future.23,24 22 Individuals apprehended in the U.S. interior, in contrast, could have crossed the border at a much earlier date, making interior apprehensions less strongly correlated with current attempts at illegal entry. 23 Between 1990 and 2003, 95 percent of those the Border Patrol apprehended agreed to depart voluntarily. 24 A further issue is that the majority of those attempt- ing illegal entry do not appear to be apprehended on any given attempt. Using MMP data, Massey and Audrey Singer (1995) find that for trips to the United States in the 1970s and 1980s the average probability of apprehension was 35 percent. and the number of attempts at illegal entry. Extending Wilfred J. Ethier's (1986) model, let (5) s where At is the number th o P(Ht, Mt) is th vidual is appr to cross the probability with is which a a and the numb enforcement sion probabili H,. For a give total attempts ability any sin (since This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms enforc �886 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) United States. In late 2001, the U.S. Border more thinly across those attempting entry), making P(.) decreasing in M,. 25 Patrol increased its vigilance at border cross- Suppose P(H,,M,) = cHa' M-t,, where c, a, and a2 are positive constants, in which case log apprehensions can be expressed as migrants from crossing as frequently as they had in the past.27 (6) InA, = ao + alnH, + 1 - a2)ln4M Hanson and Antonio Spilimbergo (1999) use monthly data over the period 1968-96 to esti- mate equation (6), modeling attempted illegal entry as a reduced-form function of real wages in Mexico, real wages in the United States, other indicators of economic conditions in the two countries, a time trend, and monthly dummy variables.26 With an estimate of a,, we can solve for a function that is an affine transformation of InMt, given by ings, which may have dissuaded some The trend in figure 6 is roughly consistent with table 1 and results from previous estimates of the U.S. unauthorized population. Illegal immigration appears to have risen steadily after the end of the Bracero Program in 1965 and has been relatively stable at high levels for the past two decades.28 I will return to data on border apprehensions and enforcement when evaluating fac- tors that affect the level of illegal immigration and the political economy of U.S. policy on illegal immigration. (7) a0 + (1 - a2)lnM, = InA, - allnH, 2.5 Summary The expression on the right of (7) will posi- Currently, no data source gives precise estimates of the size of the U.S. illegal- tively covary with InMt as long as a2 < 1. Approximated attempts at illegal entry in (7) do not give an estimate of the level of illegal immigration. However, they may indicate the variation across time and the magnitude of log changes in attempted illegal entry. Figure 6 shows estimates of (7), based on instrumental-variables estimates of equation (6) (see note 26). Approximated attempts at illegal entry rise from the 1960s to the mid1980s, are stable from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, and then decline somewhat in 2000 and 2001. Part of the 2001 decline may reflect a change in border-crossing activity after the events of September 11th in the 25 For earlier work using apprehensions data, see Bean et al. (1990) and Borjas, Richard B. Freeman, and Kevin Lang (1991). 26 To deal with the possible correlation between enforcement and unobserved shocks to apprehensions, Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) instrument for enforce- ment using U.S. government spending on national defense and indicators for whether there is an upcoming U.S. presidential, congressional, or border-state gubernatorial election. Border enforcement tends to follow a polit- ical cycle, dropping during election years (Hanson, Raymond Robertson, and Spilimbergo 2002). The reported coefficient estimate for a, is the long-run elasticity of apprehensions with respect to enforcement. immigrant population over medium or long time spans. Government data-gathering agencies have been wary of asking questions about an individual's immigration status, perhaps out of fear of dissuading illegal migrants from participating in surveys. The result is gaps in our knowledge about unauthorized migrants, which the literature has been able to partially fill in through other data sources. The perspective that emerges from the data that are available is that Mexico-to-U.S. illegal migration increased in the 1970s and 1980s and averaged around 200,000 to 300,000 net unauthorized entries per year in the 1990s and early 2000s. The population of illegal immigrants from Mexico in the 27 See Mary Jordan, "Mexicans Caught at Border in Falling Numbers," Washington Post, May 24, 2002. 28 One limitation of this exercise is that I assume border-crossing technology and border-apprehensions technology have been stable over time. There is anecdotal evidence that both may have changed considerably, especially since September, 2001. However, Hanson and Spilimnbergo (1999) find no evidence of a structural break in the apprehensions function for the 1968 to 1996 period. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 887 Figure 6. Estimated Attempts at Illegal Entry along the U.S.-Mexico Border United States includes a substantial fraction of women, is predominantly employed in nonagricultural jobs, and has schooling levels that are comparable to or higher than nonmigrating individuals in Mexico. Though many migrants maintain ties with family members in their origin communities, a majority appear to have settled in the United States on a medium or long-term basis. 3. The Supply of and Demand for Mexican Immigrants of future earnings, discount rates, and perceived cost of migrating. The cost of unau- thorized migration includes transport to the border, the physical risks and monetary charges incurred in crossing the border illegally, the psychic penalty from leaving one's friends and family behind, and the time and monetary expense of settling in another country. To uncover sources of variation in the demand for and the supply of illegal migrants, recent work estimates the sensitivity of migrant outflows from Mexico to variation in U.S. and Mexican wages, border-crossing costs, and access to Beginning with Larry A. Sjaastad (1962), economists have viewed migration as an investment decision. An individual migrates if the expected discounted difference in the migration networks. Also beginning with Sjaastad, economists tend to model the migration decision as irreversible (Greenwood 1997; Lucas 1997). stream of income between the new and old In many contexts, this assumption may be location exceeds moving costs. The incentive reasonable. U.S. legal immigrants, if they to migrate will vary across individuals wish to keep their green cards valid, must according to differences in their expectations make the United States their permanent This content downloaded from ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �888 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) residence.29 Those migrating to the United States legally would thus tend to be individuals expecting to stay in the country for an extended period of time. In the context of illegal migration from Mexico, individuals may operate on shorter time horizons. The substantial round-trip migration documented by the MMP indicates that for at least some Mexican nationals the cost of moving First, consider the components of illegal migration costs. Of these, transport costs to the border are likely to be small and psychic costs difficult to evaluate. Border-crossing costs and settlement costs are in principle measurable, though it is only the former that has been subject to much in the way of formal research. To avoid capture by the U.S. Border Patrol, migrants often pur- back and forth across the border is suffi- chase the services of a smuggler, known as a coyote.30 Coyotes offer a range of services, ciently low to warrant making the trip annufrom simply guiding migrants across the ally. Of interest to both Mexico and the United border to more complete packages that States is not just the volume of migrant flows include transport to an interior U.S. city, but their composition. Widening differences in earnings between immigrants and natives Phoenix.31 The MMP is one of the few data in the United States is cited as evidence that sources that asks migrants from Mexico recent U.S. immigrants are negatively select- about their border-crossing behavior. Using ed in terms of skill (Borjas 1999a). Following this line of thought, one might expect negative selection to be especially strong among illegal immigrants. Recent work examines migrant selection by comparing the charac- teristics of Mexican immigrants in the United States with those of nonmigrating individuals in Mexico. 3.1 The Incentive to Migrate from Mexico to the United States A long line of research applies the general framework in Sjaastad (1962) to examine the sensitivity of migration flows to the observed costs and benefits of migrating. For prospec- tive illegal migrants in Mexico, the costs include the four components identified above and the benefits include gains in real income associated with moving from low- wage Mexico to the high-wage United States. such as Houston, Los Angeles, or MMP data, Orrenius (2001) documents that, during the period 1978 to 1996, 69 percent of migrants reported hiring a coyote, as shown in figure 7.32 During this peri- od, the average price paid for coyote services varied between $385 and $715 ( in 2000 dollars). Since 2001, when the Border Patrol became more vigilant in monitoring U.S. border crossing points, coyote prices have risen. Based on a 2005 survey of return migrants in rural areas of two Mexican 30 Coyotes also help migrants navigate unfamiliar terrain. Recent changes in U.S. enforcement strategy have made it more difficult to cross the border in urban areas, encouraging migrants to enter the United States through the mountainous desert regions of Arizona and Eastern California, where temperature extremes expose migrants to physical risks. Annual deaths of border crossers have increased from an average of 100 during the mid 1990s to 410 during the period 2000-2004 (Cornelius 2005). With net annual illegal immigration from Mexico since 2000 at approximately 300,000 individuals (see table 1), there appear to be around 1.4 deaths per 1,000 successful net unauthorized migrants. 31 For the more expensive complete package of smuggling services, the coyote typically receives a portion of the fee up front and the remaining portion once the migrant is 29 A green-card holder may lose U.S. permanent resident status by taking permanent residence abroad, remaining abroad without obtaining a reentry visa, or by filing a foreign tax return as a nonimmigrant. Once a legal immigrant becomes U.S. citizens, he or she is free to enter and leave the country at will. safely delivered to friends or family members in the United States. See Charlie LeDuff, "The Crossing: A Special Report; A Perilous 4,000 Mile Passage to Work," New York Times, May 29, 2001, p. 1. 32 To reduce recall bias, I only show data for years within four of years of an MMP survey. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 889 Figure 7. Use of Smugglers by Migrants in the Mexican Migration Project states (that are also in the MMP), Cornelius (2005) finds that between the 1996-98 and 2002-04 periods average coyote prices rose by 37 percent from $1180 to $1680.33 One might be concerned that coyote prices based on MMP data are biased downwards. As mentioned in the last section, the hiring a smuggler in 2004 report using friends or family to find a coyote. Results using the MMP itself are consistent with concerns about bias in observed coyote prices. Gathmann (2004) finds that migrants with family members in the United States are less likely to use coyote services and, MMP surveys households in communities among migrants who do hire a smuggler, with high rates of migration to the United those with family members abroad pay lower prices. Yet, even if one accepts the high coy- States. Individuals in these communities ote prices quoted in the press,34 bordermay have relatively good access to migration networks, making them less dependent on crossing costs since 2001 appear to be no coyote services or better able to negotiate more than $2,000, which is 35 percent of lower prices from smugglers. Cornelius Mexico's 2003 per capita GDP. (2005) reports that 65 percent of migrants 34 Recent articles in the popular press give a price range for coyote services of $1,500-$2,000 ("Man Accused 33 The increase in prices is based on respondents recolof Smuggling Immigrants," The Oregonian, September 17, lections in 2005 of prices they paid in previous years and 2005, p. B2; "US Immigration," The Economist, May 19, thus may be subject to recall bias. In 2005, 90 percent2005; of "Between Here and There," The Economist, July 5, respondents in Cornelius's data (all of whom are from 2001; the "Illegal Immigration; Border Agents Understand a states of Jalisco or Zacatecas) report using a coyote on their Complex Issue," The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 26, previous trip to the United States. 2005, p. B12). This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �890 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) Next, consider the benefits to migration. To calculate the gross return to migration, one would need to account for the expected in the migration incentive. Yet, since their specification is a reduced form, the coeffi- cient estimates do not allow one to recover length of stay in the United States, the expect- the elasticity of migration with respect to ed path of future earnings, and the discount rate applied to these earnings. In the absence of data on these components, much of the research on the decision to migrate takes a reduced-form approach to modeling how the returns to migration affect behavior.35 Using retrospective data from the MMP, Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) estimate the hazard that young males migrate to the United States as a function of individual and household characteristics and economic conditions in the two wage differentials between the United States and Mexico. Further, since the MMP is restricted to communities with historically high propensities to migrate to the United States, the results may not be informative about how prospective migrants in other regions of Mexico respond to changes in binational economic conditions. To examine how the gross level of attempted illegal migration responds to changes in U.S.-Mexican wages, Hanson countries.36 In the MMP, most migrants and Spilimbergo (1999) estimate an appre- appear to be entering the United States illegally. The migration hazard is nonmonotonic in schooling, increasing at low and medium hensions function, similar to that in equation (6). Using monthly data, they regress appre- hensions at the U.S.-Mexico border on schooling levels (primary and secondary lagged apprehensions, current and lagged school) and decreasing at higher schooling linewatch enforcement hours, the real peso levels (preparatory school and beyond).37 The wage for production workers in Mexican hazard is decreasing in per capita GDP in industry, real peso and real dollar U.S. wages (measured as the weighted average of wages Mexico and increasing in U.S. average wages. These results suggest that migrants tend to be drawn from the middle of the schooling dis- tribution and that migration is more likely during periods when U.S. income is expanding relative to income in Mexico. The migra- tion hazard is also higher for individuals whose fathers have migrated or whose siblings have migrated. This result could indicate the presence of family migration networks, or in U.S. industries that employ recent Mexican immigrants in large numbers), and other controls. They instrument for enforcement using U.S. government spending on national defense and indicators for whether there is an upcoming U.S. presidential, congressional, or border-state gubernatorial election (see note 26). Figure 8 shows a partial regression plot of log apprehensions on log Mexican real it could indicate the presence of unobserved household characteristics (e.g., unmeasured average hourly earnings, based on Hanson and Spilimbergo's estimates. Border appre- wealth) that influence migration behavior. hensions appear to be very responsive to changes in Mexican wages. A 10 percent By treating migration as a function of age, education, and other individual characteris- decline in Mexican real wages is associated tics, Orrenius and Zavodny pick up variation across individuals in the incentive to with a 6-8 percent percent increase in border apprehensions. Moreover, this effect is almost fully realized within three months following a migrate. By also including macroeconomic wage change, suggesting that shocks to the conditions, they pick up time-series variation Mexican economy are rapidly transmitted to changes in attempted illegal migration. 35 In earlier work, J. Edward Taylor (1987) examines migration behavior in a single rural community in Mexico.Over the past three decades, Mexico has 36 See also Oded Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) and experienced wide variation in real income, as Massey and Espinosa (1997). periodic devaluations of the peso have lead 37 McKenzie and Rapoport (2004), who also use MMP data, obtain similar results. to bursts of inflation, which have caused This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 891 Figure 8. Border Apprehensions and Average Wages in Mexico Figure 9. Border Apprehensions and U.S.-Mexico Relative Per Capita Income This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �892 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) incomes to fall sharply. Figure 9, which plots relative per capita GDP in the United States how long a migrant from Mexico would have to work in the United States in order to and Mexico, gives evidence of this volatility. recoup border-crossing costs, as approximat- During three separate episodes in the last ed by the price of coyote services. I focus on males, since, as tables 2 and 3 show, there are declined by five log points or more (relative large differences in labor-force participation rates between women in Mexico and thirty years, Mexico's per capita GDP to the United States) within the space of three years. Each of these episodes was followed by an increase in border apprehensions. Much of the research on interregional migration in the United States and other countries finds that it is labor earnings in the receiving region, and not the sending Mexican immigrant women in the United States, which complicates comparing female wage outcomes across national borders. By limiting the analysis to current wage differ- ences and a single component of migration costs, this exercise falls well short of a com- region, that appear to drive migration flows plete cost-benefit accounting of the migra- appear to be the case in Mexico, where tion decision. Still, given large back and forth flows of labor across the U.S.-Mexico bor- (Greenwood 1997). However, this does not income volatility appears to be a strong push der, the current U.S.-Mexico wage differen- factor for illegal migration. tial is likely to be the relevant gross return to While apprehensions are the only avail- migration for at least some prospective able high-frequency measure of gross migrants. have important limitations. Since individual Table 4 reports average hourly earnings by age and schooling categories for males in attempts at illegal migration, these data migrants may be apprehended multiple times in a given time period, the number of apprehensions may far exceed the gross number of migrants (Espenshade 1995). Controlling for border enforcement addresses this problem, but only if one has valid instruments for enforcement (since enforcement is likely to be endogenous to shocks to attempted illegal migration) and if the impact of enforcement on apprehen- sions (controlling for the incentive to migrate) is stable over time (see notes 26 and 28). 3.2 U.S.-Mexico Wage Differences Mexico (based on the 2000 Mexico Census of Population and Housing) and for immigrant males from Mexico in the United States (based on the 2000 U.S. Census of Population and Housing).38 To increase the share of illegal immigrants among Mexican immigrant men, I limit the sample to very recent immigrants (individuals residing in the United States for 0-3 years). To adjust for cost of living differences between the countries, I scale up Mexican hourly wages to achieve purchasing power parity with the United States, using the 2000 PPP adjustment factor for Mexico in the Penn World Tables.39 The reduced-form results of Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) and Hanson and tude of the returns themselves. As a crude 38 For Mexico, average hourly wages are calculated as monthly labor income/(4.5 x hours worked last week); for the United States, average hourly wages are calculated as annual labor income/(weeks worked last year x usual hours worked per week). For Mexico, I need to assume individuals work all weeks of a month, which could bias wage estimates downwards. To avoid measurement error associated approximation of the short-run gross return to migration, I examine differences in hourly wages for men in Mexico and Mexican immigrant men in the United States in 2000. I ask with implausibly low wage values or with top coding of earnings, I drop the largest and smallest 0.5 percent of wage values. 39 In 2000, Mexico's PPP-adjusted price level was 61 percent of the U.S. price level. Spilimbergo (1999) suggest that illegal migration flows are highly responsive to changes in the return to migration. However, these results give no indication of the magni- This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 893 TABLE 4 AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES FOR MEXICAN MALES, 2000 Years of Schooling Completed Age 4 5 to 8 9 to 11 12 13 to 15 16+ Mexican 18 to 22 7.83 7.60 7.45 8.07 8.76 8.44 Immigrants 23 to 27 8.44 8.19 8.21 9.06 9.53 13.02 in U.S. 28 to 32 8.27 8.56 8.70 9.66 9.56 15.69 33 to 37 9.46 9.25 9.34 10.07 11.36 16.84 38 to 42 9.19 9.39 9.33 11.01 12.11 16.26 43 to 47 9.75 8.90 9.35 10.68 12.80 15.88 48 to 52 9.57 9.37 9.42 9.31 11.65 17.78 Residents 18 to 22 1.36 1.56 1.76 2.06 2.61 3.91 of Mexico 23 to 27 1.43 1.80 2.10 2.79 3.77 5.20 28 to 32 1.56 1.93 2.42 3.22 4.80 33 to 37 1.65 2.08 2.56 3.45 5.25 6.63 7.07 38 to 42 1.64 2.14 2.88 3.74 5.62 7.42 43 to 47 1.69 2.30 3.00 4.40 5.86 8.05 48 to 52 1.66 2.30 3.15 4.21 6.11 8.71 Note: Table shows average hourly wages in 2000 or male residents of Mexico who report workin 0.5 percent of wage values are excluded). Data f microsample of the XIII Censo General de Pobla percent U.S. PUMS in 2000. Mexican immigrants States for three years or less. See the text on the Not surprisingly,high-migration wages are substanti states Mexico as a whole. higher among Mexican immigrants in United States than In among table 5, resident the log b Mexico. For 23-27 ence year-old males, the declines with sc adjusted hourly wage differential varies f with empirical resea $7.01 for those with 0-4 yearsreturns of schoolin estimated to Mexico. In the $5.76 for those with 13-15 years of 1990s schoo to $7.82 for those with 16 or year more of y an additional of schooling. Given that migration pro with an increase in w ties vary widely across regions grant men of ofMexico 2.5 t might think that the average hourly wag 1996; Trejo 1997; Jef 2002).may In the i the country as a whole not1990s be the and vant alternative wage for mostyear prosp an additional of migrants. Table 5 reports wage differe with an increase in w between the United States and high-m 9.7 log points (Dan tion states in Mexico, defined to be st Returns to experie with above-average 2000.40 emigration rat 41wage On the returns to ed U.S.-Mexico differentials Michael Ian Cragg and Mar Airola and Chinhui Juhn (2 40 These states are Aguascalientes, Colima, Dur schooling are correlated, es Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mich may be biased. Also, self-se Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi, Zac into migration may and introdu This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �894 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) TABLE 5 LOG U.S.-MEXICO HOURLY WAGE DIFFERENTIAL, MALES IN 2000 Years of Schooling Completed Age 4 5 to 8 9 to 11 12 13 to 15 16+ Log of U.S.-Mexico Wage Differential, All Males in 18 to 22 1.263 1.098 0.985 0.895 0.750 0.361 (0.022) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.042) (0.099) 23 to 27 1.281 1.043 0.904 0.746 0.507 0.387 (0.024) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.038) (0.048) 28 to 32 1.225 1.036 0.821 0.652 0.306 0.357 (0.029) (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.047) (0.052) 33 to 37 1.258 1.025 0.823 0.613 0.339 0.294 (0.034) (0.023) (0.034) (0.031) (0.057) (0.059) 38 to 42 1.287 1.019 0.775 0.575 0.288 0.216 (0.035) (0.029) (0.045) (0.043) (0.068) (0.075) 43 to 47 1.265 0.905 0.708 0.498 0.275 0.118 (0.040) (0.037) (0.063) (0.063) (0.103) (0.116) 48 to 52 1.264 0.987 0.715 0.418 0.164 0.122 (0.050) (0.046) (0.096) (0.076) (0.122) (0.142) Log of U.S.-Mexico Wage Differential, Males in High-Migration States 18 to 22 1.188 1.061 0.989 0.912 0.676 0.381 (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025) (0.052) (0.128) 23 to 27 1.211 1.013 0.895 0.722 0.481 0.425 (0.027) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) (0.050) (0.052) 28 to 32 1.144 1.011 0.824 0.657 0.361 0.415 (0.031) (0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.057) (0.053) 33 to 37 1.151 0.988 0.821 0.652 0.317 0.411 (0.035) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) (0.061) (0.060) 38 to 42 1.206 0.966 0.792 0.601 0.185 0.291 (0.036) (0.030) (0.044) (0.046) (0.070) (0.073) 43 to 47 1.194 0.867 0.671 0.528 0.237 0.181 (0.041) (0.037) (0.061) (0.067) (0.101) (0.112) 48 to 52 1.193 0.961 0.727 0.292 0.284 0.227 (0.049) (0.045) (0.092) (0.080) (0.125) (0.137) Notes: Table shows the log difference in average hourly wages (and standard err Mexican immigrant males and male residents of Mexico. The top half of the tab includes all regions of Mexico; the bottom half includes only high-migration sta table 4 and the text for details. higher for Mexican residents than for Mexican immigrants. Higher returns to education in Mexico are consistent with the In 2000, a 23-27 year-old recent Mexican migrant with 5 to 8 years of schooling (the category just below the national mean level of country having a low relative supply ofschooling for Mexico) would recoup borderskilled labor compared to the United States. crossing costs of $2,000 in 313 hours, or 7.8 Higher average wages in the United States weeks based on a forty-hour work week. The (within schooling groups) are consistent with speed with which migrants would seem to the country having a higher relative level ofrecover border-crossing costs suggests that TFP and higher relative supplies of physical other costs to migration (including psychic costs and financing costs associated with capital. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 895 credit constraints) are large. In a simple stat- ic model, the equilibrium wage differential between two countries is fixed by migration costs. To reconcile persistent U.S.-Mexico wage differences with small border-crossing costs, there would need to be positive unobserved migration costs (otherwise migration flows would be larger) and heterogeneity across individuals in these costs (otherwise migration flows would be lumpier, with either everyone or no one in a skill group willing to migrate). There are reasons to be skeptical about how well the observed U.S.-Mexico wage differ- What is surprising, perhaps, is that the estimated wage premium for legalization is so small. One might expect that being confined to the underground economy would substantially limit workers' employment prospects. Once legalized, they would enjoy strong wage growth. By this reasoning, a 6log-point gain over three years is unimpressive. One possibility is that the three years covered by the LPS is not long enough for individuals to realize the wage benefits associated with gaining legal status. Legalization may open up new opportunities to move between occupations or between regions, ential captures the incentive to migrate. This differential reflects the binational difference which migrants need more time to exploit. in returns to both observed and unobserved Cobb-Clark's estimate is biased downwards. characteristics. If migrants are positively selected in terms of unobserved skill, observed wage differences will tend to overstate true wage differences. In the next section, we address the issue of which types of individuals in Mexico select into migration. Another issue is that, since average wages for Mexican immigrants in the United States are a composite of wages for legal and illegal immigrants, they may overstate wages an illegal immigrant would expect to earn. Sherrie A. Kossoudji and Deborah A. CobbClark (2002) use the LPS to compare wages for illegal immigrants before and after they obtained green cards under the amnesty pro- vision of the 1986 IRCA. Between 1989 and Another possibility is that Kossoudji and Their control group includes legal and illegal immigrants from Latin America, as well as second and later generation Latin American immigrants. Suppose illegal immigrants are more negatively selected in terms of unobserved skill than legal immigrants (where overall legal immigrants may be positively or negatively selected in terms of skill). In an economy where the return to skill is rising (as in the United States during the 1990s), stronger negative selection of illegal immigrants in terms of unobserved skill would tend to make their unobserved wage growth relatively small and lead one to underestimate the wage premium due to legalization. The differential in U.S. and Mexican 1992, average hourly earnings for newly legalized immigrant men (64 percent of wages in table 5 may also miss important whom were Mexican nationals) rose by 6 log points relative to earnings for Latino men in the NLSY, controlling for observable characteristics. Also, prior to legalization, illegal- incentive to migrate. For instance, average wages for Mexican immigrants in the United States may hide heterogeneity in expecta- immigrant men had relatively slow wage growth. Not surprisingly, illegal status is asso- ciated with lower wages and less opportunity for occupational advancement (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 1996, 2000).42 sources of variation across individuals in the tions about U.S. wages among prospective migrants. Individuals with previous U.S. labor-market experience or who speak English well might have relatively strong wage expectations due to the ease with illegal immigrants. For other work on the wage consequences which they expect to find a U.S. job or the high productivity they anticipate having on the job. Though not specific to Mexico, Hoyt Bleakley and Aimee Chin (2004) find that, of IRCA, see Cynthia Bansak and Steven Raphael (2001). for immigrants from non-English-speaking 42 Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz (1999), who also uses the LPS, estimates larger wage differences between legal and This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �896 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) countries that arrived in the United States as wage differentials are large today and have children, wages are higher for those with stronger English-language skills.43 Another source of heterogeneity in wage expectations among prospective migrants is variation in access to migration networks. Individuals with friends or family that have migrated abroad may have better information about how to find a job in the United States. Munshi (2003), using data from the MMP, finds that Mexican migrants in the been large for over a century (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001). The emerging United States are more likely to be employed and more likely to be employed in a (higher-paying) nonagricultural job the larger is the U.S. population of residents from their origin community in Mexico.44 He instruments for the time-varying size of the U.S. population from a migrant's origin community in Mexico using lagged rainfall in the migrant's origin community (which literature on migration networks suggests that networks arise in response to hidden migration costs associated with finding employment and getting settled abroad. William J. Carrington, Enrica Detragiache, and Tara Vishwanath (1996) develop a model of regional labor movements in which migration networks lead migrant flows to be sluggish initially, when the migrant population is small, and then to accelerate over time, as migration costs endogenously fall in response to past migration. Imperfect credit markets, which we discuss in the next sec- tion, are another explanation for sluggish migration. 3.3 The Selection of Migrants from Mexico presumably affects the marginal productivity In an important body of work, Borjas of labor in Mexican agriculture and so the (1987, 1991) argues that who migrates to the United States from a particular country will depend on that country's wage distribution. In a country with high returns to skill and incentive to migrate abroad). His results suggest that having a larger network improves a migrant's ability to assimilate economically in the United States. Migration high wage dispersion, as in Mexico, there networks appear to be organized around will be negative selection of migrants. Those families. Among nonagricultural (agricultur- al) workers, 78 percent (74 percent) with the greatest incentive to migrate to the United States will be individuals with below- received assistance in finding a U.S. job and, among this group, 47 percent (43 percent) received help from a relative and 47 percent (43 percent) received help from a friend or paisano (someone from their home region in average skill levels in their home countries. In support of this idea, Borjas (1987, 1995) finds that as sources for U.S. immigration have shifted from Europe to Latin America and Asia, the economic performance of new Mexico). The small remaining fraction of immigrants has deteriorated. Relative to ear- those receiving assistance relied on an wage expectations among migrants, the volume of Mexico-to-U.S. migration is smaller lier cohorts, recent immigrants earn lower wages compared to natives at time of arrival and take longer for their earnings to converge to native levels. These findings counter an earlier belief that immigrants tend to than one might expect. U.S.-Mexico real have high potential for earnings growth employer, labor contractor, or other source. Even accounting for heterogeneity in (Barry R. Chiswick 1978). 43 Bleakley and Chin (2004) instrument for English-language ability using immigrant age at arrival, exploiting the fact that younger children appear to learn new languages more easily than older children. 44 For other work on migration networks in Mexico, see Paul Winters, Alain de Janvry, and Elisabeth Sadoulet (2001). A simple test of the negative selection hypothesis is to compare the observable skills of migrants from Mexico with individ- uals in Mexico who choose not to migrate abroad. While selection on observables does not necessarily reflect selection on This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 897 TABLE 6 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT FOR THE MEXICO BORN POPULATION, 2000 21-65 Year Olds 28-37 Year Olds Residents Mex. Imm. Residents Mex. Immigrants in U.S. of Mexico in U.S. of Mexico 0-3 Yrs 4+ Yrs Males 0 0.069 0.127 0.036 0.076 0.078 1-4 0.166 0.080 0.103 0.045 0.043 5-8 0.270 0.307 0.263 0.303 0.275 Highest 9 0.189 0.087 0.246 0.114 0.116 Grade of 0-9 0.694 0.601 0.648 0.538 0.512 Schooling (%) 10-11 0.045 0.055 0.059 0.064 0.067 12 0.101 0.212 0.129 0.260 0.278 13-15 0.047 0.083 0.044 0.075 0.098 10-15 0.193 0.350 0.232 0.399 0.443 16+ 0.113 0.050 0.121 0.062 0.046 N 215,804 80,453 68,206 9,358 15,839 Females 0 0.092 0.133 0.047 0.070 0.078 1-4 0.179 0.087 0.116 0.041 0.043 5-8 0.280 0.315 0.278 0.269 0.294 Highest 9 0.174 0.085 0.219 0.112 0.125 Grade of 0-9 0.725 0.620 0.660 0.492 0.540 Schooling (%) 10-11 0.040 0.049 0.054 0.056 0.062 12 0.112 0.204 0.145 0.276 0.253 13-15 0.042 0.079 0.039 0.083 0.090 10-15 0.194 0.332 0.238 0.415 0.405 16+ 0.080 0.048 0.103 0.093 0.055 N 235,086 72,967 75,625 6,575 16,173 Notes: The sample is individuals 21-65 or 28-37 years old excluding group quarters; in Mexico, excluding those not b Residents of Mexico in 2000 are a 10 percent random sam microsample of the XIII Censo General de Poblacion y Viv grants are from the 2000 5 percent U.S. PUMS and are re years or older at time of entry into the country who have States for 0-3 years or 4 or more years. Schooling variabl individuals whose high grade completed is that indicated. unobservables, one might expect individuUnited States). Section 2 suggests a relaals' observable and unobservable skills torecent be immitively high fraction of very positively correlated. Table 6 likely shows educagrants are to be illegal immigrants. To tional attainment for Mexican immigrants control for age, I limit the sample to 28-37 in the United States and for residents of year olds, which in tables 2 and 3 is the age Mexico in 2000, based on census data from cohort with the highest likelihood of migrat- the two countries. To help isolate the popu- ing abroad. For comparison, the table also lation of illegal immigrants, the table shows describes educational outcomes for the full results separately for very recent immi- sample of working-age residents of Mexico grants (0-3 years in the United States) and and immigrants from Mexico in the United for longer-term immigrants (4+ years in the States. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �898 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) countries in which there appears to be an It is well known that Mexican immigrants in the United States are much less educated inverted U-shaped relationship between rural household income and the likelihood that a than U.S. natives (Borjas and Katz forthcoming). However, Mexican immigrants, whether household finances urban migration for one or recent or longer term, compare favorably more of its members (Lucas 1997). when we examine residents of Mexico. In Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) develop a more formal approach to evaluate the selec2000, 65 percent of male residents of Mexico had nine or fewer years of schooling, com-tion of Mexican immigrants in terms of pared to 54 percent of recent immigrants andobservables. Let the observed density of wages for individuals working in Mexico be 51 percent of longer-term immigrants. Beyond nine years of education, Mexican immigrants outperform Mexican residents in (8) g(wli= MX)= JfMX(wIx)h(xi i= MX)dx, every category except college graduates. and the observed density of wages for Relative to male residents of Mexico, recent Mexicans working in the United States be Mexican immigrant men are more likely to have ten-fifteen years of education (40 per- (9) g(wli = US) =ffus(wIx)h(x|i = US)dx, cent versus 23 percent) and less likely to have sixteen plus years of education (5 percent where fi(wIx) is the density of wages w in country i, conditional on a set of observed versus 12 percent). A similar pattern holds for men in 1990 and for women in either characteristics x, and h(xli) is the density of year. It appears that, in Mexico, individuals observed characteristics in i. Consider the with moderate to high education levels havedensity of wages that would prevail for the highest likelihood of migrating abroad, Mexican immigrants in the United States if which is inconsistent with negative selectionthey were paid according to the price of skills in Mexico: of migrants in terms of observable skills. Other data on Mexican migration are also inconsistent with negative selection. Using his- (10) gM(w) = JfMX(wIx)h(xli = US)dx. torical data from U.S. and Mexico population John DiNardo, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas censuses, Zadia M. Feliciano (2001) finds that Lemieux (1996) show that, under the assumpaverage schooling of Mexican immigrants has tion that the distribution of unobservables been higher than for residents of Mexico since (conditional on the distribution of observat least 1940. Based on MMP data, in which ables) is the same in the two countries, a counthe vast majority of individuals who migrate to terfactual density as in (10) can be written as the United States do so illegally (at least on their first attempt), Orrenius and Zavodny (11) (2005) estimate that the probability a young ggs(w)= f OfMx(wlx)h(xli =MX)dx, adult male migrates to the United Stateswhere increases as schooling rises from low levels to (12) levels around the national mean (eight years) and then declines as schooling rises to levels above the national mean. McKenzie and Rapoport (2004) obtain similar results, also theta = h(xli = US) h(xli = MX) = Pr(i = US Ix) Pr(i = MX) 46 Pr(i = MX Ix) Pr(i = US) using the MMP.45 These findings are similar to 46 Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) show how to derive a literature on internal migration in Botswana, weighting function similar to (12) that controls for differ- India, the Philippines, and other developingences in labor-force participation among workers in the two countries. To simplify the exposition, I leave out the analytics behind this extension. The results in figure 10 control for differences in labor-force participation between 45 On migrant selection in Mexico, see also Pablo Ibarraran and Darren Lubotsky (forthcoming). Mexico and the United States. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 899 Thus, the counterfactual density in (11) can be estimated by taking the observed density for wage earners in Mexico and reweighting weights in (12) has as regressors dummy vari- grant workers in the United States. The wage individuals who exhibit a stronger ten- it to reflect characteristics of Mexican immi- weight in (12) can be estimated parametrically by running a logit on the probability of a Mexico-born adult being in the United ables for age, schooling, and marital status, and interactions of these variables. Consistent with table 6, it is not the lowest- dency to migrate to the United States. In either year, for Mexican immigrant males there is greater mass in the middle of the States, conditional on observed characteris- wage density and less mass in either tail tics, using a sample that combines Mexican immigrants and Mexican residents. By comparing actual and counterfactual when compared with the actual wage density of Mexico residents. The immigrant-resident wage densities, we can nonparametrically tail to just below zero, positive for middle wage values, and again close to zero in the summarize the nature of migrant selection in Mexico. Consider the difference between density difference is close to zero in the left right tail. This suggests that immigrant males are drawn disproportionately from the midthe actual wage density for residents of dle of Mexico's wage distribution, rather than Mexico and the counterfactual wage density that would obtain were Mexican immigrants from the bottom half. Low-wage and highwage individuals appear to be relatively less paid according to skill prices in Mexico: likely to migrate to the United States. These (13) gs(w) - gMX(w) counterfactual wage densities support inter- = f [OM - 1]fMx(wlx)h(x i = MX)dx. If there is negative selection of migrants in terms of observable skills, the difference in (13) would show positive mass in the lower part of the wage distribution-indicating migrants are overrepresented among Mexico-born individuals with below-average skills-and negative mass in the upper part-indicating migrants are underrepresented among the Mexico-born with above- average skills. In contrast, with positive selection there would be negative mass for low wages and positive mass for high wages. Figure 10 shows estimates of the density difference in (13) for men and women in 1990 and 2000, based on results in Chiquiar and Hanson (2005). The sample is workingage adults (21 to 65 years of age) who either reside in Mexico or are very recent Mexican immigrants in the United States. Immigrants are individuals twenty-one years or older at time of U.S. entry and who have been in the United States for three years or less. (Again, very recent immigrants are likely to include a relatively high fraction of illegal immigrants.) The logit regression used to estimate the mediate selection of immigrant men in terms of observable skills. The results for females contain even less support for negative selection. The immigrant-resident density difference is negative for low wage values, strongly positive for upper-middle wage values, and zero for high wage values. For women, there appears to be moderate positive selection of immigrants. Table 6 and figure 10 do not explicitly separate legal and illegal Mexican im-migrants, leaving it unclear how the two groups compare in terms of skill. What does theory suggest about the self-selection of legal versus illegal migrants? Consider a simple extension of Borjas (1991), who adapts the A. D. Roy (1951) model.47 Let individuals from Mexico, indexed by 0, choose whether or not to migrate to the United States, indexed by 1, where migration is a one-time decision (or, equivalently, a one-period decision). Residents of Mexico face a wage equation given by 47 For expositional simplicity, I consider a nonstochastic version of Borjas (1991), in which there is no unobserved component of skill. The extension to a stochastic setting is straightforward. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �900 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) Figure 10. Immigrant (counterfactual)-Resident (actual) Wage Densities, 1990 and 2000 (counterfactual density for Mexican immigrants minus actual density for Mexican residents) This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 901 (14) In(wo) = g0 + o0s, agents are capable of migrating abroad, as in where for Mexico wo is the wage, p0 is the base wage, s is the level of schooling, and 60 is the return to schooling. If the population of Mexicans were to migrate legally to the (2004), and Orrenius and Zavodny (2005).48 To capture the relationship between credit constraints and skill, suppose that individual wealth in Mexico, Yo, is a linear function United States, they would face the wage equation (15) ln(wL) = pL + 6Ls, Rapoport (2002), McKenzie and Rapoport of skill, such that (18) Y0o = Po+ Cos. Low-skill individuals will be unable to while if they were to migrate illegally they would face wage equation, finance migration because they have insufficient collateral to secure a loan. The low- (16) ln(wI) = pL{ + 5s, feasible is est skill level for migration strategy i to be (19) = where wl is the wage, yp is the base wage, and S8 is the return to skill for Mexican migrants with status i. Higher levels of TFP and larger which is higher the larger ar relative supplies of capital in the United costs. Whether the least s States suggest the base wage is lower inmigrant is more or less skilled th Mexico (pi > p0, for i = I, L); higher U.S. rel- skilled illegal migrants depends ative supplies of human capital suggest that tive magnitude of legal and ill the return to schooling is higher in Mexico tion costs. In Cornelius (2005), recent (i8 > do, for i = I, L). Tables 4 and 5 supportborder-crossing costs for illegal migrants both assumptions. Kossoudji and Cobb-Clarkrange from $1,200 to $1,700 (in 2000 dol(2002) find that in the United States the base lars). The current costs of legal migration wage and the return to schooling are higherinclude fees paid to the U.S. government to for legal than for illegal immigrants, whichprocess a visa application, which range suggests p1> Ž4 p and 31 2 S~. from $700 and $1,000 for family-sponsored Migrant selection also depends on theimmigration visas, and the expense of hirstructure and financing of migration costs.ing a lawyer or immigration specialist to Consider a setup similar to Borjas (1987), inhandle the application process, which typi- which the migration cost for migration status i,cally ranges from $400 to $1,000.49 C', expressed in time-equivalent units,Ignoring the time costs involved in crossing 7' = C*/wo, is assumed to be constant acrossthe border illegally or in completing the individuals. Combining equations (14)-(16), a bureaucratic steps needed to obtain a green resident of Mexico will be willing to migrate tocard, entry costs for legal migrants from the United States under migration status i if Mexico appear roughly similar in value to (17) In(wi) - In(w0 + C') =- ln(wi) - In(wo) - ri > 0. those for illegal migrants, in which case s, and sL would also be similar. Based on (17), high-skill individuals will choose not to migrate because higher Suppose that migrants finance migration costs by borrowing and that to secure a loan 48 I limit the analysis to partial equilibrium. Rapoport of amount C' a migrant must have collateral (2002) develops a general-equilibrium model of credit conof amount yC', y > 0. Collateral requirements straints and migration, based on the occupation-choice model in Abhijit V Banerjee and Andrew F. Newman (1993). may reflect imperfect credit markets, which 49 On fees for immigration visas, see http://uscis.gov/ place initial wealth restrictions on whichand http://www.usavisanow.com/. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �902 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) returns to skill in Mexico make it more U.S. green card in the future. As of yet, attract to stay at home. The highest skill level there is little empirical research on which for which migration strategy i is attractive is types of households in Mexico appear to (20) s have better access to legal channels of obtaining a U.S. green card. Combining (19) and (20), it is clear that as migration costs rise both legal and illegal which is higher the larger migrants the U.S.-Mexico become more positively selected in skillsmaller (i.e., the interval (s for i = I, difference in the base wage terms and of the the U.S.-Mexico difference in the to return L, shifts the right).to In the MMP, Orrenius skill. Thus, larger differences and in Zavodny the return to that as the level (2005) find of negative U.S. border enforcement rises (U.S. skill between countries make seleclinewatch enforcement tion of migrants in terms of skill more pro-hours increase) the nounced. I assume parameter values are probability a young adult male migrates to such that Si > si for i = I, L, which yields posthe United States falls, with the effect being itive levels of both legal and illegal migra-with lower schooling stronger for individuals tion. As long as the lower support the levels. This for suggests that higher migration distribution of skill is less costs than min (s_,sI)select lower-skilled disproportionately and the upper support of the distribution individuals out of of the migrant pool. Similarly, and Rapoport (2004) skill is greater than max (ssi), both McKenzie legal and in MMP communities with illegal migrants will tend tofind be that, drawn from individuals with intermediate skill U.S.-migration levels. If stronger networks, the legal and illegal migration costs are similar, inverted-U-shaped relationship between Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark's (2002) results migration and schooling is weaker. As migra- on base wages and returns to tion skill costs fall for (access legal to migration networks and illegal migrants would improves), suggest positive that selection of migrants becomes less pronounced. 9L >S or that the highest skilled legal There abundant evidence that Mexican migrants are at least as skilled as is the highest skilled illegal migrants. immigrants in the United States are disproThe simple theoretical model together portionately drawn from the middle of the distribution of observable skills in Mexico. with available empirical evidence suggests that legal migrants would beWhile more there positively are no data that explicitly differselected than illegal migrants in terms of entiate between the selection pattern of legal skill. However, this outcome and illegal implicitly migrants, there is intermediate selection among migrants depends on all prospective migrants in in the MMP, in Mexico having an equal probability which a very of high being fraction of migrants are illegal. Intermediate selection eligible for a U.S. legal immigration visa. is consistent with migrants credit constraints in financing There is no reason to expect thisfacing to be the case. If more-skilled individuals are more the cost of migration, such that low-skill, low- (less) likely to have family members who are income individuals are disproportionately U.S. citizens or U.S. legal permanent resiselected out of the migrant pool. Other factors that could contribute to intermediate dents, they will be more (less) able to obtain selection include higher discount rates, a U.S. green card, in which case there would be stronger (weaker) positive selection of greater risk aversion, or higher psychic migralegal migrants relative to illegal migrants.tion costs among low-skilled, low-income individuals, such that these individuals are Also, the discussion ignores dynamic considerations in which individuals may migrateless willing to migrate to the United States for any given binational wage differential. Credit illegally today in expectation of obtaining a This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 903 constraints or some other factor is needed to integration, as are cross-border trade and reconcile the facts that (a) the incentive to investment flows. migrate appears to be strongest for individuals with low schooling (as seen in tables 4 and labor flows from Mexico to the United 5), and (b) individuals with low schooling have a relatively low probability of migrating abroad (as seen in table 6). To examine further the determinants of States, consider a simple two-country model in which the aggregate production function for Mexico (indexed by 0) at time t is given by (21) Qo 3.4 Migration and the Supply of Labor in Mexico and the United States where A, is total factor produ the supply of capital, Loht is labor of skill type h, v < 1 d focuses primarily on the correlation elasticity of substitution betw between migration and U.S.-Mexico earnlabor (v= 1 - 1/KL), and < ings differences. There is little work on the the elasticity of substitution underlying causes on these wage differences skill types (K = 1- 1/o-hh, all h or whether migration is related to variation the wage to the marginal produ in these causal factors. The work that perhaps most closely addresses these issues is (22) InwOht = (1 - v)lnQ0 Robertson (2000), who examines the corre- As we have seen, the literature on labor flows from Mexico to the United States lation between U.S. and Mexican wages over time. Using synthetic cohorts con- structed from household data in the two + (v - K')lnL0, + (K - l)lnLoht where Lot is the labor aggreg Pot is the price of Mexico's out countries over 1987-97, he regresses the gate production function f quarterly change in Mexican wages for a given age-education-region cell on quarter-States (indexed by 1) has an an ture, with the added dimens ly changes in U.S. wages for the same skill type h, Llht, is an agg age-education cell and on the lagged difference in U.S. and Mexican wages for the cell.employment of native and im ers, who are imperfect substitu A shock that raises U.S. wages by 10 percent is associated with an increase in wages in (23) lht Mexican interior cities by 1.8 percent and wages in Mexican border cities by 2.5 per-where Llht is the supply of n cent.50 Positive comovements in U.S. and labor of skill type h, Iht is the s Mexican wages are consistent with the two grant labor of skill type h, an countries' labor markets being at least parmines the elasticity of substit tially integrated. Migration flows are one native and foreign labor (77 = factor that may contribute to labor-market marginal product of immigra United States (assumed to be 50 Robertson (2000) also finds that wage changes inlegal and illegal immigrants) i Mexico are negatively correlated with the lagged U.S.-Mexico wage difference, which suggests that over(24) time wages in the two economies tend to converge. The estimated convergence rates are very rapid, with equilibri- Inwlht = (1- v)lnQ1t + (v + (K - ?7)lnLlht + (hq - l)lnIht um U.S.-Mexico wage differentials being reached within one to two quarters. Rapid convergence seems at odds where with rising levels of trade, investment, and migration L,, is the U.S. labor agg is the price of U.S. output. between the two countries, which suggests that integration of U.S. and Mexican markets is incomplete and that wage If migration equalizes wages convergence between the two countries is more gradual. United States and Mexico, th This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �904 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) (25) Inw0ht-lnP0t = Inwth, - InP, - Incht, where Pkt is the consumer price index in country k (expressed in terms of a common currency) and cht = 1- Cht/(wIht/Plht) is the Mexico-U.S. relative real GDP per worker, the Mexico-U.S. terms of trade, and the Mexico-U.S. real exchange rate over the 1960-to-2000 period (based on the Penn World Tables). Relative real GDP per work- migration cost for labor type h expressed as a markup over the wage rate. Cht may be a function of U.S. border enforcement or, if er is a crude proxy for a term that combines the first, second, fourth, and fifth terms in migration networks exist, of the existing U.S. stock of immigrants from Mexico. of labor for skill type h and migration costs). Using (22)-(25) to solve for the level of immigration of skill type h, (26) InIht= + L1, (26) (i.e., all terms except the relative supply Relative income declines in the 1980s and is flat in the 1990s. Slow growth in Mexico's GDP and rapid growth in Mexico's labor force have combined to make the U.S.-Mexico gap in income per worker la er in 2000 than it was in 1980. Changes the terms of trade appear to have matte little for relative income changes. Over last two decades, the Mexico-U.S. terms trade have been stable, consistent with two countries exporting similar type Immigration of skill type h worker manufactured goods.51 Mexico is (a) decreasing in Mexico-U Changes in aggregate income may und state the contribution of binational ative GDP (which, in turn, is income decrea Mexico-U.S. relative TFP and the differences to Mexico-U.S. migration. Mexico-U.S. relative supply of capital), Relative (b) average aggregate income may hide increasing in the Mexico-U.S. relative variation labor in income across sectors or regions aggregate (as long as different labor in Mexico skill that affect migrant outflows. For negative income shocks to Mexican types are more substitutable than instance, are aggreagriculture or to Mexico's high-migration gate labor and capital, such that K - v a 0), (c) increasing in the Mexico-U.S. states relative would likely increase migration supply of skill type h (as long as immigrant abroad, even if positive income shocks to and native workers of the same skillother typesectors are or regions helped smooth more substitutable than are labor ofincome different at the national level. Also, the rela- tive variability of income may affect migraskill types, such that 7 - c > 0), (d) decreastion, independent of changes in relative ing in the Mexico-U.S. terms of trade, (e) mean income. increasing in the Mexico-U.S. relative cost As movements in Mexico's relative price level in figure 11 indicate, of living, and (f) decreasing in migration Mexico's economy has recently been subject costs. All else equal, immigration rises when to a high degree of price volatility. Mexico has slower productivity growth, slow- er capital accumulation, faster labor-force growth, or negative terms-of-trade shifts 51 Terms-of-trade relative to the United States. What is the relative contribution of the changes in the Penn World Tables may understate true terms-of-trade changes. Within indus- tries, Mexico and the United States tend to specialize at different ends of the production chain, with the United variables on the right of (26) to the increase States focused more on capital-intensive component proin Mexican migration to the United States?duction and Mexico focused more on labor-intensive product assembly. Such within-industry specialization may not Unfortunately, existing literature offers few be adequately reflected in conventional measures of the answers to such a question. For a prelimi- terms of trade, which fail to account for the fragmentation production. nary take on the data, figure 11 plotsof This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 905 Figure 11. Mexico-U.S. Relative Incomes, Prices, and Terms of Trade To characterize changes in relative labor supplies in Mexico and the United States, figures 12 and 13 show the relative size of the working-age population in the two countries over the period 1970 to 2000. I take the population of Mexican nationals to be the sum of individuals born in Mexico residing in either Mexico or the United States, which I then divide into age cohorts by gender. To examine a population of U.S. natives who are likely to be substitutable in production with Mexican labor, I restrict U.S. age and gender cohorts to be individuals with a high-school education or less. Over the 1980-to-1990 and 1990-to-2000 olds. By 2000, Mexico's supply was larger than the U.S. supply. The change in relative supply occurred in part because a large cohort of young Mexicans entered the labor force in the 1980s and 1990s and in part because more U.S. natives now continue their education beyond high school. The increase in relative labor supply is especially strong among women, for whom skill upgrading in the United States has been most pronounced (Katz and David H. Autor 1999). As further evidence of the contribution of relative labor-supply changes to Mexico-U.S. migration, figure 14 plots the stock of periods, there is a dramatic increase in theMexican immigrants in the United States supply of young Mexican nationals relativeagainst the Mexico-U.S. relative supply of to the supply of young less-educated U.S.labor by gender and age cohort over the natives. In 1980, Mexico's supply of 20-291970-to-2000 period (where I use five-year year olds was just over half the size of theage cohorts to increase the sample size). I U.S. population of less-educated 20-29 yearrestrict U.S. natives to be either those with a This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �906 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) Figure 12. Mexico-U.S. Relative Male Population, 1970-2000 Figure 13. Mexico-U.S. Relative Female Population, 1970-2000 This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 907 Figure 14. Mexico-U.S. Relative Labor Supply, 1970-2000 This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �908 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) high-school education or less or those with considerable micro-level evidence that less than a high-school education, which migration networks affect individual migra- roughly approximates a plot of ln(Iht) against ln(LOht/L1ht) in (26).52 Across cohorts and time, tion decisions, there are few estimates of the there is a strong positive correlation between impact of these networks on aggregate labor flows. Thus, the literature provides little Mexico-U.S. migration and the relative supply of Mexican labor. Figure 14 gives sug- growth, population growth, skill upgrading, gestive evidence that increases in the relative supply of Mexican labor contribute to migration abroad, presumably by pushing down Mexican wages. Surprisingly, the determinants of wage differences between the United States and guidance for thinking about how GDP or other shocks to national economies affect aggregate labor flows from Mexico to the United States. 3.5 Summary Differences in earnings between the Mexico and their link to Mexico-U.S. migra- United States and Mexico are one factor that tion flows are largely unexplored topics. A contributes to Mexico-to-U.S. migration. cursory glance at the data suggests that a Consistent with previous migration research combination of slow growth in Mexico's in many other contexts, labor outflows from economy and rapid growth in Mexico's labor Mexico increase when U.S.-Mexico income force have contributed to rising labor out- or wage differences increase. Illegal migra- flows in recent years. However, many details tion flows, measured either using survey data about this story are unknown. In the last two on migrant-sending communities in Mexico decades, Mexico has undertaken major eco- or apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border, nomic reforms, which may have changed the are quite responsive to relative income distribution of factor rewards or the distri- changes. Access to migration networks bution of regional incomes in a manner that also appears to facilitate cross-border labor increased the incentive to emigrate.53 The flows. migration function in (26) suggests the link The literature has made little progress in between relative factor supplies and migrantidentifying how the underlying determinants flows depends on the substitutability ofU.S.-Mexico wage differences affect binaMexican and U.S. labor, which we know lit- tional migration. Another unresolved issue is tle about (Borjas 2003).54 And, while there iswhy, given large income differences between the United States and Mexico and small 52 To keep this approximation as literal as possible, I observed costs in crossing the border illegally, define the supply of Mexican labor to be residents of migration flows are not larger. There appear Mexico and the supply of U.S. labor to be the sum of Mexican immigrants in the United States and less-educated U.S. natives (where both variables are measured by age and to be unobserved sources of migration costs (or heterogeneity in the perceived benefits of gender cohort). migrating abroad) that are important enough 53 These reforms include a liberalization of foreign trade and investment (unilaterally over the period 1985 to 1989 to impede many individuals from leaving and trilaterally with Canada and the United States under Mexico. These unobserved costs appear to be the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994), the especially large for less-educated individuals, privatization of state-run enterprises and the deregulation of industry (in the late 1980s and early 1990s), and changes who have relatively low migration propensiin the land-tenure system (in the early 1990s, which priva- ties despite having relatively large apparent tized land previously held by rural cooperatives). Ernesto Aguayo Tellez (2005) finds that in the 1990s individuals from communities more exposed land reform were more likely to migrate internally in Mexico. 54 Patricia Cortes (2005) and Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano returns to migration. 4. Policies to Control Illegal Immigration and Giovanni Peri (2005) provide recent evidence that in Many government policies the United States low-skilled native and foreign labor are less than perfect substitutes. determining the level of illegal This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms play a role in immigration. �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 909 to enforcement, seen in figure 5, suggests Some policies, including the enforcement of international borders and the monitoring of hiring practices by employers, affect illegal that the lack of success is not for want of effort. immigration directly. By changing the intensity with which they enforce borders or mon- ture, rising illegal immigration tends to be itor employers, authorities effectively interpreted as a result of policy failure regulate the inflow of illegal immigrants from abroad. In the United States, enforce- (Peter Andreas 2000; Massey, Durand, and ment policies are under the control of feder- al government agencies and can be changed frequently, even on a day-to-day basis. Other policies, including quotas for permanent or temporary legal immigration, the rights of immigrants to draw on public assistance, and minimum-wage requirements, affect illegal inflows indirectly through their impact on In political science and sociology litera- Malone 2002; Cornelius et al. 2004; Cornelius 2005). Due to political con- straints, the United States has focused on border enforcement, rather than monitoring U.S. employers, which appears ill-suit- ed to curtail unauthorized entry in a country that shares a 2,000-mile long land border with a poor neighbor. Further, the United States has chosen to concentrate migration. In the United States, these and enforcement resources in border cities, leaving less populated corridors largely Congress and tend to change slowly over unpoliced through which illegal immigrants continue to enter the country in large num- time, which has made their impact on illegal bers. Are U.S. enforcement policies inef- the expected reward from unauthorized other such indirect policies are set by immigration difficult to gauge. In this section, I examine U.S. policies to fective? And, if so, why have U.S. enforcement policies, as these have been the immigration authorities chosen these policies? I deal with research on the first question in this section and on the second Theoretical literature considers the incen- subject of most academic research. question in the next. Each year, the U.S. Congress appropriates tives of countries to restrict illegal immigra- funds to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for enforcement of U.S. control illegal immigration. I focus on tion and the political economy of impediments to labor inflows from abroad; empirical literature examines the impact of borders, which falls under U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and for enforcement of enforcement policies on migrant flows. immigration laws in the U.S. interior, which falls under U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Prior to 2002, both border There is little work on policies that restrict labor outflows, as such policies do not exist in Mexico and are uncommon except in highly authoritarian regimes. 4.1 U.S. Border and Interior Enforcement Policies There is considerable academic and policy interest in the economic impact of U.S. actions to prevent illegal immigration. The increase in the stock of illegal immigrants in the United States, evident in table 1, indicates that U.S. enforcement efforts have and interior enforcement belonged to the now-defunct INS in the U.S. Department of Justice.) The U.S. Border Patrol, the primary agency responsible for border enforcement, is part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Border Patrol officers may be deployed to linewatch duty, in which they attempt to apprehend unauthorized immi- grants at the U.S.-Mexico border; to entry points along the U.S.-Mexico and not succeeded in stopping illegal entry from U.S.-Canada borders, at which they monitor Mexico or other countries. The concomi- tant increase in U.S. resources devoted pedestrian and vehicular traffic entering the United States; or to traffic checkpoints along This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �910 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) major highways inland from border cross- ings, at which they conduct inspections. Some of these activities (linewatch duty) are And, of apprehensions of Mexican illegal aliens, less than 1 percent occurred at U.S. worksites. The vast majority of Mexican more oriented toward preventing illegal nationals apprehended were "seeking immigration, while others (traffic checks) are more oriented toward preventing the smug- employment," which generally means they were caught trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico gling of contraband. The broad scope of border illegally. Border Patrol activities suggests that DHS officials (and INS officials before them) have policy output. How might one measure sufficient discretion in allocating resources to allow them to vary the intensity with which enforcement, the primary inputs are officer they enforce borders against illegal immigra- tion. Discretion creates an opportunity for political pressure to influence enforcement activities over short time horizons (as well as through the more-protracted congressional appropriations process). The detection of illegal immigrants in the U.S. interior falls under U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The activities of ICE agents (and of INS agents before Apprehensions of illegal immigrants are a inputs into enforcement policy? For border hours the Border Patrol spends policing the border and capital expenditure on enforcement infrastructure. In figure 5, between 1990 and 2003 officer hours devoted to bor- der enforcement increased by 3.8 times, from 2.5 million to 9.5 million. For interior enforcement, measures of policy inputs are more difficult to obtain. Those that are avail- able suggest immigration authorities devote a relatively small share of their resources to the creation of DHS) include attempts to the U.S. interior. Between 1999 and 2003, apprehend illegal immigrants at U.S. worksites, investigations of international smug- the number of man hours ICE agents devot- gling operations, and prosecutions and ed to worksite inspections declined from 480,000 (or 9 percent of total INS agent deportations of noncitizens who have been hours) to 180,000 hours (or 4 percent of total convicted of a felony in the United States. As ICE agent hours) (GAO 2005). Thus, in discretion in how ICE agents are deployed, 2003, U.S. immigration authorities devoted fifty-three times as many officer hours to with the Border Patrol, DHS officials have allowing them to vary the intensity of interi- linewatch enforcement as to worksite or enforcement against illegal immigration at the local, regional, and national level. worksite enforcement is that few U.S. Boeri, McCormick, and Hanson (2002) enforcement. One consequence of low employers who hire illegal immigrants are detected or prosecuted. The number of U.S. document that U.S. immigration authorities apprehend far more illegal immigrants at U.S. borders than in the U.S. interior. Table hiring unauthorized workers was only fifteen 7, which shows "deportable aliens" located by U.S. immigration authorities from 1992 two in 1998 and to zero in 2004. A recent to 2004, updates their data. (Deportable aliens include, primarily, apprehended illegal immigrants, and, secondarily, legal immi- grants subject to deportation because they have committed a criminal offense.) Over the period, 93 percent of deportable aliens were located by the Border Patrol, rather than by ICE or INS agents in the U.S. interior. Of those apprehended by the Border Patrol, 97 percent were Mexican nationals. employers paying fines of at least $5,000 for in 1990, which then fell to twelve in 1994 to U.S. General Accounting Office study concludes, "The worksite enforcement program has been a low priority under both the INS and ICE" (GAO 2005).55 55 Further, since September 2001 and the shift in government priorities toward preventing terrorist attacks, the majority of time ICE agents spend on worksite enforcement is devoted to monitoring "critical infrastructure sites," such as airports and power plants (GAO 2005). This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 911 This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �912 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) The emphasis of border enforcement over interior enforcement does not appear to be due to illegal immigrants being difficult to locate once they are inside the United prospective migrants appear to have shifted their attempts to enter the United States to the more remote desert regions of the California-Mexico and Arizona-Mexico bor- States. Several U.S. industries, including ders. Border Patrol operations have suc- agriculture, construction, and restaurants and hotels, appear to employ large numbers ceeded in reducing illegal border crossings of unauthorized workers. The U.S. at targeted locations, but not, as the increase in illegal immigration during the 1990s reveals, at other locations along the border. Department of Labor (2005) reports that, Thereof is active debate in policy circles over the period 1999 to 2002, 54 percent the U.S. farm laborers it surveyed about werethe in effectiveness with which U.S. immigration authorities deploy the resources the United States illegally. At harvest time, have in the late summer and early fall, they many of available. In their own defense, authorities these workers are plainly visible at farms in claim that they are overwhelmed California, Texas, Washington, and by current else- levels of attempted illegal immi- where in the western United States. U.S. gration (U.S. General Accounting Office immigration authorities simply choose not to2001). Even with the increase in enforcement resources, authorities suggest they have conduct large-scale raids on U.S. farms, conbeen unable to staunch in the inflow of unaustruction sites, or other places of business where illegal immigrants tend to work. thorized migrants because the number of those attempting to enter the United States Beyond concentrating on border enforceillegally has risen too fast. An opposing line of ment, U.S. immigration authorities target argument is that immigration authorities their efforts at specific locations along the deploy their enforcement resources ineffecborder. Figure 15 plots annual hours the tively for strategic motives (Cornelius et al. U.S. Border Patrol officers spent on 2004). In response to political pressure from linewatch duty by region along the border employers and other groups that benefit over the period 1977 to 2003. Officer hours from illegal immigration, goes the reasoning, increase sharply in the early 1990s in Texas, in the mid-1990s in Western California (San U.S. immigration authorities choose not to enforce U.S. laws against hiring illegal immiDiego), and in the late 1990s in Arizona. These increases reflect successive Border grants and to deploy the Border Patrol in a Patrol operations near specific U.S. border manner that allows large numbers of illegal cities, including El Paso, San Diego, El immigrants to enter the country. Centro, and McAllen (Reyes, Hans P. Has increased U.S. border enforcement in Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen fact made illegal immigration in the Un2002). Operations involve increased patrols, ited States more costly?56 Hanson and constructing walls and barricades, and Spilimbergo (1999) find that, controlling for mounting electronic surveillance equip- the endogeneity of enforcement, border ment. Figure 16 plots apprehensions by U.S. apprehensions increase as border enforceBorder Patrol officers on linewatch duty by ment increases. This finding suggests that border region. Following the increase in expanded enforcement makes crossing the Border Patrol activities in Western border more difficult (since more of those attempting illegal immigration are being California, apprehensions declined in the region but shortly thereafter increased in nearby Eastern California and Arizona. 56 InFor earlier work on this question, see Espenshade (1994, 1995), Kossoudji (1992), Katharine M. Donato, response to greater border security in San Durand, and Massey (1992), and Massey and Singer Diego, which in the 1970s and 1980s was theFor other recent work, see Manuela Angelucci (1995). (2003). primary illegal entry point along the border, This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 913 Figure 15. Linewatch Enforcement by U.S. Border Patrol Region Figure 16. Linewatch Apprehension by U.S. Border Patrol Region This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �914 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) caught at the border), but it does not reveal whether greater difficulty in border crossing deters prospective migrants from attempting to enter the United States illegally. Gathmann (2004) provides more direct evidence of the consequences of expanded border enforcement for migration. She uses MMP data to examine the correlates of coyote prices paid by migrants from Mexico to smuggler prices. Gathmann documents that, as the United States carried out its 1990s bor- der buildup, many migrants shifted from higher-enforcement to lower-enforcement crossing points. We do not know how coyote prices would respond to a borderwide increase in enforcement as the United States has yet to carry out that experiment. Another issue is that MMP data may lead one to underestimate the impact of enforceimpact of coyote prices on migrantment de- on smuggler prices. MMP communities ahave sent migrants to the United States mand for smuggler services.57 The price forin decades. Many families in these commumigrant pays to a smuggler is higher nities years when border enforcement is higher. have long-term relationships with coythe United States and to estimate the otes. Prices coyotes charge long-term But the elasticity of coyote prices with may be less responsive to shocks respect to enforcement is small, incustomers the than prices they charge on the smuggling range of 0.2 to 0.5. During the sample period, a one-standard-deviation increase spotinmarket used by migrants in the rest of enforcement would have lead to an increase Mexico. Hence, in the rest of the country, attempted illegal migration could be more in coyote prices of less than $40; in the mid1990s average coyote prices were $410. The responsive to border enforcement than estimated demand for smuggler services Gathmann's results suggest. The United States has undertaken a masand the individual probability of choosing to migrate to the United States are both sive increase in the resources that it devotes quite responsive to changes in coyote to border enforcement. Yet, the apparent prices. However, given the small enforce- impact of this increase has been modest. observed increase in border enforcement reduced attempted illegal entry at what ment elasticity of coyote prices, the While expanded border enforcement has over 1986 to 1998 appeared to reduce the used to be major crossing points in average migration probability among MMP California and Texas border cities, it appears to have had a small effect on deterrespondents by only 10 percent. Gathmann's results, of course, are condi- ring illegal immigration overall (measured tional on the pattern of border enforcement either in terms of changes in smuggler that was realized over the sample period. By prices or the average probability a Mexican increasing enforcement in some border loca- national migrates to the United States). tions but not others, U.S. immigration author- One possibility is that there are important ities may have (intentionally or not) mitigated nonconvexities in enforcement, such that it the impact of expanded enforcement on only becomes an effective deterrent to ille57 In the estimation of coyote prices, Gathmann (2004) instruments for border enforcement using the drug budg- et of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). In the estimation of the demand for coyote services, she includes both the smuggler price and the level of border enforcement as regressors, instrumenting for the former with the average U.S. prison term for smugglers (which rises over the sample period) and for the latter again with the DEA gal entry at high levels of resource commitment. This is perhaps the implicit argument of those calling for further expansion of U.S. enforcement efforts.58 Another possibility is that U.S. enforcement strategies are ineffective by design, due to the political economy of immigration control. drug budget. Under the assumption of normality in the 58 See Steven A. Camarota, "Use Enforcement to Ease errors, she is able to control for selection into migration Situation," Arizona Republic, October 23, 2005. (by exploiting MMP data on nonmigrants). This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 915 4.2 Determination of U.S. Enforcement Policies In the absence of economic distortions, the optimal immigration policy would be to have open borders. All else equal, immigration raises national income by allowing countries to use fixed factors more productively, making free immigration welfare maximizing. In practice, countries may choose to restrict immigration because existing distortions, such as the existence of social-insurance pro- grams financed by non-lump-sum taxes, make a departure from free immigration the constrained optimum (Ulrich Scholten and Marcel Thum 1996; Dietmar Wellisch and Uwe Walz 1998; Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka 1999).59 Or, governments may choose to restrict immigration because they weight the welfare of different individuals unequal- ly, for whatever reason favoring those opposed to immigration (James ForemanPeck 1992). For instance, if the median voter is a worker whose wages would be reduced by immigration, politicians may choose to restrict immigration in order to enhance their future electoral prospects (Jess Benhabib 1996). Policies to address illegal immigration enter a country's choice set when legal immi- grant admissions are subject to binding restrictions and the enforcement of borders against illegal entry is costly. Enforcement costs may be due to the expense of policing the border or to agency costs associated with giving immigration authorities an incentive to implement laws against unauthorized entry. Using Gary S. Becker's (1968) crime- theoretic framework, Ethier (1986a, 1986b) 59 See Hanson (2005) and Hanson, Kenneth F. Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter (2006) for evidence on how the public-finance consequences of immigration affect indi- vidual preferences toward immigration in the United States. See Hans-Werner Sinn, Gebhard Flaig, Martin Werding, Sonja Munz and Herbert Hofmann (2003) and Razin and Sadka (2004) for analysis of the public-finance consequences of immigration in welfare states similar to the European context. derives conditions under which border enforcement raises national income. In the absence of migration, wages in a home coun- try exceed wages in a foreign country. Restrictions on legal migration prevent legal labor flows from equalizing international fac- tor prices, creating an incentive for illegal migration. The home country interdicts illegal migrants through costly border enforcement. Let the probability of apprehension, 0 g < 1, be an increasing, convex function of expenditure on enforcement, E, which is financed by taxes on skilled labor. The home-country wage for unskilled natives, w, is then related to the alternative foreign-country wage of illegal labor, w*, through the equalization of expected wages that results from illegal migration: (27) w* = g(E)w* + [1 - g(E)]w - k, where k is the cost of migration (which, dis- tinct from Ethier (1986a), I suppose is incurred whether or not an individual is apprehended). Consider the impact of an increase in enforcement on the home-foreign wage gap. Totally differentiating (27) (28) dw The expression in (28) is posi greater enforcement increa foreign wage difference, a apprehension probability is enforcement (g' 2 0), the init positive (absent which ther incentive to migrate), and m (e.g., smuggler prices) are we in enforcement (k' 2 0). In (2 that changes in enforcement af for unskilled workers in the through three channels: by l in the foreign country (great increases foreign labor supply foreign wage), by lowering t that those attempting migrat entering the country (greater means a given level of atte immigration has a smaller This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �916 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) home-country's labor supply), and by raising the cost of crossing the border (greater enforcement raises coyote prices). Ethier (1986a) identifies two environ- ments in which interdicting illegal migrants raises national income: the exis- tence of downward wage rigidity in the home-country market for unskilled labor, such that border enforcement lowers use quarterly data for 1980 to 1997 on wages in immigrant-labor-intensive industries in U.S. border states and among less-skilled workers in Mexican border cities. For highimmigrant industries (apparel, textiles, food products, furniture) in California and Texas, they find zero correlation between wages and enforcement of the Mexico-U.S. border in that state. They also find no evidence of a positive effect of border enforcement on the unemployment by reducing illegal immiwages of workers with low-education levels gration; and the presence of market power in the home-country demand for foreign (high-school dropouts or high-school graduates) in border regions of California or labor, such that greater border enforceTexas.61 For Mexico, the impact of U.S. borment lowers the wage the home country enforcement appears to be larger. In has to pay immigrant workers. Inder the absence of these or other distortions, Tijuana, which is the most active crossing enforcement is welfare reducing.60 One implication of Ethier's work is that for border enforcement to be more than a point for illegal immigrants during the sam- ple period, greater U.S. enforcement at the city's border with San Diego is associated with lower wages for less-skilled workers (up resource drain on the home country it must to six years of education). affect outcomes in sending and receiving labor markets. We have already seen evi- There are two quite different inter- dence in Gathmann (2004) that, in Mexico,pretations of Hanson, Robertson, and higher U.S. border enforcement is associat-Spilimbergo's results. One is that that border ed with modestly higher smuggler prices andenforcement deters illegal immigrants, but illegal immigration has a minimal impact on modestly lower migrant outflows. Are there labor markets in U.S. border regions. U.S. measurable impacts of border enforcement in the United States? Hanson, Robertson, border regions may adjust to influxes of illeand Spilimbergo (2002) examine the effectgal immigrants without large changes in wages either through U.S. native workers of border enforcement on wages in U.S. and exiting these regions (Borjas, Freeman, and Mexican border regions. If enforcement impedes illegal immigration, and if illegalKatz 1997) or through border economies shifting toward industries that are relatively immigrants depress wages in the regions in intensive in the use of immigrant labor which they settle, then wages in receiving (Card and Lewis forthcoming). A second (sending) border regions will tend to rise (fall) after an increase in enforcement. They interpretation of their results is that border enforcement has a minimal impact on illegal immigration, consistent with Espenshade 60 Extending Ethier's analysis, Eric W Bond and Tain- (1994) and Massey and Singer (1995). It Jy Chen (1987) introduce international capital mobility, Slobodan Djajic (1987, 1999) puts migration in a dynamic would still be conceivable that illegal immisetting, Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Sudeshna Champati gration puts downward pressure on wages in Bandyopadhyay (1998) and Helena Gaytin-Fregoso and Sajal Lahiri (2000) consider interactions of trade policy or U.S. border regions but, since border foreign aid and illegal migration, and Alan Woodland and Chisato Yoshida (forthcoming) examine border enforcement where illegal migrants are risk averse. Another dis- 61 Both sets of results hold with or without instrumenting for border enforcement (to control for the INS setting tortion that could potentially justify positive border enforcement in response to economic conditions in U.S. or enforcement is the presence of welfare policies that result in net fiscal subsidies to illegal immigrants (through theirMexican border areas) using data on U.S. political cycles (see note 26) and entry activity at other U.S. international use of public schools, emergency health care, and other boundaries (ports and Canadian border crossings). public services). This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 917 enforcement does not impede illegal immi- labor. Their second assumption has more gration, there would be zero correlation between enforcement and wages in U.S. border regions. Gathmann's (2004) results suggest border enforcement does affect empirical support. Periodic attempts by the INS or ICE to increase interior enforce- migration costs. And it is the case that wages Association, a business lobby representing farmers in the western United States, issued in Tijuana decline following increases in border enforcement, even if wages don't change in California or Texas. The framework in Ethier (1986a, 1986b) is a normative analysis of border enforcement. Turning to positive questions, how does the U.S. Congress decide on the level of funding for immigration control and how do U.S. immigration authorities allocate budgeted resources between enforcement and other activities for which they are responsible? In the context of trade policy, Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1994) develop a framework in which endogenously determined industry campaign contributions affect import tariffs on foreign goods. Giovanni Facchini and Gerald Willmann ment are met with political opposition. For instance, in 2005 the Western Growers a statement complaining that excessive enforcement was preventing farmers in Arizona from hiring sufficient immigrant labor to harvest their winter lettuce crop.62 In 1998, INS raids of onion fields at harvest time in the state of Georgia prompted the U.S. Attorney General, both Georgia U.S. senators, and three Georgia congressional representatives to criticize the INS for injuring Georgia farmers.63 There is also historical evidence of antienforcement efforts by business groups. In the 1940s and 1950s, the district commissioner of the U.S. Border Patrol in El Paso would routinely issue orders to stop apprehending illegal immigrants during the agricultural harvest season (Calavita 1992). On occasions when (2005) extend the Grossman-Helpman the Border Patrol did increase enforcement model to consider policies on international factor mobility. In their setup, governments activities, Texas farmers often complained restrict factor inflows from abroad through toa their congressional representatives, who per-factor unit tax or quota. Facchini and pressured the INS (through formal written Willmann make two important assumptions communication) to be less aggressive. about the structure of immigration policy:Lax worksite enforcement by the U.S. (1) the receiving-country government capgovernment is indirect evidence that polititures factor tax revenues or quota rents, cal factors influence the intensity with which which it rebates to citizens, and (2) individthe country enforces against illegal immigra- uals are organized according to their factor tion. Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) search type and lobby the government on immigrafor systematic evidence of such effects. They tion policy. In equilibrium, each factor estimate the sensitivity of border enforcelobby offers the government campaign conment to relative price changes in industries tributions to support stronger (weaker) that use unauthorized immigrant labor restrictions on inflows of factors for which intensively (apparel, perishable fruits and its members substitute (complement) vegetables, in slaughtered livestock, construcproduction. tion). In theory, higher relative prices for Facchini and Willmann's first assumption immigrant-intensive industries would appears to be counterfactual. In the context of illegal immigration, the U.S. and other 62 See Miriam Jordan, "As Border Tightens, Growers See Threat to 'Winter Salad Bowl,'" The Wall Street governments do not collect payments assoJournal, March 11, 2005, p. 1. ciated with factor inflows. On the contrary, the government spends resources on enforcement to impede the immigration of 63 See Mark Krikorian, "Lured by Jobs, Illegal Immigrants Risk Death at Border Crossings," Santa Barbara News-Press, April 25, 1999. This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �918 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIV (December 2006) increase the returns to lobbying for weaker border enforcement. Controlling for macroeconomic conditions in the United States 5. Concluding Discussion In the United States, unauthorized immi- and Mexico, they find that increases in the gration accounts for one-third to one-half of relative product price for an immigrantnew immigrant inflows. Mexico is by far and intensive industry today is associated with away a the largest source country for those decrease in border enforcement six to ten entering the United States illegally. An months in the future. This finding suggestsemerging body of academic research on illeauthorities relax enforcement when the gal migration from Mexico to the United demand for undocumented workers increas- States has made progress on many fronts. es. Enforcement also rises when overall Yet, the literature is at an early stage. labor-market conditions in the United StatesHeightened policy interest in illegal immitighten, which suggests that the U.S. govern- gration, both in the United States and ment raises enforcement when attempted Mexico, suggests the many unanswered illegal immigration is expected to be high. questions, some of which I now highlight, It appears, then, that enforcement soft-will receive attention in the time to come. ens when the specific sectors that use illegal Available measures of the stock and flow aliens intensively expand but not when the of illegal migrants are imprecise, hampered overall demand for labor is high. This is by the unwillingness of official government suggestive of a free-rider problem among agencies to question individuals about their immigration status. With the U.S. populaspecial-interest groups, in which sectors that benefit greatly from lower bordertion of illegal immigrants now exceeding 10 enforcement, such as apparel and agricul- million individuals, one would expect that, at ture, lobby politicians on the issue (and lobby the very least, U.S. government household surveys would conduct postenumeration more strongly when the gains to higher immigration are greater), while sectors thatsurveys that explicitly ask individuals about their immigration status. This would allow benefit modestly are less politically active. researchers to estimate the stock of illegal 4.3 Summary immigrants with much more precision. Of Restricting unauthorized immigration only greater benefit would be incorporating questions about immigration status directly into makes sense for a country that is subject to distortions that would be exacerbated by ille- the U.S. Census of Population or U.S. Current Population Survey. There is precegal labor inflows. By selecting the intensity with which it enforces U.S. borders againstdent for U.S. government surveys including questions about whether a respondent has a unauthorized entry and monitors the employment practices of U.S. business, U.S.legal immigration visa. For over a decade, immigration authorities implicitly determine the U.S. Department of Labor has conductthe level of illegal immigration. The Uniteded surveys of U.S. farm workers in which it States makes stark choices in its enforcement explicitly asks whether an individual is in the United States legally or illegally (e.g., U.S. polices. It heavily polices specific U.S. border cities, maintains a lighter presence in less-Department of Labor 2005). populated areas, and weakly enforces U.S. A handful of data sources provide inforworksites. There has been little research bymation about illegal immigrants from economists on the political economy of poli-Mexico in the United States. Immigrants cies specifically related to illegal immigra-from Mexico, whether legal or illegal, are drawn disproportionately from the middle of tion. The work that does exist suggests that the country's schooling distribution. Over special interest groups are active in attempting to influence U.S. enforcement practices.time, illegal migrants appear to have become This content downloaded from 129.210.115.230 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 01:54:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Hanson: Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States 919 more likely to be female, to work outside of in consumption, and credit constraints in agriculture, and to settle in the United States financing migration are all potential explana- on a long-term basis. Largely absent in the literature is analysis of the life-cycle behav- tions for the volume and composition of Mexican immigration. Research on these ior of migrants. Many individuals from issues is just beginning to emerge. Mexico first enter the United States as illegal immigrants and over time gain a legal permanent residence visa through sponsorship by a U.S. family member. One would expect that how a prospective migrant responds to changes in U.S. or Mexico economic condi- tions, or the extent to which a migrant already in the United States assimilates into U.S. society, would depend on whether the individual expects to obtain a U.S. green card in the future. Family sponsorship in the granting of entry visas may thus create a direct link between receiving-country policies on legal immigration and the incentive for illegal immigration. Individuals in Mexico with family members in the United States do appear to be more likely to emigrate. However, we do not know whether this represents the effect of migration networks, which lower the cost of migration, or prospects for obtaining a green card, which Over the last two decades, the United States has greatly increased the resources it devotes to controlling illegal immigration. The government has, in particular, beefed up enforcement at specific U.S. border cities. While the United States has criminalized the hiring of illegal immigrants, the government devotes few resources to monitoring U.S. worksites for the emplo ment of unauthorized workers. The net effect of changes in enforcement policy (coupled with changes in U.S. and Mexico economic conditions) has been increasing levels of illegal immigration. There is no formal political economy theory of immigration control that would explain why the United States chooses border over interior enforce- ment.64 The United States appears to be on the verge of granting an amnesty to at least some of the illegal immigrants residing in the country, which would come two decades raise the benefit to migration. after an earlier legalization under the Consistent with research in many other contexts, Mexico-to-U.S. migration flows are correlated with changes in relative incomes Immigration Reform and Control Act. There is also no formal theory that would explain why a country would choose to enact imperfect and costly enforcement against illegal in the two countries. Attempted illegal immigration appears to be particularly responsive to shocks to the Mexican econo- my, with surges in apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico border coming shortly after downturns in Mexico. Yet, given the large magnitude of U.S.-Mexico wage differences and the small apparent cost of crossing the border illegally, the volume of migration flows from Mexico to the United States is surprisingly low. Also, given the high relative return to education in Mexico, it is puzzling that Mexican immigrants exhibit intermediate selection in terms of their observable immigration today and later grant an amnesty to those that entered illegally. Given the importance of illegal immigration for the U.S. labor market and for U.S. public finances, policies to control labor inflows have been the subject of surprisingly little research. 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Title A name given to the resource Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hanson, Gordon, H Subject The topic of the resource Immigration Illegal Immigration United States Immigration Policy Description An account of the resource In this paper, I selectively review recent literature on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States. I begin by discussing methods for estimating stocks and flows of illegal migrants. While there is uncertainty about the size of the unauthorized population, new data sources make it possible to examine the composition of legal and illegal populations and the time-series covariates of illegal labor flows. I then consider the supply of and demand for illegal migrants. Wage differentials between the United States and Mexico are hardly a new phenomenon, yet illegal migration from Mexico did not reach high levels until recently. An increase in the relative size of Mexico's working-age population, greater volatility in U.S.-Mexico relative wages, and changes in U.S. immigration policies are all candidate explanations for increasing labor flows from Mexico. Finally, I consider policies that regulate the cross-border flow of illegal migrants. While U.S. laws mandate that authorities prevent illegal entry and punish firms that hire unauthorized immigrants, these laws are imperfectly enforced. Lax enforcement may reflect political pressure by employers and other interests that favor open borders. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Journal of Economic Literature Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2006–12 Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Journal Article Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://www.jstor.org/stable/30032389 Language A language of the resource English https://dh.scu.edu/exhibits/files/original/90/2940/nihms592095.pdf 1c74a7def3715d9e1bda927540fa511a PDF Text Text NIH Public Access Author Manuscript Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. NIH-PA Author Manuscript Published in final edited form as: Demography. 2014 August ; 51(4): 1159–1173. doi:10.1007/s13524-014-0304-y. The Consequences of Migration to the United States for Shortterm Changes in the Health of Mexican Immigrants Noreen Goldman, Office of Population Research, Princeton University, Wallace Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Anne R. Pebley, California Center for Population Research, University of California Los Angeles, CA. 90095, USA Mathew J. Creighton, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Departament de Ciències Polítiques i Socials, Barcelona, Spain Graciela M. Teruel, Universidad Iberoamericana, AC and CAMBS, México D.F., México NIH-PA Author Manuscript Luis N. Rubalcava, and Centro de Análisis y Medición del Bienestar Social, AC and CIDE, México D.F., México Chang Chung Office of Population Research, Princeton University, Wallace Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Noreen Goldman: ngoldman@princeton.edu Abstract NIH-PA Author Manuscript Although many studies have attempted to examine the consequences of Mexico-U.S. migration for Mexican immigrants’ health, few have had adequate data to generate the appropriate comparisons. In this article, we use data from two waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) to compare the health of current migrants from Mexico with those of earlier migrants and nonmigrants. Because the longitudinal data permit us to examine short-term changes in health status subsequent to the baseline survey for current migrants and for Mexican residents, as well as to control for the potential health selectivity of migrants, the results provide a clearer picture of the consequences of immigration for Mexican migrant health than have previous studies. Our findings demonstrate that current migrants are more likely to experience recent changes in health status— both improvements and declines—than either earlier migrants or nonmigrants. The net effect, however, is a decline in health for current migrants: compared with never migrants, the health of current migrants is much more likely to have declined in the year or two since migration and not significantly more likely to have improved. Thus, it appears that the migration process itself and/or the experiences of the immediate post-migration period detrimentally affect Mexican immigrants’ health. Keywords Immigrant; Health status; Self-rated health; Selection; Mexico �Goldman et al. Page 2 Introduction NIH-PA Author Manuscript Large-scale Mexican-U.S. migration has changed social, economic, and cultural life on both sides of the border. Migration to the United States can offer increased earnings and savings accumulation (Gathmann 2008). However, it can also be a difficult experience for migrants because of the risks and costs of border crossing; poorly paying, irregular, and hazardous jobs; crowded housing; lengthy family separation; discrimination; and a politically hostile climate (Hovey 2000; Massey and Sanchez 2010; Ullmann et al. 2011). NIH-PA Author Manuscript What are the consequences of the immigrant experience for immigrants’ health? The literature suggests that Mexican immigrants are positively selected for good health and healthy behaviors (the “healthy migrant effect”) but that living in the United States may lead to deterioration in both health and healthy behaviors of migrants (Ceballos and Palloni 2010; Kaestner et al. 2009; Oza-Frank et al. 2011; Riosmena and Dennis 2012). However, the evidence for both parts of this scenario is often contradictory and limited by available data. A study based on Mexican longitudinal data found only weak evidence of positive health selection for migrants (Rubalcava et al. 2008). However, studies using binational crosssectional data to compare Mexican immigrants in the United States with Mexican residents have argued more strongly in support of positive health selection (Barquera et al. 2008; Crimmins et al. 2005). Research on the effects of life in the United States on immigrant health is also problematic. Studies comparing immigrant duration cohorts cross-sectionally in the United States have generally suggested that immigrant health and health behaviors deteriorate with longer durations of residence (Abraído-Lanza et al. 2005; Lara et al. 2005). In contrast, some studies indicate that health trajectories are not monotonically related to time spent in the United States (Jasso et al. 2004; Teitler et al. 2012). NIH-PA Author Manuscript Many of the limitations characterizing previous research on immigrant health result from reliance on cross-sectional data. These studies did not have adequate information on premigration health, making it impossible to determine when health deterioration began. In addition, cross-sectional comparisons involve cohorts of immigrants with different characteristics that arrived in different time periods with distinct political and economic climates; comparisons are further biased by selective attrition of return migrants, who, on average, are less healthy than the stayers (i.e., the “salmon bias”; Riosmena et al. 2013). Moreover, cross-sectional studies cannot assess whether the observed health trajectories of immigrants differ from those of nonmigrants. Alternative strategies that compare U.S. emigrants who have returned to Mexico with those who remained in their home communities are also problematic because of potential health-selective return migration. In this article, we use data from the two waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) to explicitly examine short-term changes in health status for current migrants in the United States compared with return migrants and never migrants. Because the richness of data in the MxFLS permits extensive controls for the potential health selectivity of migrants, this article provides a significantly clearer picture of the consequences of immigration for Mexican migrant health than previous studies. Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �Goldman et al. Page 3 Background NIH-PA Author Manuscript The literature suggests several reasons why immigrant health may deteriorate in the United States. The first is inadequate access to health care, particularly for undocumented migrants (Nandi et al. 2008; Prentice et al. 2005; Vargas Bustamante et al. 2012). Having health insurance is a key predictor of access to health care, particularly for immigrants (Siddiqi et al. 2009). A second explanation is the detrimental effects of acculturation on health behaviors (i.e., poor diet, a sedentary lifestyle, and substance abuse) through exposure to U.S. society. In recent years, the acculturation literature has been strongly criticized (Carter-Pokras et al. 2008; Creighton et al. 2012; Hunt et al. 2004; Viruell-Fuentes 2007; Zambrana and CarterPokras 2010) for failing to take socioeconomic status seriously and for its limited theoretical grounding in the immigrant integration literature. A more nuanced interpretation of the acculturation hypothesis, drawn from the literature on segmented assimilation, suggests that Mexican immigrants may adopt the less healthy behaviors of lower-income Americans because many involuntarily join this social class upon entering the United States (AbraídoLanza et al. 2006). NIH-PA Author Manuscript Other hypotheses focus on social inequality as causes of declines in migrant health (ViruellFuentes et al. 2012). For example, the acculturative stress hypothesis suggests that because U.S. society views Mexican-origin immigrants as low status, immigrants face discrimination and chronic stress (Finch and Vega 2003). In addition, Mexican immigrants may live and work under unhealthy conditions that expose them to infectious disease, environmental toxins, injury, and other health risks (Acevedo-Garcia 2001; Kandel and Donato 2009; Orrenius and Zavodny 2009). NIH-PA Author Manuscript A related stressor is the increasingly hostile political climate for recent immigrants in the United States, including stronger border enforcement, restriction of access to welfare and Medicaid, and state anti-immigrant efforts (Cornelius 2001; Massey and Sanchez 2010). Discrimination, family cultural conflict and lengthy separation, a hostile political climate, loss of social support, and, after the 2008 economic crisis, fewer jobs are all likely to be stressful experiences, especially for undocumented immigrants, and are likely to have a more immediate impact on immigrants’ mental and physical health than poor access to health care or acculturation mechanisms. Despite these findings, it is possible that emigration to the United States improves Mexican migrants’ health. Residence in the United States has a consistently positive effect on the wealth of middle-aged and older Mexican return migrants (Wong et al. 2007), and income and wealth are strongly associated with better health (Marmot and Bell 2012). Mexican migrants, particularly documented ones, may also experience better working and housing conditions than they would have in Mexico. Previous studies have found that health care use and self-perceptions of health may improve with duration in the United States (Hummer et al. 2004; Lara et al. 2005) and that some health outcomes are better for immigrants who have resided in the United States for several years (Riosmena et al. 2013; Teitler et al. 2012). Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �Goldman et al. Page 4 NIH-PA Author Manuscript In this article, we examine whether the health of Mexican immigrants deteriorates or improves after migration to the United States. We explicitly compare changes in health status of recent immigrants with those of previous immigrants and with individuals who remained in Mexico. Because these three groups are likely to differ in initial health status (e.g., because of the healthy migrant effect and salmon bias), a critical part of this analysis is the introduction of extensive controls for baseline health status. Data NIH-PA Author Manuscript The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) has several advantages for this analysis: it interviews respondents at closely spaced waves that permit assessment of short-term changes in health for migrants to the United States and individuals who remain in or return to Mexico; it collects objective and subjective health assessments that provide controls for potential health selectivity of migrants; and it obtains detailed migration histories that allow us to distinguish among recent, earlier, and never migrants. The baseline survey in 2002 (MxFLS-1) interviewed all adult members residing in more than 8,440 households in 147 localities of Mexico (Rubalcava and Teruel 2006). Respondents in the baseline survey were reinterviewed in 2005–2006 (MxFLS-2) and 2009–2012 (MxFLS-3). MxFLS followed individuals who left their household of origin, irrespective of destination, including movers to the United States: of those sampled in MxFLS-1, more than 90% were located and interviewed again in MxFLS-2 (Rubalcava et al. 2008). This analysis is based on MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2; MxFLS-3 is not yet available. The sample includes respondents who are 20 years and older at baseline. Of the 19,132 ageappropriate respondents, one could not be matched to a municipality and was excluded. An additional 4,874 respondents did not report one or both of the health outcomes at follow-up. After exclusion of these respondents, the analytic sample comprises 14,257 adults. In exploratory analyses, we estimated a logistic model of the probability that a respondent was missing either of the two health outcomes. The results indicate that individuals with no previous migration history, those with more education, men, and individuals in their 20s were more likely to be missing outcomes than others. However, with these variables in the model, there were no significant differences by self-reported health status at baseline. NIH-PA Author Manuscript Variables Outcome Variables: Self-reported Health and Change in Health Despite the frequent use of self-reports of overall health to compare the well-being of various immigrant and native-born groups (e.g., Finch and Vega 2003), comparisons may be biased by differences in choice of reference group, degree of acculturation, and language of interview (Bzostek et al. 2007). Because this analysis examines changes in reported health for a given individual, such biases are likely to be substantially reduced. We consider two outcomes—self-rated health (SRH) and perceived change in health—each with five possible responses: “much better,” “better,” “the same,” “worse,” and “much worse.” The SRH question in MxFLS-2 for both Mexican residents and immigrants in the United States, is as follows: Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �Goldman et al. Page 5 If you compare yourself with people of the same age and sex, would you say that your health is (…)? NIH-PA Author Manuscript With controls for SRH at baseline, an analysis of SRH at follow-up implicitly examines change in the respondent’s health between interviews. The second outcome is a direct assessment of change, based on different questions for respondents in the United States and in Mexico. Respondents in Mexico were asked: Comparing your health to a year ago, would you say your health now is (…)? Respondents interviewed in the United States were instead asked: Comparing your health to just before you came to the United States, would you say your health now is (…)? Calculations indicate that the average time since migration to the United States for current migrants is 1.6 years—only slightly longer than the explicit period of 1 year used in the Mexico interviews. NIH-PA Author Manuscript Because few respondents reported the extreme categories of “much better” or “much worse,” the five response categories were collapsed into three: “much better” and “better” were combined into a single category, as were “much worse” and “worse;” “same” health is the reference category. Migrant Status We categorize respondents as “current,” “return,” and “never” migrants. Current migrants migrated after the baseline survey and were interviewed in the United States in MxFLS-2. Return migrants were interviewed in Mexico at Wave 2 but had previous migration experience to the United States; they include long-term and temporary migrants as well as those who migrated to the United States between survey waves but returned to Mexico before the second interview. Never migrants reported no international migration experience by Wave 2. Control Variables NIH-PA Author Manuscript To account for potential differences in the health status of migrants, return migrants, and nonmigrants at baseline that are not captured by SRH, we include four health variables in addition to SRH, all measured at Wave 1. Obesity, anemia, and hypertension are derived from assessments conducted in the home by a trained health worker. Obesity is defined as a body mass index (BMI) ≥30 based on height and weight measurements (WHO 2000). Individuals are classified as anemic for the following hemoglobin (Hb) levels: Hb<130 g/L for males or Hb<120 g/L for females (WHO 2000). Individuals with elevated systolic (mmHg≥140) and/or diastolic (mmHg≥90) blood pressure are considered hypertensive (WHO 2000). The final health measure reflects whether the respondent had been hospitalized in the past year. Two measures of socioeconomic status provide additional controls for potential selectivity of migrants: (1) years of schooling, and (2) log per capita household expenditure. The latter Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �Goldman et al. Page 6 NIH-PA Author Manuscript measure has been used to assess household economic well-being in a broad range of contexts, including Mexico (Contreras 2003; Rubalcava et al. 2009; Xu et al. 2009). All models also control for sex and age (linear and quadratic terms). Municipal Controls Because the literature suggests that migration decisions depend on place of origin (Rubalcava et al. 2008) and migration flows at the municipality level are likely to be related to unobserved characteristics (e.g., human capital) of residents, we include three variables at the municipality level. A municipality was coded as rural if there were fewer than 2,500 residents (INEGI 2003). We also include two measures based on the 2000 Mexican Census: (1) a marginalization index derived from a factor analysis of municipal-level measures of education, housing, income, and schooling (Luis-Ávila et al. 2001); and (2) a measure of migration intensity based on the number of return migrants, current migrants, and amount of remittances received by households (Tuirán et al. 2002). Both measures are categorized as “low,” “medium,” and “high.” Methods NIH-PA Author Manuscript As described earlier, we classify both health outcome variables (self-rated health at Wave 2 relative to someone of the same age and sex and perceived health change over the year prior to Wave 2) as better, same, or worse health. For each of the two health outcomes, we fit multinomial regression models, with “same” health as the reference category, to estimate relative risk ratios (RRRs) for worse relative to same health and RRRs for better relative to same health. We estimate a set of three models that sequentially includes (1) migrant status, baseline SRH, age and sex; (2) objective health measures; (3) socioeconomic status and municipal-level characteristics. The estimate of primary interest pertains to current migrants: that is, is health at follow-up or perceived change in health of current migrants better, worse, or the same as that of never or return migrants? NIH-PA Author Manuscript We use multiple imputation to estimate a response for explanatory variables with missing values (see Table 1 for the frequency of missing data). We create five imputed data sets. The imputation models include all covariates with complete information as well as a variable denoting household size (to improve overall model fit). The estimated RRRs in the results section are derived from average values of the coefficients across the five imputed data sets. The sample is clustered at two levels: 14,257 adults are drawn from 7,200 households and 136 municipalities. To account for the dependence of observations, we use robust standard errors clustered at the household level to calculate variances under multiple imputation. The estimates are computed in Stata 12 using the mlogit command (StataCorp 2011). Results Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. At each wave, about 60 % of respondents evaluate their overall health the same as someone of the same age and sex, and only about 8 % rate their health as worse. Almost twice as many respondents note an improvement as Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �Goldman et al. Page 7 compared with a deterioration in health over the period. About 5 % of the respondents are current or return migrants. NIH-PA Author Manuscript The relative risk ratios (RRRs, or exponentiated coefficients) in Table 2 pertain to self-rated health at follow-up. Based on Model 3, the estimated RRR for current migrants is 1.7 (p < . 05) for worse compared with the same health and 1.3 (p < .05) for better compared with the same health (relative to a never migrant). In other words, current migrants in the United States are less likely than never migrants to rate themselves as having the same health status as someone of their age and sex: they are more apt to rate their health both worse and better —but especially worse than their peers—at the second interview. The estimates for return migrants are not significantly different from those for never migrants. Estimates for the control variables generally conform to expectation. NIH-PA Author Manuscript Because RRRs are difficult to interpret, in upcoming Table 4, we present predicted probabilities of worse, same, or better health at follow-up by migrant status. Each estimate was determined by setting all explanatory variables except migrant status at their observed values for each individual, setting migrant status to the same value for all individuals (never, return, or current migrant) and calculating the mean prediction from the model. The first panel, which shows predictions based on Model 3 in Table 2, underscores the results noted earlier: at follow-up, current migrants are considerably more likely (by nearly 50 %) than never migrants to rate their health as worse than someone of the same age and sex and only slightly more likely (by about 13 %) to rate their health as better. The RRRs in Table 3 are based on respondents’ assessments of the change in their health status. Consistent with the previous estimates, the RRRs for deteriorating health are large and significant for current migrants (1.9 in Model 3). In contrast, the RRRs for improving health are not significantly different from one for current migrants. As with SRH, the RRRs for return migrants are not significantly different from one for either deteriorating or improving health. The predicted probabilities in the second panel of Table 4 indicate that the health of current migrants is about 60 % more likely than that of never migrants to have worsened in the recent past and only very slightly (and insignificantly) more likely to have improved. NIH-PA Author Manuscript Discussion The central question of this analysis has been whether migrants from Mexico to the United States experience changes in their health after they move. This simple question has not been adequately answered by prior research because of the dearth of appropriate data. However, through data collection efforts in Mexico and the United States at the second wave, and extensive baseline information on variables potentially related to the health selectivity of migrants, the MxFLS permits us to address this issue in a methodologically appropriate way. Two outcome variables—SRH at the second wave and self-assessment of recent change in health status—provide insights into the changing health status of current migrants relative to others. Both measures indicate that current migrants are more likely to have experienced recent changes in health status—both improvements and declines—than either earlier Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �Goldman et al. Page 8 NIH-PA Author Manuscript migrants or nonmigrants. This is perhaps not surprising because migration to the United States is associated with changes in many of the determinants of health status, including access to health care, exposure to stressful experiences and health risks, and lifestyle. Moreover, the fact that some migrants report better health while others report worse health is consistent with the notion of multiple acculturative processes that ultimately lead to distinct mental and physical health outcomes (Castro 2013). An important question concerns the net change in health status: compared with residents in Mexico, was improvement in health as prevalent as deterioration in health among current migrants? Because migrants may use a different reference group to evaluate their health status in the United States than they used three years earlier in Mexico (Bzostek et al. 2007), respondents’ direct assessments of changes in their recent health status may be more informative. Our results demonstrate that the net change across the sample of current migrants is a decline in their overall health relative to the other groups. NIH-PA Author Manuscript Although this finding is consistent with the large literature on deteriorating migrant health with length of residence in the United States, our study is the first (to our knowledge) to demonstrate that declines in self-assessed health appear quickly after migrants’ arrival in the United States. Most previous studies suggest that recent Mexican immigrants in the United States are in better health compared with longer-term migrants and the U.S.-born population. However, comparisons based only on U.S. residents miss an important part of the picture: they ignore changes in individual immigrant health in the year or so after migration (compared with migrants’ own health before migration and that of nonmigrants). Our results suggest that the migration process itself and/or the experiences of the immediate postmigration period detrimentally affect Mexican immigrants’ health. NIH-PA Author Manuscript The speed with which declines occur suggests that the process of acculturation, which tends to unfold over numerous years (Antecol and Bedard 2006; Creighton et al. 2012), is unlikely to account for most of the decline in migrant health status. Instead, we speculate that the process of border crossing for undocumented immigrants—now more costly and dangerous than in the past (Gathmann 2008; US GAO 2006) —combined with the physical and psychological costs of finding work and lodging in the United States, lack of health care, and the stress of undocumented status can cause rapid deterioration in immigrants’ physical and mental well-being and hence perceptions of their own health. Regardless of documentation status, many immigrants face extreme poverty, isolation from families, and harsh work conditions after arrival that may affect their health assessment. Unfortunately, given the limited set of health questions asked of migrants at the second wave, we cannot provide a more nuanced analysis of how physical and mental well-being change. Moreover, the sample size of individuals who migrated between MxFLS-1 and MxFLS-2 is not sufficiently large to consider how working and housing conditions, diet, social interactions, lack of access to health care, financial stress, and other factors moderate the relationship between migration and health. With the availability of the third wave of MxFLS, collected in 2009–2012, many such questions can be addressed in the future. Objective markers of health status collected in the Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �Goldman et al. Page 9 NIH-PA Author Manuscript third wave for migrants and nonmigrants alike will yield a more precise description of the ways in which health status has evolved. In addition, the inclusion of migrants between the second and third waves will not only yield a larger sample of migrants but will also permit an analysis of whether migrants who came to the United States during the past few years—a period with an especially hostile political climate and an economic recession—experienced even worse health outcomes than the migrants analyzed in this study. Acknowledgments The authors gratefully acknowledge support for this project from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (R01HD051764, R24HD047879, R03HD040906, and R01HD047522) and from CONACYT-SEDESOL (2004-01). We would like to thank Germán Rodríguez for statistical advice and Erika Arenas for assistance in data collection and preparation of the data set for this analysis. References NIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript Abraído-Lanza AF, Armbrister AN, Flórez KR, Aguirre AN. 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Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �NIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript 3,137 391 306 Return Current Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. –– –– –– –– –– Obese Anemic Hypertensive Hospitalized in previous year 9,520 2,729 2,008 Low Medium High Marginalization Index –– 4,298 Better Age (years) 7,461 Same Male 1,008 Worse Self-rated health status relative to same age and sex (MxFLS-1) 13,560 Never Migrant status (MxFLS-2) Explanatory 14.1 19.1 66.8 –– –– –– –– –– –– 33.7 58.4 7.9 2.2 2.7 95.1 22.0 9,385 Better 65.8 1,735 Same 12.2 30.9 60.9 8.3 % Worse Perceived change in health status (MxFLS-2) 4,398 8,676 Better 1,183 Same Count Worse Self-rated health status relative to same age and sex (MxFLS-2) Outcome Variable –– –– –– 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.33 42.22 0.43 –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– Mean –– –– –– 0.23 0.47 0.24 0.47 15.74 0.49 –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– SD Description of the outcome and explanatory variables in the analytic sample 0.0 10.5 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 % Missing NIH-PA Author Manuscript Table 1 Goldman et al. Page 12 �N –– –– Rural Years of education Log per capita expenditure 14,257 –– –– High –– –– 9.7 13.1 1,376 1,860 Medium 77.3 11,021 Low Migration intensity index 6.88 6.31 0.44 –– –– –– Mean 1.08 4.40 0.50 –– –– –– SD 3.5 1.2 0.0 0.0 % Missing NIH-PA Author Manuscript % NIH-PA Author Manuscript Count NIH-PA Author Manuscript Variable Goldman et al. Page 13 Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �NIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript −5.76 −1.81 13.06 0.688 *** 1.604 *** 0.954 3.377 *** 0.944 Male Age (years)a Age Squared SRH at MxFLS-1 (ref. = same) Worse Better 1.658 *** Hospitalized in previous year Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. 0.937 1.129 Return Current Migrant status (ref. = never) 0.93 1.122 0.88 1.060 Log per capita expenditure −0.53 1.99 0.940 1.303 * 1.86 −5.71 0.939 *** Years of education Contrast: Better (vs. same) –1.31 −0.02 0.903 0.998 High 1.72 0.06 2.30 4.08 −1.70 0.87 3.42 −0.17 11.96 −0.87 6.70 −4.08 2.49 −0.73 t Rural 1.216 Medium Migration intensity index (ref. = low) 1.006 High 1.668 *** 0.887 1.111 1.264 ** 0.984 3.122 *** 0.977 1.402 *** 0.760 *** 1.707 * 0.858 RRR 1.240 * −0.60 4.05 −1.64 1.10 3.22 −0.62 12.72 −1.71 10.79 −4.70 2.70 −0.78 t Model 3 Medium 0.934 0.890 Hypertensive −0.57 1.140 Anemic Marginalization index (ref. = low) 1.245 ** 0.944 3.311 *** 0.956 1.621 *** 0.732 *** 1.789 ** 0.851 RRR Model 2 Obese −0.62 11.00 2.56 −0.72 1.731 * 0.861 t Current Return Migrant status (ref. = never) Contrast: Worse (vs. same) RRR Model 1 Relative risk ratios (RRRs) and t statistics from multinomial logistic model of self-rated health status (SRH) relative to same age and sex at MxFLS-2 NIH-PA Author Manuscript Table 2 Goldman et al. Page 14 �14,257 0.08 5.97 4.44 1.034 *** 1.093 *** Years of education Log per capita expenditure −4.26 1.004 0.722 *** High Rural 1.012 Medium 0.15 −5.32 0.666 *** Migration intensity index (ref. = low) −1.23 0.925 High 0.58 −1.33 −0.98 −1.36 10.21 −0.36 −1.31 Medium 1.053 0.943 0.920 0.944 1.541 *** 0.970 0.977 0.03 3.32 1.091 ** t 1.001 RRR Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. p < .001 *** p < .01; ** p < .05; Age is standardized by centering on the mean of 42.2 years in standard deviation (15.7 years) unit. * a Notes: Based on five multiple imputations of missing values. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level. N 1.46 1.137 Marginalization index (ref. = low) Hospitalized in previous year −0.95 0.960 −1.52 0.880 Hypertensive −0.85 12.07 −0.78 Anemic 1.653 *** 0.937 −1.33 0.17 0.88 t 0.965 12.05 1.652 *** 0.977 1.004 1.033 RRR Obese −0.76 0.938 Better −1.21 Worse 0.979 Age squared SRH at MxFLS-1 (ref. = same) –0.26 0.91 1.033 0.994 Male NIH-PA Author Manuscript Age (years) t RRR Model 3 NIH-PA Author Manuscript Model 2 NIH-PA Author Manuscript Model 1 Goldman et al. Page 15 �NIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript -8.59 15.89 -3.43 0.631 *** 1.774 *** 0.927 ** Male Age (Years)1 Age Squared 2.22 1.293 * Hospitalized in Previous Year Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. 2.09 1.130 * 1.055 0.975 1.296 * 0.937 -5.14 0.958 *** 1.034 Years of Education Log Per Capita Expenditure 1.25 -1.65 0.895 5.10 1.535 *** High Rural 3.63 1.402 *** Medium -0.27 0.69 2.22 -1.04 0.52 2.72 1.188 ** 1.060 9.22 -2.92 11.73 -7.16 3.46 -0.85 t 2.241 *** 0.937 ** 1.609 *** 0.673 *** High Migration Intensity Index (ref=Low) (3) 1.909 ** 0.870 RRR Medium Marginalization Index (ref=Low) -1.18 0.929 Hypertensive 0.44 1.60 1.90 1.049 1.127 Anemic 1.89 10.15 -3.38 15.54 -7.93 4.33 -0.29 t 1.098 1.126 Better 2.393 *** 0.928 ** 1.787 *** 0.649 *** 2.227 *** 0.955 RRR (2) Models Obese 2.416 *** Worse 10.34 4.28 2.202 *** Current SRH at MxFLS-1 (ref=Same) -0.25 0.961 t Return Migrant Status (ref=Never) Contrast: Worse (vs. Same) RRR (1) Relative Risk Ratios (RRRs) and t-statistics from Multinomial Model of Perceived Change in Health Status Relative to Previous Year or Prior to Migration NIH-PA Author Manuscript Table 3 Goldman et al. Page 16 �Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. 0.834 *** 1.038 Age (Years) Age Squared -3.27 0.776 ** High -0.60 2.43 0.996 1.056 * Years of Education Log Per Capita Expenditure N 0.77 1.043 -3.78 0.734 *** High Rural -2.20 0.832 * Medium Migration Intensity Index (ref=Low) -2.62 2.97 0.81 0.17 0.02 4.73 0.836 ** 1.309 ** 1.041 1.016 1.001 1.243 *** 1.48 2.06 1.042 * 1.144 -6.59 -3.63 1.16 0.15 t 0.830 *** 0.856 *** 1.192 1.020 RRR Medium 14257 3.44 1.362 ** Hospitalized in Previous Year Marginalization Index (ref=Low) 1.12 1.057 0.00 1.000 Hypertensive 0.35 5.51 1.41 Anemic 1.286 *** 1.136 1.86 -7.52 -3.49 0.36 -0.24 t 1.016 5.49 1.285 *** Better 1.038 0.830 *** 0.862 *** 1.055 0.970 RRR Obese 1.58 1.153 Worse p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * -7.56 0.855 *** Male SRH at MxFLS-1 (ref=Same) -3.85 1.048 1.90 0.31 0.972 Current -0.22 t Return Migrant Status (ref=Never) Contrast: Better (vs. Same) NIH-PA Author Manuscript RRR (2) (3) NIH-PA Author Manuscript (1) NIH-PA Author Manuscript Models Goldman et al. Page 17 �NIH-PA Author Manuscript Age is standardized by centering around the mean of 42.2 years in standard deviation (15.7 years) unit. 1 Note: Based on five multiple imputations of missing values. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level. p<0.001 NIH-PA Author Manuscript *** Goldman et al. Page 18 NIH-PA Author Manuscript Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. �Goldman et al. Page 19 Table 4 NIH-PA Author Manuscript Average predicted probabilities of self-rated health status at Wave 2a and perceived change in health statusb by migrant status Migrant Status Outcome Never Return Current Worse .0826 .0735 .1199 Same .6096 .6281 .5316 Self-rated Health Status (MxFLS-2) Better .3078 .2983 .3485 Totalc 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 Worse .1208 .1072 .1939 Same .6596 .6668 .5764 Perceived Change in Health Status Better .2195 .2259 .2297 Totalc 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 NIH-PA Author Manuscript Notes: Predicted probabilities were determined by setting all explanatory variables except migrant status at their observed values for each individual, setting migrant status to the same value for all individuals (never, return, current migrants), and calculating the mean prediction from the model. a Based on Model 3 in Table 2. b Based on Model 3 in Table 3. c Some columns may not sum exactly to 1.0000 because of rounding. NIH-PA Author Manuscript Demography. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 August 01. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Consequences of Migration to the United States for Short-term Changes in the Health of Mexican Immigrants Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Goldman, Noreen Pebley, Anne, R Creighton, Matthew, J Teruel, Graciela M., 1968- Rubalcava, Luis, N Chang, Chan Subject The topic of the resource Mexican Immigration Healthcare Description An account of the resource Although many studies have attempted to examine the consequences of Mexico-U.S. migration for Mexican immigrants’ health, few have had adequate data to generate the appropriate comparisons. In this article, we use data from two waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) to compare the health of current migrants from Mexico with those of earlier migrants and nonmigrants. Because the longitudinal data permit us to examine short-term changes in health status subsequent to the baseline survey for current migrants and for Mexican residents, as well as to control for the potential health selectivity of migrants, the results provide a clearer picture of the consequences of immigration for Mexican migrant health than have previous studies. Our findings demonstrate that current migrants are more likely to experience recent changes in health status—both improvements and declines—than either earlier migrants or nonmigrants. The net effect, however, is a decline in health for current migrants: compared with never migrants, the health of current migrants is much more likely to have declined in the year or two since migration and not significantly more likely to have improved. Thus, it appears that the migration process itself and/or the experiences of the immediate post-migration period detrimentally affect Mexican immigrants’ health. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Author Manuscript Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2014—8 Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Research Article Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4165490/. Language A language of the resource English https://dh.scu.edu/exhibits/files/original/90/2939/Immigration_and_Naturalization_Service_v._Errico.pdf 65e2d78b5c6998fa8abc210148bb4121 PDF Text Text Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico Source: Center for Migration Studies (NY) Contributed by: United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/community.29562889 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Center for Migration Studies (NY) is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Center for Migration Studies (NY) This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �214 OCTOBER TERM, 19~6. I Opinion of the- Court'. . 385 U.S. 214 - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION - -. SERVICE _v. ERRICO .. .CERTIO.RARL TO----T.HE UNITED STATES-COURT OF APPEALS' FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 54. _Arg~ed Oct-ob~r w; 1966 ...:.,.Decided December 12, 1966.* • &lction ·24f(f)" of the Immigration .and· Nationality Act, which ex.·- empts from deportation .an alien who obtained a -irisa and entry - ·to the United States by fraud and misrepresentation where the alien is the spouse, pa.rent or child of an .American citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and was uotherwise admissible at the time of entry," is construed, in the light of its humanitarian purpose of preventing the breaking up of families, to save from deportation such aliens \vbo misrepresented their status for the purpose of evading quota restrictions. Pp. 217-225. No. 54, 349 F. 2d 541, affirmed; No. 91, 350 F. 2d 279, reversed. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for petitioner in No. 54 and for respondent in No. 91. • With · him on the briefs were Assi.stant Attorney General Vinson, Louis F. Claiborne, L. Paul Winings and Charles Gordon. Frank I erulli argued the cause for respondent in No. 54. With him on the brief was Edu!'in J. Peterson. Julius C. Biervliet argued the cause for petitioner in No. 91. With him on the brief was Edward Q. Carr, Jr. MR. CHIEF JusTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. We granted certiorari in these cases to resolve a conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits on their interpretations of § 241 (f) the Immigration and j' 9pinion of the Court. Nationality Act.' The issue is identical in both case,; and, therefore, Iends itself to· a _single opinion .. - Section 24i ( f) reads as :follows: ·"The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of _ . •. - ·entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have •· ·. procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien othernise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." The issue is whether the statute saves from deportation an alien who misrepresents his status for the purpose of e:vading quota restrictions, if he has the necessary familial relationship to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. Respondent Errico in No. 54, a native of Italy, falsely represented to the immigration authorities that he was •a skilled mechanic with specialized experience in repairing foreign automobiles. On the hasis of that misrepresentation he was granted first preference quota status under the statutory preference scheme then in effect, and entered the United States in 1959 with his wife. A child was born to the couple in 1960 and acquired United States citizenship at birth. In 1963 deportation proc~edings were commenced against Errico on the ground that he was excludable at the time of entry as not "of the proper status under the quota specified in the illh'lligrant visa." ' ot ""'Together with No. 91, Scott, aka Plummer v. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-vice, on certiorari to -the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms '75 Stat. 655 (1961), 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (f). 2 Section 211 (a) (4) of the Immigration. and Nationality Act, 66 StaL 181 (1952), later amended, 79 Stat. 917 (1965), 8 U. S. C. § 1181 (a) (1964 ed., ·Supp. I). Aliens who we~e excludable at the time of entry under the law then existing are deportable under § 241 (a)(!), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(!). �IMMIGRATION SERVICE v. ERRICO. . OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 216 Opinion of_ the Court. - . . - ' 385 U.S. 217 Opinion of the Court. 214 - Throughout the. proceedings Errico insisted that he was . __ .· s:w~cffrom deportat1oii by § 241 (f). -• .The special inquiry . ···• _officer of the Immigrationc'and Naturalization Service · .• ruled that reliefunder.§ 241 (f) was not availabl~ because . Errico had. not complied with quota requirements and, -. hence, was_ not. ':otherwise adm1ssible· at the time of -•·••entry.". Tlie Board of Irrimigr!l,tion Appeals affirmed the . deportatiorr order but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth · Circuit reversed, holding that. the construction of the · statute adopted by the Board would strip it of practically all mearring, since a material misrepresentation would presumably be given to conceal some factor that would bear on admissibility. 349 F. 2d 541. We granted certiorari. 383 U. S. 941. Petitioner Scott in No. 91, a native of Jamaica, contracted a marriage with a United States citizen by proxy solely for the purpose of obtaining nonquota status for entry into the country. She has never lived. with her husband and never intended to do so. After entering the United States in 1958, she gave birth to an illegitimate child, who became an American citizen at birth. When the fraud was discovered, deportation proceedings were begun, and a special inquiry officer of the Immigration ~ and Naturalization Service found her deportable on the ·· ground that she was not a non quota immigrant as specified in her visa.' The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Board .. 350 F. 2d 279. The -court agreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals that a shani marriage contracted solely to circumvent the immigration laws would not confer nonquota status on an . alien as the spouse of an 1\illerican citizen. It also af. firmed the ruling that Mrs. Scott was not entitled to relief · . under § 241 ( f) because she was not otherwise admissible 'Section 211 (a) (3), 66 Stat. 181 (1952), later amended, 79 Stat. 917 (1965), 8 U.S. C. § 1181 (a) (196.J. ed., Supp. 1). at tke time.of entry, since her country's quota was over-• subscribed. - We granted.certiorari. .. 383 U.S. 941. At the outset it should be noted that even the Government agrees that § 241 (f) cannot be applied with strict literalness. Literally, § 241 (f) applies only when the alien is charged with entering in violation of § 212 (a)(19) of the statute, which excludes from entry "[a]ny alien who ... has procured a visa or other documentation ... by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact."' Under this interpretation, an alien who entered by fraud could be deported for having entered with a defective visa or for other documentary irregularities even if he would have been admissible if he had not committed the fraud. The Government concedes that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the manifest purpose of the section, and the administrative ·authorities have consistently held that § 241 (f) waives any deportation charge that results directly from the misrepresentation regardless of the section of the statute under which the charge was brought, provided that the alien was "otherwise admissible at the time of entry." ' The Government's argument in both cases is that to be otherwise admissible at the time of entry the alien must show that he would have been admitted even if he had not lied, and that the aliens in these cases would not have been admitted because of the quota restrictions. It is the argument of the aliens that our adoption of the government thesis would negate the intention of Congress to apply fair humanitarian standards in granting relief from the consequences of their fraud to aliens who are close relatives of United States citizens, and that the statute would have practically no effect if construed as the Government argues, since it 66 Stat. 183 (1952), as amended; 8 U. S. C. § 1182 (a) (19). 'See Matter of S-, 7 L & N. Dec. 715 (1958); Matter of Y-, 8 L & N. Dec. 143 (1959). 4 233-£53 0 - 67 - 21 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �218 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Oplnion of the Court. JNHvllGRATIU~ ~Ei-tVICE v. ElU\.il:U. 385 U.S. requires a considerable stretch of the imagination to con. ceive of an alien making a material misrepresentation that did not conceaLsome factor that would make him inadmissible. The sharp divergence of opm10n among the circuit judges in these cases indicates that the meaning of the words "otherwise admissible" is not obvious. An inter.pretation -0f these words requires close attention to the · language of § 241 (f), to the language of its predecessor, § 7 of the 1957 Act,' and to the legislative history of these provisions. The legislative history begins with the enactment of the Displaced Persons_ Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009. This Act provided for the admission to the United States of thousands of war refugees, many from countries that had fallen behind the Iron Curtain. Some of these refugees misrepresented their nationality or homeland while in Europe to avoid being repatriated to a Communist country. In so doing, however, they fell afoul of § 10 of the Act, which provided that persons making wil1ful misrepresentations for the purpose of gaining admission "shall thereafter not be admissible into the United States." The plight of these refugees, who were excluded from the United States for misrepresentations that were generally felt to be justifiable, inspired recurring proposals for stat- • utory reform. When the Act was revised and codified in 1952, the House Committee recommended adding a provision to save such refugees from deportation when they had misrepresented their nationality or homeland only to avoid repatriation and persecution.' The Conference Committee deleted the provision, but announced its sympathy with the refugees in the following terms: "It is also the opipion of the conferees that the sections of the bill which provide for the exclusion 'Pub. L. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639 (1957). See H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 128 (1952). 7 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 214 21'..,i Opinion of the Court. of aliens who obtained travel documents by fraud or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact, should n~t serve to exclude or to deport certain bona fide refugees who in fear of being forcibly repatriated to their former homelands misrepresented their place of birth when applying for a visa and such misrepresentation did not have as its basis the desire to ·• evade the quota provisions of the law or an investi. gation in the place of their ·former residence. · The conferees wish to emphasize that in applying fair humanitarian standards in the administrative adjudication of such cases, every effort is to be made to prevent the evasion of law by fraud and to protect the interest of the United States." H. R. Rep. No. 2096, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 128 ( 1952). The Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Attorney General did not construe the statute as the Conference Committee had recommended, believing that the explicit statutory language did not allow for an exemption for justifiable misrepresentations. Refugees who misrepresented their place of origin were always found to have concealed a material fact, since the misrepresentation hindered an investigation of their background.' The misrepresentation section was not the only provision of the 1952 legislation that was widely thought to be unnecessarily harsh and restrictive, and in 1957 Congress passed legislation alleviating in many respects the stricter provisions of the earlier legislation. The purpose of the 1957 Act is perfectly clear from its terms, as well as from the relevant House and Senate Com8 See Matter of B- and p_:., 2 I. & N. Dec. 638 (1947); H. R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10 (1957). �IMMIGRATION SERVICE v. ERRICO. OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 220 Opinion of the Court. 385 U.S. mittee Reports.' .The most important provisions of the act provide for _special nonquota status for the adopted children or illegitimate children of immigrant parents, and for orphans who have been or are to be adopted by United States citizens. Other important provisions allow the Attorney General to waive certain grounds for exclusion deportation, including ·afiliction with tubercuIos1s or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, on behalf of aliens who are near relatives of United States citizens or of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The intent of the Act is plainly to grant exceptions to the rigorous provisions of the 1952 Act for the purpose of keeping family units together. Congress felt that 1 in many circumstances, it was more important to unite famiJje§ and nreserxe family ties than it was to enfor~e strictly the anota limitations or even the many restrictive sections that are designed to keep or undesirable or harmful aliens Qllt gf the qguptry. 10 In this context it is not sur rising that Congress% also re e. to aliens facing exclusion or eporta 10n 9 "The legislative history of the lmmigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates that the Congress intended to provide for a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united." H. R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., !st Sess., p. 7 (1957). See also S. Rep. Ne. 1057, S5th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). 10 It is in this context that the legislative history cited in the dissent should be understood. The remarks of Senator Eastland and Congressman Celler quoted in footnote 4 of the dissent in context do not refer to § 7 of the Act but to the provisions of the bill providing for the adoption of alien orphans. Furthermore, Senator Eastland and Congressman Celler did not mean that no exceptions to the quota requirements were intended to be created, because the basic purpose of the bill was to relax th~ quota system for adopted children and for certain other classes of ~liens deemed ··deserving of relief. They were reassuring their colleagues that no fundamental chancres 0 in the quota system were contemplated. __ This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 221 Opinion of -the Court. 214 t10n. ec 10n - rovided that: . "The provisions of section 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as '(1) aliens who have sought to procure, or.have pro. -cured visas or other' documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation, · or (2) aliens who were not of the nationality specified in their visas, shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who (A) is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; or (B) was admitted to the United States between December 22, 1945, and November 1, 1954, both dates inclusive, and misrepresented his nationality, place of birth, identity, or residence in applying for a visa: Provided, That such alien described in clause (B) shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the misrepresentation was predicated upon the alien's fear of persecution because of race, religion, or political opinion if repatriated to his former home or residence, and was not committed for the purpose of evading the quota restrictions of the immigration laws or an investigation of the alien at the place of his former home, or residence, or elsewhere. After the effective date of this Act, any alien who is the spouse, parent, or child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence and who is excludable because (1) he seeks, has sought to pro. cure, or has procured, a visa or other documentation, or entry into the United States, by fraud or misrepresentation, or (2) he admits the· commission of �222 IMMIGRATION SERVICE v. ERRICO. OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U.S. 214 223 Opinion of the Court. • , _perjury in connection therewith, shall hereafter be granted a visa and admitted to the United States for permanent residence, if otherwise admissible, if the Attorney General in his discretion has consented . to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa and for admission to.the United States." · ·This section waived deportation under certain circum. stances for two classes of aliens who had entered by· fraud or misrepresentation. First, an alien who was "the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen . . ." was saved from deportation for his fraud if he was "otherwise admissible at the time of entry." Second, an alien who entered during the postwar period and misrepresented his nationality, place of birth, iden. tity, or residence was saved from deportation if he was "otherwise admissible at the time of entry" and if he could "establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the misrepresentation was predicated upon the alien's fear of persecution because of race, religion, or political opinion if repatriated to his former home or residence, and was not committed for the purpose of evading the quota restrictions of the immigration laws or an investigation of the alien at the place of his former home, or residence, or elsewhere." This language would be meaningless if an alien who comIUitted fraud for the. purpose of evadmg quota restnct10ns would be deportable as not "otherwise admissible at the time of entry." t.Congress must have felt that aliens who evaded quotri'.restrictions by fmnd woulrl be "otherwise admissibl~ at ·the time of entry) or _it would not have found 1t necessary to provide further that, in the case of an alien not possessing a close familial relationship to a United States citizen or lawful per- This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms manent resident, the fraud inust not be for the purpose of evading quota restrictions. · This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Congress further specified that the aliens who were not close relatives of United States citizens must establish that their fraud was not committed for the purpose of evading an investigation. Fraud for the purpose of evading an investigation, if forgiven by the statute, would clearly leave the alien "otherwise admissible" if there were no other disqualifying factor. Elementary principles of statutory construction lead to the conclusion that~- gress meant to enecif;v two speqifiq types of fraud that would leave gp @lien "otherwise admissible" bnt t.bat would nonetheless bar reJief to those aligp§ who could not G]aim close reJBtionsbin with a Jinited StateB citi;wn r or flljer JawfuJJy ndwiHcd £0- permanent resioenqe ~ The present § 241 (f) is essentially a re-enactment of § 7 of the 1957 Act. The legislative history leaves no doubt that no substantive change in the section was intended.u The provision dealing with aliens who had entered the United States between 1945 and 1954, and had misrepresented their nationality for fear of persecution or repatriation, was omitted because it had accomplished its purpose; the rest of the section was retained intact.'' It could hardly be argued that Congress intended to change the construction of the statute by this codification. , The intent of § 7 of the 1957-Act !'0t to require that aliens who are close relatives of United States citizens have complied with quota restrictions to escape deportation for their fraud is clear from its language, and there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress had in mind a contrary result. The only specific n H. R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 37 (1961). See also 107 Cong. Rec. 19653-19654 (1961) (remarks of Senator Eastland). "H. R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 37 (1961). �224 IMMIGRATION SERVICE v. ERRICO. OCTOBER TERM, 1966. Opinion of the Court. 385 U.S. reference to the part of § 7 that deals with close relatives of United States citizens residents is in the House Committee Report, and it says only that most of the persons eligible for relief wonld be "Mexican nationals, who, d~ring the time when --_bOrder-control operatiaDS- Si1ffered from regrettable. :-laxity;·were Sbl to ·eff(er the TTni+ed States estab...: · · lish a family in this country, and were subsequently found to r · · the United States illegally."· . R. Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11. Without doubt most of the aliens who had obtained entry into the United States by illegal means were Mexicans, because it has always been far easier to avoid border restrictions when entering from Mexico than when entering from countries that do not have a common land border with the United States. There is nothincr in the Committee Report to indicate that relief under the section was intended to be restricted to J\,fexicans, 110wever. Neither does it follow that, because Mexicans are not subject to quota restrictions, therefore nationals of countries that do have a quota must be within the quota to obtain relief. The construction o1 the statute that we adopt in these cases is further reinforced when the section is regarded in the context of the 1957 Act. The fundamental purpose of this legislation was to unite families. Refugees from Communist lands were also benefited, but the Act principally granted relief to persons who would be temporarily or permanently separated from their nearest relatives if the strict requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including the national quotas, were not relaxed for them. It was '¾·holly consistent with this urpose for Congress to provide that immigrants who ained a mission by misrepresentaf ou no e because their countries' oversubscribed when the or 0 - 0 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 214 STEWART, 225 J., dissenting. effect of deportation .would be to se arate families compose m-par.t of American citizens or lawful permanen residents. · · .. Even if there were some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor. of the alien. As this Court has held, even where a punitive section is being construed: . " .• · .. - . . ''We resolve doubts in favor of that constru~~ tion because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile, DelgadiU.o v. Carmic/w,el, 332 U. S. 388. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this ·country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the . stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used." Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10. See also Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U. S. 637, 642-643. The 1957 Act was not a punitive statute, and § 7 of that Act, now codified as § 241 (f), in particular was designed to accomplish a humanitarian result. We conclude that to give meaning to the statute in the light of its humanitarian purpose of preventing the breaking up of families composed in part at least of American citizens, the conflict between the circuits must be resolved in favor of the aliens, and that the Errico decision must be affirmed and the Scott decision reversed. It is so ordered. the with whom MR. JUSTICE and Ma. JusTICE WHITE join, dissenting. The ,facts in one of these cases (No. 91) vividly illustrate the effect of the Court's interpretation of § 241 (f) MR. HARLAN JusTICE STEWART, �226 OCTOBER TERM, 1966. STEWART, J., dissenting. l;\,1MIGRATION SERVICE v. ERR1CO. 385 li. s. of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The petitioner, a resident of Ja:rnaica, paid for a sham marriage with an American citizen. A ceremony was held, but the petitioner and her "husband" parted immediately and have not seen eac.c'i other since. However, the pretended marriage served its. purpose; the petitioner was admitted into this· country as a nonquota immigrant upon her false representation that she was the wife of a United States citizen. After this fraudulent entry she managed· to become the actual parent of a United States citizen by conceiving and bearing an illegitimate child here. The Court holds that this unsavory series of events gives the petitioner an unqualified right under § 241 (f) to remain in this country ahead of all the honest people waiting in Jamaica and elsewhere to gain lawful entry.' I can find no support in the statute for such an odd and inequitable result. Section 241 ( f) provides as follows: • "The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." It seems clear to me, for two separate and independently sufficient reasons, that this statute does not operate to bar the deportation of the aliens in the cases now \ 1 When "1irs. Scott" made her fr~udulent entry in 1958, Jamaica had an annual quota of 100-im.migrants and a waiting list of 21,759 hopeful applicants. The corresponding :figures for Italy in 1959, the year of 11r. Errico's entry, were 5,666 and 162,612. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 214 STEWART, J., dissenting. 227 .. before us. In the first place, § 241 (f) has applicat10n only to the deportation provisions which are based upon fraudulent entry, and the aliens in these two cases were not ordered to be deported under those provisions. Secondlv even if it were generally applicable, § 241 (f) does n;t' cover the aliens involved in these two cases, because neither of them was "otherwise admissible" at the time of entry. I. Section 241 (f) by its terms neutralizes only those "provisions ... relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they ... sought to procure ... entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation . . . . " Although the aliens in these two cases could have been deported under those "provisions," the deportation proceedings in both cases were in fact brought on grounds unrelated to their procurement of fraudulent visas. Both aliens were ordered to be deported, not because of their fraud, but because they were not properly within their countries' quotas. The plain terms of § 241 (f), therefore, do not even potentially apply to these aliens.' To hold that§ 241 (f) is relevant to these cases is tantamount to holding that 2 The Court states that the Government "concedes,, and that "administrative authorities have consistently held that § 241 (f) waives any deportation charge that results directly from the misrepresentation." Ante, at ·217. But this concessiol! and administrative practice fall far short of covering these cases. - For here the grounds for deportation did not "[result] directly from the misrepresentation." They antedated and were the reason for the misrepresentation. The (/administrative authorities11 cited by the Court turned upon this distinction. In Matter of Y-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 143 (1959), for example, the Board of Immigration Appeals broadener! § 241 (f) enough to cover fraud-related administrative procedural defects in the alien's ·entry. It is this construction of § 241 (!) which the Government concedes, not_ the Court's construction which broadens the statute to excuse all disqualifications for entry. �228 IMMIGRATION SERVICE v. ERRICO. OCTOBER TERM, 1966. 385 U.S. itis applicable to bar deportation based on any ground at all so long as the alien lied about that ground aUhe time of his unlawful entry.' I think nothing could befurther from the statutory language or the congressional purpose, II. · Eut evenif § 241 ( f) were gene~ally applicable, these aliens could not claim its benefits because they·were not within their respective national immigration quotas andtherefore were not "otherwise admissible" at the time they entered the United States. That is the clear import of the statutory qualification, if its words are to be taken at their face value. That, too, has been the uniform and consistent administrative construction of the statute. See Matter of D'O-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 215 (1958); Matter of Slade, IO I. & N. Dec. 128 (1962). To except quota requirements of admissibility from the statutory qualification of "otherwise admissible" would undercut the elaborate quota system »'hich was for years at the heart of the immigration laws. Yet the legislative history of the predecessor of § 241 (f), § 7 of the 1957 Act, makes clear that the limited relief given by the statute was t_o have no effect at all on the quota system.' 3 Thus, a Communist who had lied to the immigration authorities about his party membership at the time of entry could invoke § 241 (f) and reIDJ1in in this country, while one who had told the truth, but was admitted by virtue of an administrative error, .could be deported. See §212 (a)(28), Immigration and Nationality Act. 4 Senator Eastland, Chairman of the Committee which sponsored the 1957 amendments to the Immigration Act, stated, .-ithe bill does not modify the national origins quota provisions." 103 Coner Rec 15487 (Aug. 21, 1957). See also\ 103 Cong. Rec. 16300 (A~~- 28. 1957) (remarks of Congressman \Celler), "[The bill] makes n; changes-no changes whatsoever, in the controversial issue of the national origins quota system." Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 1 made substantial changes .. in the quota system. But that statute, passed in 1965, hardly indicates a This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 214 STEWART, 229 J., dissenting. Moreover, the consistent use of the same qualifying phrase; "otherwise admissible" in other sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act makes clear that, as a term of art, it includes quota adnli.ssibility. The term typically follows a definition of grounds for admissibility or for exceptions to deportation, to insure that all the other relevant requirements of the Act are imposed upon the alien.' · · Thus the plain meaning of the "otherwise admissible" qualification, as well as legislative policy and legislative history, all indicate that the term serves the same basic function in § 241 ( f) as in other sections of the Act. Fraud is removed as a ground for deportation of those with the requisite family ties, and "otherwise admissible" insures the integrity of the remainder of the statutory scheme.' congressional intent in 1957 or in 1961 (when the present statute was revised) to abandon quota requirements. See, e.g., §§ 211 (a) and (b); The War Brides Act, 59 Stat. 659. 'Under § 7 of the 1957 Act certain aliens had to establish both that they were "otherwise admissible" and that they had not lied to 5 evade quota restrictions. The Court reasons from this that quota restrictions are not embodied in the "othernise admissible" qualification. But this reasoning is inconsistent with the Court's conclusion concerning the general applicability of § 241 (f), discussed in Part I of this dissent. Section 7 of the earlier Act provided as follows: "The provisions of section 241 of the Immigration and Nationality Act relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as (1) aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation, or (2) aliens who were not of the nationality specified in their visas, shall not apply to an a.lien otherwise 2.dmis- sible at the time of entry who . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) If the present meaning ·of "otherwise admissible" is to be determined by the 1957 Act, so then must other parts of the statute be similarly determined. Section 241 (f) begins with words almost identical �230 . ,OCTOBER TERM, 1966. STEWART, FORTSON v. MORRIS. 385 U.S. J., dissenting. , The Court justifies its disregard of the plain meaning and consistent administrative construction of § 241 (f) by resort to the spirit of humanitarianism which is said to have moved Congress to enact the statute. No doubt Congress in 1957 was concerned with giving relief to some aliens who had entered this country by illegal means and _established families here.· But the people who were to benefit from this genuine human concern were those from countries like Mexico, which had no quota restric- · tions, and those who had misrepresented their national origins in order to avoid repatriation to Iron Curtain countries. There is nothing to indicate that Congress enacted this legislation to allow wholesale evasion of the Immigration and Nationality Act or as a general reward for fraud. I respectfully dissent. ♦ 231 Syllabus. • FORTSON, _SECRETARY OF STATE OF GEORGIA v, MORRIS ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA. No. -SOO. Argued Decemher 5, 1966.-Decided December 12,-1966. Georgia's Co~stitution sine~ 1824 has provided that a majority bf - the state legislature shall select the Governor irom the two candidates with the highest number of votes in a general election whe!e no gubernatorial candidate received a majority vote, a situation which arose in the November 8, 1966, general election. On equal protection grounds a three-judge District Court invalidated the provision. Held: Georgia1s provision for selecting a Governor is not invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 233-236. . (a) A State can permit its legislative body to elect its Governor, there being no federal constitutional provision prescribing the method a State must use to select its Governor. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, distinguished. Pp. 233-234. (b) The Georgia Legislature is not disqualified for malapportionment to elect a Governor, since under Toombs v. Fortson, 384 U. S. 210, this Court held that it could function until May 1, 1968. P. 235. (c) The obligation under an oath ta.ken by Democratic members of the legislature to support party candidates ended -with the last general election, which is over. Pp. 235-236. 262 F. Supp. 93, reversed. to those quoted above. But the second ground of applicability-to '~aliens who were not of the nationality specified in their visas"-is omitted. Thus, lies about nationality were not forgiven by the first part of the 1957 Act and are not, by the Court's reasoning, excused by§ 241 (f), the successor statute. And since there is nothing to distinguish lies about natiori4lity that avoid quota restrictions from other lies with the same effect, the reasoning that leads to the Court's conclusion that the aliens were "otherwise admissible" leads also to the conclusion that § 241 (f) is not applicable at all in these cases. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:33:25 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Harold N. Hill, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, G. Ernest Tidwell, Executive Assistant Attorney General, Coy R. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, and Gerald H. Cohen and Alexander Cocalis, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General. Charles Morgan, Jr., argued the cause for appellees Morris et al. With him on the briefs were Morris Brown � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit Subject The topic of the resource Errico, Giuseppe Deportations Fraud Description An account of the resource Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals to review a decision made regarding a conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits on their interpretations of section 241 (f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Center for Migration Studies (U.S.) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 Type The nature or genre of the resource Legal Document Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 054-cms105-b2f3i1 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived 89th, 92nd, 93rd Congress -- Fraud and Misrepresentation - Immigration and Nationality Act Section 241 (f) Language A language of the resource English Relation A related resource Arthur P. (“Skip”) Endres Papers Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Immigration and Mental Health: Mexican Americans in the United States Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Escobar, Javier, I Nervi, Constanza, Hoyos Gara, Michael, A Subject The topic of the resource Mexican Immigration Immigration Mental Health Description An account of the resource The Hispanic population in the United States continues to expand rapidly due primarily to a large flow of immigrants from Mexico. Historical observations of disadvantage in the immigrant population, when compared to the native population, had helped to shape prevailing theories on immigration and mental health. However, data emerging from new research on Mexican Americans have come to challenge the old idea that immigrants are necessarily disadvantaged. The goal of this article is to review these new studies critically, to draw conclusions concerning the relationship between immigration and psychopathology, and to offer potential explanations for the major findings. We review five recent large-scale studies that examined the prevalence of mental disorders among Mexican-born immigrants and U.S.-born Mexican Americans in the United States. Results of these studies are inconsistent with traditional tenets on the relationship among immigration, acculturation, and psychopathology. They show that Mexico-born immigrants, despite significant socioeconomic disadvantages, have better mental health profiles than do U.S.-born Mexican Americans. Possible explanations for the better mental health profile of Mexican immigrants include research artifacts such as selection bias, a protective effect of traditional family networks, and a lower set of expectations about what constitutes "success" in America. The elevated rates of psychopathology in U.S.-born Mexican Americans may be related to easier access to abused substances and an elevated frequency of substance abuse among the U.S.-born. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Harvard Review of Psychiatry Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2008–8–28 Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Research Article Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/hrp_8.2.64 Language A language of the resource English https://dh.scu.edu/exhibits/files/original/90/2937/U.S._IMMIGRATION_AND_REFUGEE_POLICY_1983_22Current_Status_of_U.S._Immigration_and_Refugee_Policy_22_and_22_Immigration_as_an_Intrusive_Global_Flow_A_New_Perspective_22.pdf 6accef3dec4276f9982b360b956a4e0d PDF Text Text Center for Migration Studies (NY) U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 1983: "Current Status of U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy" and "'Immigration as an Intrusive Global Flow; A New Perspective" Source: Center for Migration Studies (NY) Contributed by: Kritz, Mary M. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/community.29222931 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Center for Migration Studies (NY) is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Center for Migration Studies (NY) This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:24:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �from: Charles B. Keely, "Current Status of U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy," In Mary M. Kritz,editor, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 1983 1 Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp, 339~359, Why Is Immigration Policy So Hnrd lo Change? The previous recitation of specific issues gives us lillle guidance about the shape of future immigration and refugee policy. The business ofa prophet is risky. In the case of immigration, the pace of change itself should raise questions-after all, official concern as evidenced in congressional hearings about illegal migration began more than ten years ago. Although trying to predict what is going lo happen is an interesting parlor game. it may be lcs.s valuable than trying to shed light on the pace of change in the recent past. That light might even illuminate the future a bit and tell us what to expect and why. The reason for slow change in this mailer is no different from any other issue involving various interest groups. Many groups and individuals have a tangible or symbolically important stake in the status quo; few groups have so direct an interest in change. Ethnic groups, refugee agencies, government bureaucracies with their designated areas. employers (from those wishing housemaids to multinationals trying to move key executives), religious groups, and unions all have a stake in a family reunion and refugee-oriented policy that is also relatively generous. One could add lawyers to the roster. with their stake in the li:'gislative complexity that provides their living. Surely the list of partisans could be expanded. On the opposite side, a list of interested parties is ·hard lo draw up. Supporters of employer sanctions and greater emphasis on labor impacts orten point to the impact of legal, and especially illegal, migration on women, the handicapped, blacks, Hispanics, and other disadvantaged minorities. Nevertheless, one docs not sec the National Organization for Women, the Urban League, or the NAACP in the forefront of support for the labor impact argument. Minority organizations are sophisticated political actors and need no spokespersons. Explanations to the effect that minority groups really support the labor-oriented approach but hesitate to upset delicate interminority coalitions (that is, black and Hispanic coalitions) not only ignore women and the handicapped, but also arc implicitly admitting immigration policy and the specific labor-oriented approach arc either not on or far down on the agendas of such organizations. If proposals for major shifts in policy (large reductions in the ceiling or a labor-oriented selection system) do not garner support of groups that arc directly affected, who does support them? 1l1e answer is groups that define themselves as public interest groups-guardians of society-such as conservationists, veterans organizations, and groups concerned with population growth, as well as some parts of organized labor, but notably not the unions . . . most directly affected by migration, especially illegal migration. Such groups are opposed not only by the directly affected groups but by guardians of society of a different type-civil rights and public law groups, for example. The result has be~n a familiar scenario, a strategic battle of the supporters of current pohcy holding off change to protect their advantages, vers~s groups staging a prolonged_seige to chip away al current policy and h.opmg to tak~ advantage of fortuitous openings, like those provided by a poor economy, a Mariel boatlift, and anti-immigrant feelings that accompany such episodes,.~·.· The status quo'supporters have the advantage due to their stake in the issue~ the ~assage of time, an?_lhe abs nce of the catastrophe to be expected 7 . from 1;11~as1?ns or floods of ab ens predicted by the opposition. In this regard, . the Civil Rights movement has declawed some of the rhetoric of an earlier time about the qliaHty and value of racial, ethnic, religious, and foreign-born groups. The supporters of a cutback in numbers, a more labor-oriented policy, and a heavier reliance on an enforcement approach have the advantage~ ~f_being on the.offensive beca~se of the state of the economy and the poss1b1lity o~ s~dden mfluxes (as the Cuban boatlift) to mobilize support. Of course, th~re IS also the effect of change due to elections-:-for example, Senator Simpson rather than Senator Kennedy as the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration. · . Th~ we~kness of the administrative and managerial system with respect to unnugrabon, the lack of cohesion on policy formulation on immigration in ) the Executive, and the proprietary sense of Congress over immigration means t~~re is no st~ong~nterfortheemergence ofimmigration policy. There is no v1s1~le'. credible, high stat~s agen~ responsible for monitoring immigration ~nd •.ts unpacts and ?ev 1opmgpohcy for government action. A proposal for an ~mm1gration ~o~nctl with preCJsely that charge was narrowly defeated in the :)elect Comm1ss1on and the concept has some strong congressional backing. ' While the Select Commission was a delaying tactic in the minds of some iNho created it, it has set in motion a process to introduce change. It is not at ~I clear_tl~at immi;r~tion_and refugee policy will be fundamentally changed. 1treamhnmg admm1strabve procedures and tinkering with preferences are ?robably in the.offing; These are not unimportant for they affect the lives of ieoplein this country and abroad. What is not so clearis whether fun dam en- ' al shifts in policy will take place in the near future. The issue is nothing less '-. . . . . . ..,,· . than the future of U.S. pluralism-not just the shape, the tint or the accent of U.S. society, but the values that define us. whatever our ancestry. as a 7 _ people. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:24:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �f~om: Kevin F. McCarthy and David F. Ronfeldt, ''Immigration as an Intrusive Global Flow; li New )?erspective," In Mary M. Kritz, editor, U,S, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE )?OLICY 1. 1983, Lexington, MA: Lexington,Books, pp, 381~399, The cu,;ent Context of Turbulence U.S. immigration policy is characterized by the failure of current regulatory policies; an inability to develop a comprehensive alternative policy and a consequent reliance on crisis management: and moral ambivalence toward immigration and refugee issues. Th: fa~lurc_of c~rr~nt policies directly rcnects the incrcasingdirliculty of regulatmg 1mm1grat1on nows to the United States and is succinctly described by the statement made by an a!lorncy general, "We have lost control of our borders.·· This loss of control is evident in the nows of illegal migrants across U.S. bor?ers (m?st notably, but by no means exclusively, from Mexico). in the massive seahrt of Cubans from Mariel Bay. in the less dramatic but far more regular stream of Haitians to Florida, and in the admission of tens of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees above the established refugee q'uota. Each of these nows underscores the contradiction of a global superpower unable to exercise control over its own borders. However, this contradiction can be viewed as a natural by-product or a system or global ~o;vs that incrca~<:5 the interdependence among natii,ns and reduces the w11lmgncss and ability of a superpower to use its power to control the outcomes of the system. Indeed. the multiple objectives served by such globa) nows, and the spillover effects they generate, blur distinctions ?ctween foreign and domestic policy, and excite a broad range of domestic mt~rest groups. This mingling of objectives, issues and interests heightens policyma~:rs' awareness of the complexity and political ramifications of their dcc1s1ons. . . ~e U.S. treatment of Mexican immigration exemplifies the way in wl)l~h mterdependence among nations effectively limits any single nation"s ab1hty ~o control flows. Flows of migrants from Mexico have been arriving in the United States for a long time because they served the interests of both count~ies. They supplied the cheap labor necessary for economic develop• '."cnt m_ the Southwest, and they relieved the pressures of underemployment m Mexico_government efforts to stem this flow by closing the border have trad1t1onally responded to U.S. internal economic needs. However. the _Dnited St~tes is unlikely to consider closing the border now, as it did dun~g Opc~at1o_n W~tb~ck _in 1954, b~cause there is increasing recognition that '.llcgal 1mm1gratmn 1s simply one issue in the broader contcxl or U.S.Mexican relations and that reciprocal vulnerabilities are involved. U.S. desire to secure a stable supply of oil during a period of uncertain supplies. to insure a stable political environment in a neighbor nation, and to nurture industrial development in our border areas has made us increasingly scnsi- _u.s. . live to Mexico's economic need to export its surplus labor. Moreover. U.S. industrial and agricultural interests that rely on immigrant labor, together with a growing Mexican-American populatio? in the Un!ted ~ta_tcs, have expanded the number of domestic groups with a stake m this_ issue ~nd reduced the chances of developing a consensus on a comprehensive policy. The cases of Cuban and Southeast Asian refugees provide striking examples of how global nows may have unanticipated longer-term consequences and tend to create situations in which foreign policy decisions produce domestic ramifications. Both of these refugee flows originated as unanticipated results of foreign policy actions, and both created situations in which the United States was unwilling or unable to stop the flow once its domestic effect began to be felt. The reasons for the apparent inability to regulate these flows differ somewhat by case: inability to control the flow at its SOU{Ce (Cuban); concern for the effect of refugees on friendly first-asylum countries (Southeast Asian); sensibility to the reaction that stopping the flow would produce among previously settled refugees (Cuban); and humanitarian concerns (both groups). However, both cases demonstrate the far-reaching and often unintended spillover effects such flows can generate, as well as the multiplicity of policy objectives they affect. The global flow perspective also suggests why the formulation of a comprehensive immigration policy is so difficult and why officials often rely instead on crisis management. Because the call for a change in policy is typically motivated by the spillover effects of specific flows, there is a built-in time lag between the start of the flow and the call for policy. During this lag the spillover effects spread, the number of policy areas affected increases, and the number of concerned interests multiplies. As a result, the likelihood of reaching consensus on a comprehensive alternative declines. For example, policymakers would ·have faced fewer constraints in attempting to control the Mariel Bay flotilla had not that wave of Cuban refugees been preceded by several prior waves, that were by then firmly established in U.S. society,flt~, •· ·· ·· · • The·problems of time lag and policy constraints are rooted in the nature of global flows, but they are compounded by the moral ambivalence with which Americans view immigration issues. As citizens of a nation cognizant of immigrant roots and proud of its commitment to human rights, Americans are,reluctant to view immigrants and refugees as part of a flow, and'·. · ·prefer instead to consider them individuals with certain inalienable rights> This perspective collides with an equally widely held view that the United States simply cannot afford to absorb everyone who might want to come to this country, Thus, moral ambivalence is reflected in the contradictory belief in an inalienable right to emigrate without a corresponding right to imm!grate. . This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:24:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �This ambivalence complicates the policy process in a number of ways. For example, it contributes to the policy time Jag by focusing public atten• tion on the humanitarian aspects of refugee and immigration flows while ignoring their potential long-term effects. Thus, attempts to halt boats full of Haitian immigrants were attacked for their cold legalities. Similarly, Americans are reluctant to acknowledge that establishing refugee camps and institutional procedures to facilitate the resettlement of Southeast Asian political refugees encourages others who are more aptly described as economic refugees to take advantage of these efforts. In addition, this ambivalence imposes direct constraints on policy options. For example, both the Carter and Reagan initiatives on illegal Mexican migrants contain an· ani~ ncstyproposal For essentially humanitarian reasons. However, provisions to limit the rights of those granted amnesty, and thus discourage potential future illegals, are soundly criticized. At times these constraints become even more direct as when Federal Judge James King ruled that the INS could not deport the Haitian plaintiffs because it had not proven that their human rights would not be harmed upon their return to Haiti. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:24:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, 1983: "Current Status of U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy" and "'Immigration as an Intrusive Global Flow; A New Perspective" Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kritz, Mary M. Subject The topic of the resource Immigration Law United States Description An account of the resource Both documents are excerpts from a larger work, Mary M. Kritz's U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REGUGEE POLICY, 1983. The first, "Current Status of U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy" by Charles B. Keely, documents why immigration policy is so slow to change. The next, "Immigration as an Intrusive Global Flow; A New Perspective" by David F. Ronfeldt, describes U.S. immigration policy as a failure of current regulatory policies, an inability to develop a comphrehensive alternative policy and a consequent reliance of crisis management, as well as a moral ambivalence toward immigration and refugee issues. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Center for Migration Studies (U.S.) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1983 Type The nature or genre of the resource Policy Documents Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 011-cms105-b1f4i6 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived 98th Congress - Refugee Assistance Extension Act of 1983 - Publications Language A language of the resource English https://dh.scu.edu/exhibits/files/original/90/2936/Rise_and_Fall_of_U.S._Low-Skilled_Immigration.pdf 0c70f398eec83a099fd255374418dbf8 PDF Text Text The Rise and Fall of U.S. Low-Skilled Immigration Author(s): GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU and CRAIG McINTOSH Source: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity , (SPRING 2017), pp. 83-151 Published by: Brookings Institution Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/90013169 REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/90013169?seq=1&cid=pdfreference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Brookings Institution Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Brookings Papers on Economic Activity This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON University of California, San Diego CHEN LIU University of California, San Diego CRAIG M c INTOSH University of California, San Diego The Rise and Fall of U.S. Low-Skilled Immigration ABSTRACT    From the 1970s to the early 2000s, the United States experienced an epochal wave of low-skilled immigration. Since the Great Recession, however, U.S. borders have become a far less active place when it comes to the net arrival of foreign workers. The number of undocumented immigrants has declined in absolute terms, while the overall population of low-skilled, foreign-born workers has remained stable. We examine how the scale and composition of low-skilled immigration in the United States have evolved over time, and how relative income growth and demographic shifts in the Western Hemisphere have contributed to the recent immigration slowdown. Because major source countries for U.S. immigration are now seeing and will continue to see weak growth of the labor supply relative to the United States, future immigration rates of young, low-skilled workers appear unlikely to rebound, whether or not U.S. immigration policies tighten further. I mmigration is a divisive issue in public discourse about U.S. economic policy. At the center of the debate is how to address inflows of undocumented immigrants. During previous decades, inflows of illegal aliens were substantial. The Pew Research Center estimates that between 1990 Conflict of Interest Disclosure: The authors received financial support for this work from the Center on Global Transformation at the University of California, San Diego. With the exception of the aforementioned affiliations, the authors did not receive financial support from any firm or person for this paper or from any firm or person with a financial or political interest in this paper. They are currently not officers, directors, or board members of any organization with an interest in this paper. 83 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �84 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Figure 1. U.S. Foreign-Born Population, Age 18–64, 1970–2015 Millionsa 30 All 20 High school or less 10 Less than high school 5 2 1980 1990 Year 2000 2010 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census, American Community Survey; authors’ calculations. a. Note that this axis is on a log scale. and 2007, the U.S. population of undocumented residents, which as of 2013 accounted for nearly two-thirds of the U.S. foreign-born adult population with 12 or fewer years of schooling, grew on net by an annual average of 510,000 individuals (Borjas 2016; Passel and Cohn 2016). These inflows contributed to a sizable increase in the U.S. supply of low-skilled, foreign-born workers (figure 1). During the 1990–2007 period, the number of working-age immigrants with 12 or fewer years of schooling more than doubled, rising from 8.5 million to 17.8 million. Since the Great Recession, however, U.S. borders have become a less active place when it comes to net inflows of low-skilled labor from abroad. The undocumented population declined in absolute terms between 2007 and 2014, falling on net by an annual average of 160,000 individuals, while the overall population of low-skilled immigrants of working age remained stable. Viewed through the lens of the U.S. business cycle, the recent slowdown in low-skilled immigration hardly comes as a surprise (Villarreal 2014). Construction is the second-largest sector of employment for undocumented labor and the third-largest among all low-skilled immigrants (Passel and Cohn 2016). Because the collapse in the U.S. housing market helped precipitate the Great Recession (Mian and Sufi 2014), it follows logically that This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 85 the downturn in home building after 2006 would have triggered a drop in new arrivals of low-skilled, foreign-born workers. Yet, there are good reasons to believe that the Great Recession may have merely advanced forward in time an inevitable reduction in low-skilled immigration. Today, about half of low-skilled immigrants are from Mexico and another onequarter are from elsewhere in the Latin American and the Caribbean countries. Because these countries had marked declines in fertility after the late 1970s, they started to see slower growth in the size of cohorts coming of working age in the 2000s, thereby weakening a key demographic push factor for emigration (Hanson and McIntosh 2010, 2012). Just as relatively strong growth in U.S. GDP and Latin American labor supplies a generation ago helped initiate the great U.S. immigration wave of the late 20th century, the reversal of these conditions may be launching the United States into an era of far more modest low-skilled labor inflows (Hanson and McIntosh 2009, 2016). The policy dilemma facing the United States is thus not so much how to arrest massive increases in the supply of foreign labor, but rather how to prepare for a lower-immigration future. The pertinent issues for economists to address include how the scale and composition of low-skilled labor inflows have changed over time, whether the drop in inflows is primarily a cyclical phenomenon or represents a secular decline, and how the U.S. economy would adjust to an environment with modest numbers of low-skilled, foreign-born workers entering the labor force each year. These questions guide the analysis in this paper. We begin by summarizing trends in low-skilled immigration over the last several decades. As is well known, supplies of less-educated, foreignborn labor increased sharply after 1970, while their predominant national origins shifted from Europe to Latin America. Perhaps less appreciated, the demographic structure of this population has also changed, moving from younger, recent arrivals toward an older, more settled population. Which types of individuals select into immigration also appear to have changed, a pattern we examine in detail for the case of Mexico, given its outsize importance as a source country for U.S. immigrants. In 1990, those having recently migrated from Mexico to the United States—as captured by the population censuses of the two countries—were drawn more heavily from just above versus just below the mean of potential labor market earnings in Mexico (Chiquiar and Hanson 2005). This mild positive selection weakened during the 1990s and the 2000s, such that by 2010 the population of recent Mexican immigrants was close to a random draw of working-age individuals from Mexico, with a slight overrepresentation of individuals This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �86 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 from the middle of the skill distribution. Although immigrant selection captured in census data may be subject to measurement error associated with undercounts of undocumented immigrants (Fernández-Huertas Moraga 2011), selection patterns in these data are similar to those in the Mexican Family Life Survey, which appears less subject to missing information on undocumented migrants (Kaestner and Malamud 2014). The largely neutral selection of immigrants from Mexico in terms of skill implies that any future shock to Mexican immigration—such as a further tightening of U.S. borders—would target middle-income earners in Mexico, while affecting low-wage earners in the United States. Recent changes in low-skilled immigration have occurred in a tumultuous environment for the U.S. labor market. Even before the economic turbulence that occurred after 2006, there were adverse changes in the demand for low-skilled labor associated with automation and increased import competition from low-wage countries (Autor and Dorn 2013; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Pierce and Schott 2016; Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu 2016). At the higher end of the labor market, demand for young, college-educated labor has also weakened (Beaudry, Green, and Sand 2016). Together, these changes have combined to create a period low wage growth since 2000 for all but the highest-earning U.S. workers (Valletta forthcoming). To put recent changes in U.S. labor market conditions in a global context, we compare the level and volatility of U.S. income with that in major sending countries for low-skilled immigrants. The gap between the 25th percentile of the income distribution in the United States and the 50th percentile of the income distribution in Mexico—which approximates the expected gains in earnings for the typical Mexican migrant—was stable during the 1990s and early 2000s but shrank noticeably after 2007. Relative volatility in income growth has also changed. The Great Moderation heralded a period of steady U.S. GDP growth from the early 1980s to the mid-2000s (Bernanke 2004), a calm that was brought to an end by the Great Recession. In Mexico and other migrant-sending nations of the Western Hemisphere, the pattern is roughly the opposite. The 1980s and early 1990s were periods of high macroeconomic volatility, whereas the 2000s were a period of steady if not spectacular economic growth. Shrinking income gaps and reduced income volatility between the United States and major migrant-sending nations have eased pressures for net labor flows into the United States. Another factor contributing to the decline in low-skilled immigration is changes in U.S. enforcement against illegal labor inflows (Roberts, Alden, and Whitley 2013). Between 2000 and 2010, the number of U.S. Border This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG McINTOSH 87 Patrol agents policing the U.S.–Mexico border doubled, from 8,600 to 17,500 officers, and has since remained at historically high levels. Concurrently, the U.S. government intensified immigration enforcement in the interior of the country, which led to an increase in deportations of noncriminal aliens—many of whom are apprehended through traffic stops or other routine law enforcement operations—from 116,000 individuals in 2001 to an average of 226,000 a year from 2007 to 2015.1 Increases in border enforcement, which deter potential migrants from choosing to enter the United States (Gathmann 2008; Angelucci 2012), and in interior enforcement, which reduces the existing population of undocumented immigrants and may also deter future immigration, appear likely to continue under the administration of Donald Trump (Meckler 2017; Kulish and others 2017). Looking toward the future of U.S. low-skilled immigration, forces are at work that are likely to soften pressures for labor inflows and that will remain in place for the next several decades. By the mid-1970s, the size of U.S. cohorts coming of working age was growing much more slowly than in Mexico and the rest of Latin America, creating steady pressure for migration to the United States. However, by the mid-2000s this demographic push factor had largely disappeared. Because the United States’ neighbors to the south are today experiencing much slower growth in the labor supply, the future immigration of young low-skilled labor looks set to decline rapidly, whether or not more draconian policies to control U.S. immigration are implemented. If changes in global macroeconomic conditions and U.S. enforcement policy have combined to weaken recent growth in the U.S. supply of lowskilled, foreign-born labor, what are the implications for U.S. labor markets? As a way of answering this question, we examine the net impact of immigration-induced changes in the labor supply on U.S. labor-market tightness. To perform this analysis, we apply the approach of Lawrence Katz and Kevin Murphy (1992) to data from the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS), which involves modeling the relative hourly earnings of more- and less-skilled labor as a function of their relative supplies and a flexible time trend, meant to capture the evolution of labor demand. We estimate the model using earnings and employment data for the period 1976–2007 and then project relative earnings through 2015, using either 1. Noncitizens (including legal immigrants) convicted of an aggravated felony, a drug crime, or multiple crimes involving moral turpitude are subject to deportation upon or before completion of their prison sentence. Deportations of criminal aliens also increased in the 2000s, from 73,000 in 2001 to an average of 156,000 per year over 2007 to 2015. See Gonzalez-Barrera and Lopez (2016). This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �88 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 actual labor supplies or labor supplies under counterfactual assumptions about low-skilled immigration. If, counterfactually, the low-skilled, foreign-born labor supply had grown at the same rate during the period 2008–15 as it did from 1994 to 2007, our simple model implies that the wage gap between more-skilled and less-skilled labor would have been 6 to 9 percentage points higher in 2015. This finding, though not a general equilibrium assessment of the wage effects of U.S. immigration, illustrates the magnitude of the immigration slowdown in terms of U.S. wage pressures. To the extent that slowing low-skilled immigration puts downward pressure on the skill premium, we would expect firms to invest more in automation and other changes in production techniques that reduce reliance on low-skilled labor (Card and Lewis 2007; Lewis 2011), effects that are likely to register most strongly in immigrant-intensive industries such as agriculture, construction, eating and drinking establishments, and nondurable manufacturing. Our work complements the existing literature on immigration, much of which takes national changes in low-skilled foreign labor supply as given and examines its impact on the earnings of U.S. native-born workers.2 As is well known, estimates of the wage effects of immigration vary widely across studies (Blau and Mackie 2016). Results depend on how one defines the geographic scope of labor markets, skill groups within these labor markets, and the interchangeability of native- and foreign-born workers on the job (Borjas 2003, 2013; Card 2001, 2009; Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013). To explain instability in the wage effects of immigration, the literature has studied factors that may confound empirical analysis, including offsetting migration by nativeborn workers (Borjas 2006), the location choices of immigrant workers (Cadena and Kovak 2016), firm-level changes in technology (Lewis 2011), occupational downgrading by immigrant workers (Peri and Sparber 2009; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013), and measurement error in labor market earnings (Aydemir and Borjas 2011). Relative to existing work, we offer the inverse perspective of how and why the low-skilled immigrant labor supply has changed. Given the abundance of research on how 2. Other literature on the effects of low-skilled immigration in the United States examines its consequences for local consumer prices (Cortes 2008), the labor supply of highskilled, native-born women (Cortes and Tessada 2011), local housing prices (Saiz 2007), state GDP growth (Edwards and Ortega 2016), cultural diversity (Ottaviano and Peri 2005), and occupational employment and wages of native-born workers in local labor markets (Burstein and others 2017). This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG McINTOSH 89 immigration affects U.S. wages, the factors that govern the magnitude of low-skilled immigration are understudied. Our work helps address this gap in knowledge. I. �The Presence of Low-Skilled Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Force We begin our analysis with an overview of the characteristics of low-skilled immigrants in the United States and then examine how selection into U.S. migration among individuals from Mexico has changed over time. For the analysis in this section and the next, we focus on individuals of working age, defined as those 18 to 64 years of age. We utilize data from the U.S. population censuses, the American Community Survey (ACS), and the CPS; and from Mexico’s population census, available from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. I.A. Characteristics of Low-Skilled Immigrants A preliminary issue we must address is how to define low-skilled labor. When it comes to the analysis of immigration, the literature alternatively defines low-skilled workers as those with less than a high school education (Borjas 2003) or those with a high school education or less (Card 2001).3 This difference matters, because those completing less than 12 years of schooling are an ever-smaller share of the U.S. native-born population but continue to account for a majority of adults in low- and middle-income countries. In the nations that send large numbers of low-skilled migrants to the United States—including Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico—compulsory schooling is through grade 8 or 9, as opposed to being through age 16 in most U.S. states. The median worker in many sending countries thus has well less than the equivalent of a U.S. high school education (Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett 2008). Cross-national differences in compulsory education are manifest in the distribution of years of schooling among less-educated foreign- and native-born adults in the United States. In 1970, those not completing high school accounted for just over half of U.S. native-born adults with a high school education or less, a share that declined to 3. We define high school education to mean completing 12 years of school, whether or not a degree is granted, a convention we adopt because the meaning of a high school degree varies across countries. Throughout the paper, we use high school education and 12 years of schooling interchangeably. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �90 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 29.4 percent in 1990 and to 16.6 percent in 2015 (table 1). Among the U.S. foreign-born adult population with a high school education or less, the share with less than 12 years of schooling has also fallen but from a much higher base, beginning at 65.2 percent in 1970 and dropping to 55.0 percent in 1990 and to 44.7 percent in 2015. To ensure that our analysis is robust to the definition of skill, we utilize both education-based definitions of low-skilled labor.4 When viewed over the sweep of the last half century, the U.S. lowskilled, foreign-born population has transformed not just in terms of its size but also in its demographic structure. These evolutions are evident in tables 1 and 2, which present summary statistics on U.S. low-skilled foreign- and native-born individuals going back to 1970 using data from the U.S. census and ACS. In 1970, when the presence of the foreign born in the U.S. population was at a historic low, low-skilled immigrants, in comparison with the native born, were relatively old and likely to be female. This population came in its majority (52.9 percent) from Europe, was dominated by individuals who had arrived in the United States in 1960 or earlier (66.1 percent), and had a near majority (45.6 percent) with eight or fewer years of schooling. As the incipient immigration wave gained momentum, the composition of low-skilled immigrants became younger, more likely to have come from Latin America, and more educated. These changes were most dramatic between 1970 and 1990. During this period, the fraction of foreignborn people age 18–33 rose from 28.6 to 43.2 percent, the fraction of males rose from 41.8 to 48.8 percent, and the fraction completing 12 years of education rose from 34.8 to 45.0 percent. In terms of origin countries, among immigrants with a high school education or less, the fraction born in Mexico rose from 11.6 to 34.0 percent, the fraction born elsewhere in Latin America (and the Caribbean) rose from 13.2 to 23.7 percent, and the fraction born in Asia rose from 5.7 to 16.2 percent.5 The 1970 to 1990 increase in the shares of immigrants coming from Mexico and the rest of Latin 4. Education is, of course, an imperfect definition of skill. Language barriers and occupational licensing present obstacles to foreign-born workers in integrating themselves into the U.S. labor force, which may induce some immigrants to downgrade occupationally by taking jobs for which, based on their observable skills, they would appear overqualified (Lazear 1999, 2007; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013). 5. Half of the 1970–90 increase in low-skilled immigration from Asia (55.1 percent) is from Southeast Asia, with much of this inflow associated with a substantial but temporary rise in U.S. refugee admissions from the region that occurred following the end of the Vietnam War. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 38.1 33.5 28.5 23.5 27.2 49.2 3.7 6.8 2.9 10.0 4.8 67.2 4.6 Age 18–33 34–49 50–64 Years of schooling 0–8 9–11 12 Industry, share of labor force Agriculture Construction Eating and drinking establishments Nondurable manufacturing Personal services Other industries Unemployment rate 3.2 6.1 5.8 14.5 7.0 58.7 4.6 45.6 19.6 34.8 28.6 34.9 36.5 41.8 75.8 Foreignborn 2.9 6.8 3.8 8.9 3.2 66.6 7.8 14.3 24.5 61.2 43.4 28.1 28.5 46.6 63.9 Nativeborn 4.0 5.7 6.8 13.0 5.8 56.8 7.8 39.2 19.0 41.7 40.2 33.0 26.8 44.4 69.1 Foreignborn 1980 2.8 8.0 4.8 7.6 3.3 65.2 8.4 8.6 20.8 70.6 41.6 31.7 26.6 48.6 59.1 Nativeborn 5.7 7.8 8.7 9.5 6.9 51.6 9.8 38.2 16.8 45.0 43.2 34.5 22.3 48.8 64.1 Foreignborn 1990 2.1 9.1 5.3 5.5 2.9 67.6 7.5 4.9 15.8 79.3 36.4 37.9 25.6 50.3 56.8 Nativeborn Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census, American Community Survey. a. All values are expressed as percentages. The sample is restricted to individuals age 18–64 with 12 years of education or less. 46.4 71.6 Sex Male Female Nativeborn 1970 5.5 10.8 9.2 7.5 6.3 52.1 8.6 33.7 16.5 49.8 42.2 38.2 19.6 51.2 63.9 Foreignborn 2000 2.3 9.2 7.6 4.3 2.9 63.9 9.7 4.0 12.6 83.4 38.2 27.9 33.8 54.3 46.2 Nativeborn Table 1. Characteristics of Native-Born and Foreign-Born U.S. Working-Age Population with High School Education or Less, 1970–2015a 6.9 14.8 11.3 5.8 7.2 47.9 6.1 29.6 15.1 55.3 27.3 42.3 30.5 51.2 60.5 Foreignborn 2015 �92 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Table 2. Summary Statistics for Foreign-Born U.S. Working-Age Population with High School Education or Less, 1970–2015a 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2015 Years of residence in the United States 0–5 19.2 23.2 6–10 14.8 18.4 11+ 66.1 58.4 24.2 21.6 54.2 22.8 19.1 58.1 21.8 18.4 59.9 11.9 13.0 75.1 Age of arrival in the United States 0–14 22.1 13.6 15–25 28.0 34.8 26+ 44.0 51.4 14.7 42.4 43.0 19.1 47.5 33.4 18.1 47.3 34.3 20.2 45.0 34.4 Country or region of origin, less than high school education Mexico 15.4 33.3 47.5 60.6 Central America 1.6 3.5 8.7 10.8 Caribbean 8.4 10.7 9.2 7.2 South America 2.6 3.6 3.3 3.4 Southeast Asia 1.7 4.6 6.6 5.8 Other Asia 3.3 5.4 5.6 4.7 Africa 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.7 Middle East 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.9 Europe 51.6 25.9 11.4 5.0 Other 13.5 11.0 6.2 0.9 64.0 12.4 5.7 3.2 4.7 4.0 1.0 0.8 3.5 0.7 59.3 15.9 6.0 3.0 4.8 6.0 1.6 0.9 2.0 0.5 Country or region of origin, high school education or less Mexico 11.6 23.2 34.0 Central America 1.6 3.3 7.7 Caribbean 8.6 11.1 10.8 South America 3.0 4.4 5.3 Southeast Asia 1.7 4.9 7.5 Other Asia 4.0 7.1 8.7 Africa 0.5 0.8 0.9 Middle East 1.8 1.8 1.6 Europe 52.9 30.9 16.5 Other 14.4 12.5 7.2 48.1 10.1 8.8 6.1 6.9 7.0 2.2 1.4 8.0 1.6 45.1 12.2 9.4 5.7 6.9 8.9 3.0 1.6 5.8 1.3 44.4 9.3 9.9 5.8 7.8 7.7 1.7 1.4 10.2 1.8 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census, American Community Survey. a. All values are expressed as percentages. The sample is restricted to individuals age 18–64 with 12 years of education or less. America is even larger among those with less than a high school education, rising from 15.4 to 47.5 percent and from 12.6 to 21.2 percent, respectively. By 1990, nearly 7 in 10 (68.7 percent) of the least-skilled U.S. immigrants of working age came from other nations in the Western Hemisphere. Jorge Durand, Douglas Massey, and Rene Zenteno (2001) describe this era of U.S. immigration as one marked by a preponderance of itinerant workers who came to the United States to take seasonal jobs, especially This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG McINTOSH 93 on farms in the Southwest, and often returned home during periods when labor demand was slack. During the two decades after 1970, the share of low-skilled immigrant workers employed in agriculture did rise, from 3.2 to 5.7 percent (as compared with a decline of 3.9 to 3.0 percent among the low-skilled, native-born workers of working age), and the fraction with 10 or fewer years of residence in the United States grew from 34.0 to 45.8 percent.6 However, throughout the sample period, farm workers accounted for only a small share of low-skilled immigrant employment. During the first decades of the late-20th-century immigration wave, lowskilled immigrants spread themselves across a wide range of jobs, while concentrating more heavily, when compared with their native-born counterparts, in agriculture, construction, eating and drinking establishments, nondurable manufacturing, and personal services. In subsequent decades, the low-skilled immigrant population has become more mature and more settled, at least when measured in terms of length of U.S. residence. By 2015, three-quarters (75.1 percent) of lowskilled immigrants had resided in the United States for 11 or more years, while the share of the population age 18–33 had dropped to 27.2 percent. Since 1990, the fraction of low-skilled immigrants from Mexico and the rest of Latin America has continued to rise, reaching 45.1 and 27.3 percent, respectively, in 2015. Among immigrants with less than a high school education, these shares are 59.3 and 24.9 percent, respectively, meaning that today, nearly 9 in 10 (85.2 percent) of the least-skilled, foreign-born workers are from Latin America and the Caribbean. It is particularly important that Mexico’s dominance as a source country for low-skilled immigrants peaks in 2005, at 48.1 percent of those with a high school education or less and 64.0 percent of those with less than a high school education. The 4.7 percentage point drop in Mexico’s share of the least-skilled immigrant population from 2005 to 2015 is largely offset by Central America’s jump during the same period of 3.5 percentage points. As we discuss in section III, demographic push factors help account for Mexico’s recent relative decline and Central America’s continuing relative gain as source regions. After Latin America, Asia remains the next most important source region of low-skilled immigration, in 2015 accounting for 15.8 percent of all low-skilled immigrants and 10.8 percent of those with less than 12 years of schooling. 6. The question for length of U.S. residence in the ACS reads, “When did this person come to live in the United States?” with the instruction, “If this person came to live in the United States more than once, print latest year.” This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �94 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Over time, low-skilled immigrants have become more specialized in particular lines of work. The share employed in immigrant-intensive sectors in 2015 reached 14.8 percent in construction (up from 7.8 percent in 1990), 11.3 percent in eating and drinking establishments (up from 8.7 percent in 1990), 7.2 percent in personal services (up from 6.9 percent in 1990), and 6.9 percent in agriculture (up from 5.7 percent in 1990). The one immigrant-intensive sector registering a decline in its share of low-skilled immigrant employment is nondurable manufacturing—which includes apparel, footwear, furniture, and textiles—industries whose overall employment in the United States has fallen sharply in recent decades due to technological change and competition from China and other lowwage countries (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013). The transition of the U.S. low-skilled immigrant population from sojourners to settlers, first noted by Wayne Cornelius (1992) nearly three decades ago, today appears to be largely complete. Part of this shift is the natural result of a dynamic process of immigration in which early arrivals initially dominate the population, only to decline in importance as the existing stock grows and matures (Piore 1980). However, the shift is also the result of the pronounced slowdown in low-skilled immigration since the mid-2000s, as seen in figure 1. Because the immigration levels portrayed in table 2 reflect changes in net immigration, they are uninformative about whether this slowdown is the result of reduced inflows of new immigrants, larger outflows of existing immigrants returning to their home countries, or some combination of the two. We next summarize evidence on changing inflows and outflows of immigrants over time. Figure 2 gives counts of immigrants by current age, age of arrival in the United States (inferred from years of U.S. residence), and census year for three source regions— Mexico, other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia—which together account for the large majority of low-skilled immigration in the United States. To avoid concerns about tracking individuals who educate themselves out of the low-skilled category over time, we include all immigrants from these source regions, regardless of schooling. Several patterns are apparent in the data. First, for most current-age groups and in most census years, the largest cohorts are those arriving between 15 and 24 years of age. That is, for a given current-age group, if we compare bars that have the same shading (thus comparing different arrival-age cohorts in the same census year for the same current-age group), those in the 15–24 arrival-age category are the largest in nearly This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �95 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 2. Number of Working-Age Immigrants by Arrival Age, Current Age, and Year of Arrival, 1980–2010 Mexico Thousands 1,500 1980 1990 2000 2010 1,000 500 5–14 15–24 5–14 15–24 15–24 25–34 5–14 25–34 15–24 25–34 35–44 35–44 Arrival age Current age Latin America, excluding Mexico Thousands 600 1980 1990 2000 2010 400 200 5–14 15–24 5–14 15–24 15–24 25–34 5–14 25–34 15–24 25–34 35–44 35–44 Arrival age Current age Southeast Asia Thousands 200 1980 1990 2000 2010 100 5–14 15–24 15–24 5–14 15–24 25–34 25–34 5–14 15–24 25–34 35–44 35–44 Arrival age Current age Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census, American Community Survey; authors’ calculations. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �96 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 all cases. Second, between 2000 and 2010, there are substantial declines in the sizes of given arrival-age or birth-year cohorts. For individuals from Mexico arriving in the United States between age 5 and 14, the number who are age 15–24 in 2000 is much larger than those who are age 25–34 in 2010. We see similar declines in the number of Mexican immigrants who are age 25–34 in 2000 and the number who are age 35–44 in 2010, both for the cohort arriving between age 5 and 14 and the cohort arriving between age 15 and 24. Similar patterns hold for immigrants from other countries in Latin America and from Southeast Asia. Declines in cohort size, as measured in the census, may result from mortality, return migration, or changes over time in the fraction of individuals in a cohort who are enumerated in the census. Given the youth of the cohorts considered, mortality seems unlikely to explain this decline. Moreover, given that we expect enumeration rates to increase with length of residence in the United States, declines in enumeration seem an unlikely explanation, which leaves return migration as the most likely cause for the decline in measured immigrant cohort sizes between 2000 and 2010. The net impact of these changes is that the size of immigrant cohorts in 2010 is skewed heavily toward individuals who have more than 10 years of residence in the United States. For immigrants from Mexico in 2010 (indicated by the darkest shaded bars), those with fewer than 10 years of U.S. residence are the smallest cohort among all current age groups, a pattern that holds for other countries in Latin America and for Southeast Asia as well. I.B. The Presence of Low-Skilled Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Force To consider how the presence of low-skilled immigrants in the U.S. labor force has changed in recent years, we focus on movements at annual frequencies using data from the CPS. Because the CPS only begins asking questions about nativity in 1994, our use of these data is for that year forward. We use two measures of the working-age population: raw data on body counts; and these values expressed in terms of productivity-equivalent units (PEUs), following the weighting procedure used by David Autor, Lawrence Katz, and Melissa Kearney (2008). Consistent with the post-1970 rise in low-skilled immigration seen in figure 1, figure 3 shows that the presence of low-skilled, foreign-born workers in the U.S. working-age population rose steadily from 1994 to 2007 but has been stable since. The left panel of figure 3 plots four measures of low-skilled immigration. The top line gives the share of the This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �97 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 3. Percentage of Low-Skilled, Foreign-Born Workers in the U.S. Working-Age Population, 1993–2014 Percent weighted by productivityequivalent units Percent Raw percent Percent Foreign-born, high school or less 8 8 Mexican-born, high school or less 6 6 Foreign-born, less than high school 4 2 4 2 Mexican-born, less than high school 1995 2000 2005 Year 2010 1995 2000 2005 Year 2010 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations. foreign born with a high school education or less among all working-age individuals in the United States. This fraction rose from 6.5 percent in 1994 to 9.1 percent in 2007, before stabilizing in subsequent years, settling at 8.8 percent in 2015. Just under half these foreign-born individuals were born in Mexico (43.1 percent in 1994; 47.3 percent in 2015). When, alternatively, we define low-skilled immigrants more narrowly as those with less than 12 years of schooling, we also see a growing immigrant presence in the U.S. working-age population, rising from 3.6 percent in 1994 to 4.5 percent in 2007, and showing little change thereafter. Individuals born in Mexico account for a high fraction of the foreign-born population with less than a high school education (61.1 percent in 1993, 64.4 percent in 2014). Body counts of low-skilled immigrants overstate their presence in the U.S. labor force to the extent that these individuals have low labor productivity relative to the average U.S. person of working age. To measure the population in terms of PEUs, we apply the approach taken by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), which involves reweighting individuals by their This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �98 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 projected relative earnings.7 Specifically, the weight attached to an individual is the ratio of the average weekly wage among full-time, full-year workers in his or her race, gender, education, and labor market experience cell to the average weekly wage for white, male, high school graduates with 8 to 12 years of potential work experience.8 Population shares expressed in terms of PEUs appear in the right panel of figure 3. These shares are naturally smaller than in the left panel, owing to the fact that low-skilled immigrant workers have low earnings relative to other U.S. workers. Using the productivity-adjusted measure, foreign-born individuals with 12 or fewer years of schooling reach 6.5 percent of the U.S. working-age population in 2007, a share that declines slightly to 6.3 percent in 2015.9 Low-skilled immigrants tend to have high rates of labor force participation and employment when compared with similarly skilled native-born workers (Borjas 2016). Consequently, the population shares shown in figure 3 may give an incomplete characterization of the presence of the lowskilled, foreign-born workers in the effective U.S. labor supply. Figure 4 reports the shares of low-skilled immigrants in total hours worked, both using raw hours (left panel) and productivity-adjusted hours (right panel). The share of total hours worked by immigrants with 12 or fewer years of schooling rose from 5.2 percent in 1994 to 8.4 percent in 2007, before falling modestly to 8.0 percent in 2015. When expressed in PEUs, these shares are 3.6, 5.8, and 5.5 percent, respectively. 7. When applying wage-based weights to the entire population, we assume that nonworking individuals would earn the same average wage as full-time workers who share their age, gender, race, education, and nativity profile. Because employment rates increase with potential earnings, this assumption may lead our productivity-adjusted shares of the lowskilled immigrant population to overstate the shares one would calculate based on “true” wage weights. This problem is partially ameliorated when we examine the share of lowskilled immigrants in total hours worked, as we do in figure 4. 8. We construct these weights as follows. First, we divide workers into labor market groups broken down by gender, two education categories (less than 12 years of education, exactly 12 years of education), and eight experience categories (0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20–20, 25–29, 30–34, and 35–39 years of potential labor market experience). Then, for each gender-education-experience group, we calculate the weight as average weekly earnings in each year (for full-time, full-year workers, defined to be those working at least 35 hours per week and 40 weeks a year) divided by average weekly earnings for white, male, high school graduates with 8 to 12 years of labor market experience. 9. The number of Mexican-born workers in the United States increased by more than 350,000 per year over the 20 years from 1980 to 2000. Negative net migration of 160,000 per year subsequent to 2007 therefore represents a drop of half a million people per year relative to the prior trend, enough to constitute a noticeable change in the foreign-born population when cumulated over a decade of low migration. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �99 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 4. Percentage of Low-Skilled, Foreign-Born Workers in Total Hours Worked, 1993–2014 Percent weighted by productivityequivalent units Percent Raw percent Percent 8 Foreign-born, high school or less Mexican-born, high school or less 6 4 8 Foreign-born, less than high school 2 4 Mexican-born, less than high school 1995 2000 2005 Year 6 2010 2 1995 2000 2005 Year 2010 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations. Because undocumented immigrants account for a large share of the lowskilled immigrant population, and because the large majority of these individuals come from Mexico and Central America, low-skilled, foreign-born labor accounts for a relatively high fraction of employment in the states along the U.S. border with Mexico. Figure 5 plots the share of low-skilled immigrants in hours worked for the four U.S. border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas), again in terms of both raw hours and productivity-adjusted hours. Among these border states, the share of foreign-born workers with 12 or fewer years of education in total hours worked rose from 11.9 percent in 1994 to 16.2 percent in 2005 and then dropped to 14.1 percent in 2015. Given the propensity of low-skilled immigrants to concentrate in particular sectors, it is not surprising that, in selected industries, they have come to account for a substantial fraction of total employment. As seen in table 3, in 2015 immigrants with 12 or fewer years of schooling account for 29.3 percent of total hours worked in agriculture (up from 3.9 percent in 1970), 21.8 percent in personal services (up from 6.4 percent in 1970), This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �100 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Figure 5. Percentage of Low-Skilled, Foreign-Born Workers in Total Hours Worked for the U.S. Border States with Mexico, 1993–2014a Percent weighted by productivityequivalent units Percent Raw percent Percent 15 Foreign-born, high school or less 15 Mexican-born, high school or less 10 5 10 Mexican-born, less than high school 1995 2000 5 Foreign-born, less than high school 2005 Year 1995 2010 2000 2005 Year 2010 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations. a. The U.S. border states are Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. Table 3. Percentage of Foreign-Born Workers with a High School Education or Less, by Industry, 1970–2015a Industry Agriculture Construction Eating and drinking establishments Nondurable manufacturing Personal services Other industries 1970 1980 1990 2000 2015 3.9 3.9 8.3 5.9 6.4 3.0 7.0 4.4 8.5 7.1 8.9 3.3 13.5 6.9 11.4 7.9 12.5 3.7 21.4 12.0 15.6 11.2 17.7 5.1 29.3 20.3 16.8 13.5 21.8 5.8 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census, American Community Survey. a. All values are expressed as percentages. The sample is restricted to individuals with 12 years of education or less. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 101 20.3 percent in construction (up from 3.9 percent in 1970), 16.8 percent in eating and drinking establishments (up from 8.3 percent in 1970), and 13.5 percent in nondurable manufacturing (up from 5.9 percent in 1970), as compared with just 5.8 percent of employment in all other industries. For these immigrant-intensive industries, future changes in low-skilled immigration matter immensely. I.C. Who Chooses to Migrate to the United States? Is the increase in low-skilled immigration in the United States the result of increasing immigration from countries that are relatively abundant in low-skilled labor or the result of low-skilled labor being relatively likely to select into international migration? One cannot answer this question by examining U.S. data alone. Differences in educational attainment across countries would make the average worker from, say, Mexico appear to be low skilled in the U.S. labor market, whereas at home he or she would fall in the middle of the earnings distribution. In seminal research, George Borjas (1987) derived the conditions under which immigrants are negatively or positively selected in terms of skills. Conditions favoring negative selection—meaning that immigrants are drawn disproportionately from the bottom half of the skill distribution— are high returns to skills in the sending country relative to the receiving country, and migration costs that are proportional to worker productivity (for example, costs that have an iceberg form), which combine to give lessskilled workers a relatively strong incentive to migrate. Migration costs that are fixed in nature and a marginal utility of income that is not strongly decreasing favor positive selection of immigrants in terms of skills (Grogger and Hanson 2011), in which case immigrants are drawn more heavily from the top half of the skills distribution. Whether immigrants are negatively or positively selected in terms of skills matters for how labor movements affect the distribution of income in sending and receiving countries and for the ease with which immigrants from low-income countries integrate themselves into the labor markets of high-income countries. If, for example, immigrants from Mexico are negatively selected in terms of skills, shocks that contribute to a positive net flow of labor from Mexico to the United States would tend to decrease Mexican wage inequality—by reducing Mexico’s relative supply of lowwage workers—and to increase U.S. wage inequality—by expanding the U.S. relative supply of low-wage workers. Further, immigrants who are negatively selected in terms of skills may face greater challenges in This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �102 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 assimilating economically in the U.S. labor market and may be more likely to be a net drain on public resources (Borjas 2016). To examine the composition of low-skilled immigration in the United States from the sending country’s perspective, we focus on the case of Mexico, which is by far the largest source country for U.S. labor inflows, accounting for nearly half of all U.S. low-skilled immigrants and nearly two-thirds of those with less than 12 years of schooling. We extend forward in time the analysis of Daniel Chiquiar and Gordon Hanson (2005), which utilizes the methodology of John DiNardo, Nicole Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux (1996) for constructing counterfactual wage distributions.10 To examine differences in the distribution of skills between Mexican residents (that is, nonmigrants in Mexico) and Mexican immigrants, we compare the actual wage density in Mexico for Mexican residents with the counterfactual wage density that Mexican immigrants in the United States would obtain if they were paid according to Mexico’s prevailing wage structure. This comparison reveals from where in Mexico’s wage distribution migrants to the United States are drawn. Because this analysis projects U.S. immigrants onto Mexico’s wage distribution based on workers’ observable skills, it ignores the role of unobserved characteristics in migration and earnings. And because it takes Mexico’s current wage distribution as given, the analysis is silent about the equilibrium impact of immigration on U.S. or Mexican wages. Let f i(w x) be the density of wages w in country i, conditional on observed characteristics x, h(x i = MX) be the density of observed characteristics among workers in Mexico, and h(x i = US) be the density of observed characteristics among Mexican immigrants in the United States. The density of wages that would prevail for Mexican immigrants in the United States if they were to be paid according to the price of skills in Mexico is given by (1) MX ( w ) = ∫ f MX ( w x ) h ( x i = US ) dx . gUS This quantity corresponds to the counterfactual distribution of wages that arises from projecting the skill distribution of Mexican immigrants in the 10. Also on the selection of immigrants from Mexico in terms of observable skill, see Feliciano (2001), Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007, 2011), and Akee (2010). This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 103 United States onto the current wage structure of Mexico. Although this distribution is unobserved, we can rewrite it as ( 2) MX ( w ) = ∫ θ f MX ( w x ) h ( x i = MX ) dx , g US where Mexico’s conditional wage distribution f MX(w x) and the skill distribution of its resident population h(x i = MX) are observed, and where ( 3) θ= h ( x i = US ) . h ( x i = MX ) Hence, we can obtain the counterfactual wage density that we desire in equation 1 simply by applying the appropriate weight q to the existing dis­ tribution of wages in Mexico. To compute this weight, we use Bayes’s theorem to write (4) h( x ) = h ( x i = US ) Pr ( i = US ) Pr ( i = US x ) and ( 5) h( x ) = h ( x i = MX ) Pr ( i = MX ) . Pr ( i = MX x ) Combining equations 4 and 5, we obtain an expression for q that is the ratio of the conditional probability that a Mexican-born worker resides in the United States, Pr(i = US x)/Pr(i = MX x), to the unconditional probability that a Mexican-born worker resides in the United States, Pr(i = US)/ Pr(i = MX). We estimate these probabilities via a logit model, use the estimates to calculate q, and apply the q weights to estimate the counterfactual wage density in equation 2.11 11. This method for constructing weights ignores differences in labor force participation rates in the two countries. Whereas labor force participation among male residents of Mexico and male Mexican immigrants in the United States are similar, labor force participation is higher among immigrant Mexican women than among nonmigrant Mexican women. Not accounting for these differences would tend to overstate negative selection among immigrants. See Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) for details and for methods to account for crossnational differences in labor force participation. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �104 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 We construct actual and counterfactual wage densities for males and females, separately, in the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. Earnings are annual labor income for individuals age 18–64. We estimate the logit regressions used to predict whether an individual born in Mexico resides in the United States separately for men and women as a function of education (seven categories, based on years of schooling: 0–4, 5–8, 9, 10–11, 12, 13–15, 16+) and age (46 categories, one for each year in the range 18–64). The population is all working-age individuals in Mexico and Mexican immigrants in the United States who have resided in the country for 10 or fewer years. Results are similar when we expand the analysis to include immigrants with 20 or fewer years of U.S. residence, who constitute the large majority of working-age Mexican immigrants in the United States. Wage densities are plotted relative to mean log earnings for workers in Mexico of a given gender in a given year, such that actual wage densities are centered on zero. Figure 6 presents the results, where in each plot the dashed line is the actual wage density for Mexico and the solid line is the counterfactual wage density in Mexico for current Mexican immigrants. For the case of males, shown in the left-side panels of figure 6, we see that in each year, the actual and counterfactual densities are very similar to each other, suggesting that the observable skills of Mexican immigrants match closely those of individuals who have not migrated abroad. In 1990, the counterfactual wage density lies slightly to the right of the actual wage density, indicating that Mexican immigrants are mildly positively selected in terms of observable skills. This difference is more defined in figure 7, which plots the difference between counterfactual and actual wage densities. In 1990, this difference, as seen in the top-left panel, has a negative mass just below zero and a positive mass just above zero, indicating that male immigrants are underrepresented among those who would earn slightly less than mean earnings in Mexico and overrepresented among those who would earn slightly more than mean earnings in Mexico. The slight rightward shift in the counterfactual relative to the actual wage density is also present in 2000 and 2010. However, the difference between actual and counterfactual densities becomes less pronounced over time, such that in the top-left panel of figure 7, the negative hump below zero and the positive hump above zero are smaller in 2000 than in 1990 and smaller still in 2010 relative to 1990. These changes are also seen in the top-right panel of figure 7, which reports the double difference in densities: counterfactual relative to actual wage densities in 2010 relative to this difference in either 1990 or 2000. The double difference using 2010 and 1990 is larger than that for 2010 and 2000, indicating a lessening of positive selection This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �105 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 6. Actual Wage Density in Mexico and Counterfactual Wage Density for Mexican Immigrants in the United States Males, 1990 Females, 1990 Density 0.5 0.4 Density Mexican residents in Mexico Mexican immigrants in the United States 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 Log wage 0.4 –0.4 Males, 2000 Density 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 –0.2 0 0.2 Log wage 0 0.2 Log wage 0.4 Females, 2000 Density –0.4 –0.2 0.4 –0.4 Males, 2010 –0.2 0 0.2 Log wage 0.4 Females, 2010 Density Density 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 Log wage 0.4 –0.4 –0.2 0 0.2 Log wage 0.4 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census, American Community Survey; Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, Mexican decennial census; authors’ calculations. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �106 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Figure 7. Selection of Immigrants from Mexico in Terms of Observable Skills Migration selection evaluated at 1990 wage, males Density Double difference, males Density 0.1 0.1 2000 0.05 2010 minus 1990 0.05 2010 0 0 –0.05 –0.05 1990 –0.1 –4 –2 0 2 Log wage 4 –4 Migration selection evaluated at 1990 wage, females Density 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.05 0 0 –0.05 –0.05 –0.1 –0.1 –2 0 2 Log wage 4 –2 0 2 Log wage 4 Double difference, females Density –4 2010 minus 2000 –0.1 –4 –2 0 2 Log wage 4 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census, American Community Survey; Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, Mexican decennial census; authors’ calculations. over time. By the time that we arrive in 2010, working-age Mexican immigrants who reside in the United States appear to be close to a random draw on the population of working-age individuals in Mexico. The three right-side panels of figure 6 repeat the analysis for women. Among women, we see evidence of stronger positive selection in 1990 and 2000 when compared with men. In each year, the rightward shift of the counterfactual wage density relative to the actual wage density is more pronounced than the corresponding density difference for males. As with males, the strength of positive selection diminishes over time, such that by 2010 the counterfactual and actual wage densities for women are very This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 107 similar. We conclude that by 2010, the selection of immigrants from Mexico is close to neutral in terms of observable skills. As mentioned above, these results are silent about the pattern of immigrant selection in terms of unobservables. One concern about the results shown in figures 6 and 7 is that we use census data to evaluate immigrant selection. Any undercount of the Mexicoborn population in either Mexico or the United States that depends systematically on an individual’s age or education could result in biased estimates either of the wage density for Mexico or of the counterfactual wage density that we construct for Mexican immigrants in the United States. There is a long-standing belief among demographers that the U.S. census undercounts undocumented immigrants in the United States (Warren and Passel 1987). To address this undercount issue, some studies evaluate immigrant selection using data exclusively from Mexico (Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2007). In noteworthy work, Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2011) uses data from Mexico’s national employment survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, ENE), which follows households for five consecutive quarters and includes in the survey questions about whether household members have migrated to the United States during the period since the last survey was conducted. Distinct from Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2011) finds that Mexican immigrants are negatively selected in terms of skills, as captured by residuals from Mincerian wage regressions. The ENE, however, has measurement problems of its own. It suffers from high rates of attrition by households from the sample within the five-quarter survey window, which a recent study by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine concludes makes it problematic as a data source for evaluating Mexican migration to the United States (Carriquiry and Majmundar 2013). Fortunately, there is a source that provides longitudinal data on households in Mexico and that tracks information on individuals who migrate to the United States. The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) has been conducted in three waves—2002, 2006, and 2009—with a recontact rate of respondents between each wave of 90 percent. Of particular importance, the survey follows household members who migrate to the United States between waves. Robert Kaestner and Ofer Malamud (2014) use data from the first two MxFLS waves to analyze the selection of immigrants according to various measures of skills. Similar to what one sees in census data, migrants to the United States in the MxFLS are more likely to be young. In terms of education, both male and female migrants are more likely to have middle levels of schooling (4–9 years for men, 4–12 years for women) than This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �108 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 to have low levels of schooling (0–3 years). For men, but not for women, migrants are less likely to have very high levels of schooling (more than 12 years) than to have very low levels (0–3 years). The MxFLS also provides a measure of cognitive ability in the form of a Raven’s Progressive Matrices test score (Raven, Raven, and Court 2000). Although cognitive ability is a frequently discussed source of skill in the analysis of earnings (Heckman and Vytlacil 2001), few data sources provide evidence of how cognitive skills relate to migration decisions. Among both men and women, Kaestner and Malamud (2014) report no difference between migrants and nonmigrants in terms of their Raven scores, suggesting that the two populations have a similar distribution of observable cognitive abilities. Following Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2011), Kaestner and Malamud (2014) also examine migrant selection in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics using Mincerian wage regressions. Their analysis shows that workers with the highest predicted earnings or the highest residual earnings in the first MxFLS wave—meaning those among the top quintile of predicted or residual wage earners—are less likely to migrate but that there is no pattern of selection among lower-wage individuals. Despite problems with possible undercounts of undocumented migrants in census data, they provide a characterization of immigration selection that is comparable to that based on high-quality longitudinal micro data. Immigrants from Mexico to the United States are overrepresented among individuals whose skills place them in the middle of Mexico’s wage distribution and mildly underrepresented among individuals who would be very low-wage or very high-wage earners in their home country. When we examine U.S. immigration from other source countries, evidence of positive selection in terms of observable skills such as education is even more pronounced (Grogger and Hanson 2011). In nearly all source countries for U.S. labor inflows, immigrants are relatively likely to come from among the more educated.12 I.D. Summary The U.S. population of low-skilled immigrants has gone through an epochal half century of growth, transforming from a small cadre of older immigrants from Europe to a large population of immigrants from Latin America and Asia who are nearing middle age and who have now lived in 12. One exception to this pattern is Puerto Rico, which as an unincorporated territory of the United States is not subject to the same barriers to U.S. immigration as foreign nations (Borjas 2008). This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 109 the United States for an extended period of time. Immigrants from Mexico, who account for one-half to three-fifths of the low-skilled foreign born population, depending on the definition of skill, are preponderantly individuals who would be middle-income earners in their birth country. As the United States looks forward to an era of weakened incentives for lowskilled immigration due to changing labor demand and labor supply conditions at home and abroad, it will be shocks to middle-wage workers in migrant-sending countries that matter disproportionately for who migrates. Efforts to reduce the existing population of low-skilled immigrants, such as through increased deportations of undocumented immigrants, would target a population that appears to have a long tenure of residence in the United States. II. Labor Demand, Labor Supply, and Low-Skilled Immigration In this section and the next, we examine factors affecting the net flow of low-skilled immigrants into the United States. We begin in this section by describing recent changes in conditions surrounding low-skilled immigration, including income differences between the United States and major migrant-sending countries, U.S. immigration policy, and relative labor supply growth in the United States and major sending countries. We then analyze for the case of Mexico the contribution of labor demand and labor supply shocks to migration to the United States. II.A. Income Differences between Countries Perhaps the simplest manner in which to evaluate the incentive for immigration is to compare income between countries. Beginning with Larry Sjaastad (1962), economists have modeled immigration as an investment decision, in which the upfront cost of migration yields an income flow over time equal to the difference in earnings between the home and foreign economies. There may be considerable heterogeneity in the time horizon over which individuals consider migration (Dustmann 2003). Seasonal workers may focus on income differences between countries no more than a few months in advance, other individuals may be uncertain about their desire to relocate permanently and so put weight on the income differences they expect to be sustained over the next several years, and still others may treat migration as a long-term decision and therefore evaluate the expected discounted difference in income streams over their full working lives. To examine high-frequency changes in the incentive for immigration, we abstract away from such heterogeneity and consider point-in-time This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �110 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 income differences between the United States and migrant-sending countries, an approach taken in the large body of literature that uses the gravity model to analyze bilateral migration flows (Karemera, Oguledo, and Davis 2000; Clark, Hatton, and Williamson 2007; Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga 2013). Even in making point-in-time income comparisons, one faces many choices for how to measure income. One approach is to evaluate earnings for individuals with similar observable skills who were born in the same country and now live in different countries. Using data from the U.S. and Mexican population censuses, Hanson (2006) reports that in 2000 the average hourly wage for a 28- to 32-year-old male with 9 to 11 years of education is $2.40 in Mexico and $8.70 among recent Mexican immigrants in the United States (these income values, like those we report below, are adjusted for purchasing power parity in terms of 2000 dollars). At a labor supply of 35 hours per week and 48 weeks per year, this would yield an annual income gain of $10,600. Combining data from Mexico’s national survey of income and expenditures with data from the U.S. census, Michael Clemens, Claudio Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett (2008) obtain similar results, estimating that in 2000 the annual income gain to migration for a 35-year-old Mexican male with 9 to 12 years of education is $9,200. Comparing migrants with nonmigrants is problematic if there are unobserved characteristics that affect both the migration decision and an individual’s income-earning ability. An alternative approach is to use longitudinal data for the same individual, which allows comparisons of income before and after migration. Mark Rosenzweig (2007) uses data from the New Immigrant Survey to estimate the change in income for new U.S. permanent legal immigrants in 2003. He checks their current U.S. earnings against earnings in the last job they held in their country of origin. For a legal immigrant from Mexico with 9 to 12 years of education, the average gain in income is $15,900 (at 35 hours a week and 48 weeks a year). Comparing the same individual in two countries corrects for selection into the migration associated with unobserved, time-invariant individual characteristics but may introduce other complications. If, in preparing to migrate, individuals reduce their labor supply in a manner that diminishes income (or if negative shocks to income precipitate migration), this approach may overstate the income gains to migration.13 13. Since Rosenzweig (2007) examines legal immigrants, his figures are not directly comparable to those of Hanson (2006) or Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008), whose samples include all immigrants. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 111 Evaluating how the incentive to migrate to the United States has changed across countries and over time is complicated by the fact that few countries produce annual household survey data, and census data are amassed infrequently. Our approach is to construct income differences between countries by combining annual data on average income from national accounts with data on the variance in income as inferred from summary statistics on income inequality. Although statistics on income inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, are often constructed at less than an annual frequency, they tend to change slowly from one year to the next (Solt 2016), which permits interpolation of their values to create an annual series. Under the assumption that income is log-normally distributed across households, which is approximately consistent with data for many countries (Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 2009), one can use the Gini coefficient to calculate the variance of income across individuals and then combine this value with average income to construct income at different percentiles of the distribution (Grogger and Hanson 2011).14 Given the neutral selection of immigrants from Mexico in terms of observable skills, the 50th percentile (equal to $8,800 in 2000) is a natural choice for the reference income of a prospective Mexican migrant. To select the reference income in the United States for a typical immigrant from Mexico, we choose the percentile of the U.S. income distribution that yields an income gain to migration in 2000 that is approximately equal to the average income gain for migrants as described by Hanson (2006); Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett (2008); and Rosenzweig (2007). The 25th percentile of the U.S. income distribution ($20,100 in 2000) serves this purpose. In the left panel of figure 8, we report the ratio of the 50th percentile of the Mexican income distribution to the 25th percentile of the U.S. income distribution, where we construct these values using Gini coefficients from UNU-WIDER’s World Income Inequality Database, and per capita GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity, from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.15 This ratio is stable in the 1990s and early 2000s, averaging 0.44 between 1990 and 2007. During this period, 2 14. Suppose log income is normally distributed with mean µ and variance – s . Given an estimate of the Gini coefficient G, the standard deviation of log income is s = √2F-1([G + 1]/2). The value of log income at the a quantile is then µe(sza-s2/2), where za is the ath percentile of N (0,1). 15. Because Gini coefficients are not available in all years, we interpolate values for missing years. The series on Gini coefficients ends in 2012 in some countries and in 2013 in others. We assume that Gini coefficients in later years equal those in the last year for which data are available. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �112 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Figure 8. The Ratio of the 50th Percentile of Income in the Sending Country to the 25th Percentile of Income in the United States, 1990–2015 Mexico Latin America, excluding Mexicoa 0.55 0.35 0.5 0.3 0.25 0.45 0.2 1995 2000 2005 Year 2010 1995 2000 2005 Year 2010 Sources: UNU-WIDER, World Income Inequality Database; World Bank, World Development Indicators; authors’ calculations. a. The Latin American countries considered are Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Jamaica. a middle-income earner in Mexico who chooses to become a low-income earner in the United States would see his or her real earnings increase by a factor of 2.3. After the Great Recession, the U.S.–Mexico income difference compresses, with the ratio of the 50th percentile of Mexican income to the 25th percentile of U.S. income rising to an average of 0.53 between 2008 and 2015 and to 0.58 during the later period of 2011 to 2015. In the right panel of figure 8, we report the corresponding ratio of the 50th percentile of the sending country’s income to 25th percentile of U.S. income for a composite of other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. We choose the next-largest sending countries for which data on Gini coefficients are available—Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Jamaica—and we weight each country’s income by its relative share of working-age, low-skilled immigrants in the United States in 2000.16 The time path of relative income is similar 16. In 2000, the share of U.S. low-skilled, working-age immigrants accounted for by these countries is 15.0 percent (4.1 percent for El Salvador, 2.8 percent for the Dominican Republic, 2.3 percent for Guatemala, 1.7 percent for Jamaica, 1.6 percent for Colombia, 1.3 percent for Honduras, and 1.1 percent for Ecuador). Gini coefficients are unavailable for Cuba and Haiti (2.5 and 1.5 percent of U.S. low-skilled immigrants in 2000, respectively), leading us to leave them out of figures 8 and 9. Significant sending nations for U.S. low-skilled immigrants outside the Western Hemisphere (and their shares of this population in 2000) include Vietnam (4.1 percent), the Philippines (2.2 percent), China (2.1 percent), South Korea (1.5 percent), Germany (1.4 percent), Italy (1.2 percent), Canada (1.2 percent), India (1.2 percent), and Poland (1.1). This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �113 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 9. Volatility of GDP Growth, 1993:Q1–2016:Q1a Mexico Standard deviations of GDP growth Latin America, excluding Mexicob Standard deviations of GDP growth 12 5 9 6 Mexico United States 3 Latin America 4 3 2 1 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year United States 2004 2008 2012 2016 Year Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators; authors’ calculations. a. GDP growth volatility is shown for rolling eight-quarter windows. Tick marks on the horizontal axes indicate quarter 1. b. The Latin American countries considered are Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Jamaica. to that for the U.S.–Mexico comparison, though the absolute income gap is larger. The income ratio is stable from 1990 to 2007, averaging 0.22, and then rises after the onset of the Great Recession, averaging 0.30 from 2008 to 2015. Since 2007, relatively slow U.S. income growth and rapid growth in neighboring countries have compressed the income gap between the United States and migrant-sending nations, presumably weakening incentives for immigration. In forming expectations about future income differences between countries, prospective migrants are likely to consider not just the level of income but also its variance. Over short time horizons, higher perceived variance in income in the sending country relative to the receiving country may add to the incentive for migration. At a monthly frequency, changes in attempted undocumented migration from Mexico to the United States, as captured by apprehensions at the U.S.–Mexico border, are strongly sensitive to changes in the dollar–peso real exchange rate, with attempted entry surging during periods following currency crises in Mexico (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999; Monras 2015). When expanding data to include countries throughout the Western Hemisphere, emigration rates to the United States are larger for cohorts subject to a higher incidence of financial crises in their home country (Hanson and McIntosh 2012). To characterize changes in U.S. income volatility relative to that in migrant-sending economies, the left panel of figure 9 reports the standard This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 deviation in quarterly real GDP growth in Mexico and the United States for rolling eight-quarter windows covering the period 1991:Q1–2016:Q1. Throughout this time span, volatility in GDP growth is higher in Mexico (average eight-quarter standard deviation of 3.7 percent) than in the United States (average eight-quarter standard deviation of 2.0 percent). However, there are evident changes in relative volatility over time. After the 1995 peso crisis, volatility spiked in Mexico while remaining low in the United States. During the ensuing 10 years, volatility remained uniformly higher in Mexico, though well below the elevated levels of crisis periods. With the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008–10, volatility jumps in both economies, declining thereafter to roughly equal levels. Reduced differences between Mexico and the United States in income volatility reflect the improved execution of monetary and fiscal policies in Mexico—which, as in much of Latin America, has helped lower inflation, reduce government debt, and stabilize GDP growth (Edwards 2009). In the right panel of figure 9, we compare volatility in quarter-to-quarter GDP growth in the United States with the same migrant-sending countries examined with regard to relative GDP levels in figure 8. Here again, we see that volatility in GDP growth in migrant-sending nations has decreased relative to the United States, which has presumably dampened pressures for cross-border labor flows. II.B. U.S. Immigration Policy Low-skilled immigrants enter the United States through three channels: with permanent legal residence visas (green cards), with temporary work visas, and as undocumented entrants. During the 2000s, the U.S. government engaged in a massive buildup in border enforcement efforts, with most newly committed resources allocated to the U.S. border with Mexico. To understand how changes in immigration policy may have affected incentives for low-skilled immigration, we review recent adjustments in U.S. policy mechanisms. LEGAL IMMIGRATION The vast majority of low-skilled immigrants who obtain green cards do so through family sponsorship, for which visa eligibility derives from having a relative who is a U.S. citizen or legal resident, or as refugees or asylees (Rosenzweig 2007). The number of U.S. green cards and the policies governing their allocation have been stable since 1990. In that year, the Immigration Act set the annual number of familysponsored visas at 480,000, the annual number of employer-sponsored visas (which go primarily to skilled workers) at 140,000, and the annual number of diversity visas (allocated via lottery to countries that have historically low migration to the United States) at 55,000. Visas available to immediate This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 115 relatives of U.S. citizens are uncapped, though applications for these visas may be subject to processing delays. The number of green cards given to refugees and asylees, though having no set cap, shows no trend over time, having fallen from 114,000 per year in the 1990s to 83,000 per year in the 2000s, before rising to 109,000 per year during the 2010–15 period.17 Any increase in low-skilled immigration via permanent legal visas thus cannot have occurred through expanded quotas for green cards. It must instead have occurred through increases in the number of low-skilled immigrants qualifying for, applying for, and receiving visas from the annual allocation of visas.18 Qualifying for a green card under family sponsorship requires having an immediate relative who is a U.S. citizen—which gives one access to visas that are not subject to numerical limit—or a more distant relative who is a U.S. citizen or legal resident—which allows one to apply for the fixed annual allocation of green cards. Because the number of new applications exceeds the annual cap on green cards, and has for many years, there is often a substantial lag between the time of application and the time of visa receipt, with waiting times of several years in length being common. The waiting time depends in part on one’s visa preference category, which is a function of how closely related one is to a U.S. resident, and in part on the number of green card applicants from an individual’s country of birth who are higher up in the visa queue. Family sponsorship for green cards makes immigration a self-reinforcing process. As the number of permanent legal immigrants from a sending country increases, so too does the number of residents of that country who are eligible for a green card. For example, permanent visas awarded to residents of Mexico rose from 64,000 per year in the 1970s to 166,000 per year in the 1980s and to 225,000 per year in the 1990s, before dropping to 169,000 per year since 2000.19 Visa growth from the 1970s to the 17. A refugee is a foreign resident who is unable or unwilling to remain in his or her country of nationality because of fear of persecution based on race, religion, social group, or political opinion; an asylee is a foreign national who meets the conditions of a refugee and is already in the United States. A refugee is eligible to apply for a green card after one year of U.S. residence. At the beginning of each fiscal year, the president, in consultation with Congress, sets a worldwide ceiling on refugee admissions. 18. All data on legal immigration are from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics). 19. Regarding admission of permanent legal residents from nations in the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean, green cards issued have risen from 50,000 per year in the 1970s, to 180,000 per year in the 1980s, to 205,000 per year in the 1990s, and to 250,000 per year since 2000. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �116 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 2000s partly reflects the growing population of Mexican residents who have family members who are legal U.S. residents, which has expanded the pool of eligible green card applicants. However, idiosyncratic changes in immigration policy are also at work. The 1990s blip in green cards awarded to residents of Mexico was partly a result of the legalization of undocumented immigrants under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which delivered green cards to undocumented residents who met eligibility requirements on a one-time basis. The recent slowdown in low-skilled immigration is evident in green card allocations. Green cards awarded to Mexican residents declined from 175,000 per year during the 2001–05 period to 140,000 per year during the 2011–15 period. Because more residents of Mexico were eligible for green cards in 2010 than in 2000, the slowdown in green cards issued must be due to a decrease in demand for U.S. visas, which may be due to improved economic conditions in Mexico relative to the United States. Another form of legal immigration available to low-skilled, foreignborn workers is a temporary work visa. These visas permit a non-U.S. resident to work in the United States for a period of less than one year. The H-2A program provides work permits to agricultural workers, while the H-2B program gives work permits to nonagricultural workers, often for seasonal jobs in construction or tourism. The number of H-2 visas has risen over time—H-2A visas from 46,000 in 2006 to 284,000 in 2015, and H-2B visas from 97,000 in 2006 to 120,000 in 2015. However, because these visas permit stays of less than one year and are nonrenewable, they account for no more than a small share (less than 3 percent) of the over 17 million low-skilled, working-age immigrants who resided in the United States as of the mid-2010s.20 UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION The most significant recent changes in the United States’ policy governing low-skilled immigration pertain to how the country monitors and enforces its borders and ports of entry. Undocumented immigrants gain entry to the United States either by overstaying their legal immigration visas or by crossing a U.S. border or entry point illegally.21 The United States has substantially expanded the resources it devotes to 20. That is, if a current H-2 visa holder desires to return on an H-2 visa in the following year, he or she must return to his or her country of residence and seek admission out of the following year’s visa allocation. 21. As of the mid-2000s, approximately 45 percent of undocumented immigrants in the United States appeared to be visa overstayers (many of whom do not remain in the United States in the longer term). See Pew Research Center (2006) and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2016b) for estimates of annual overstay rates by country. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �117 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 10. Number of U.S. Border Patrol Agents, 1992–2016 Nationwide 20,000 Southwestern states 15,000 10,000 5,000 1996 2000 2004 Year 2008 2012 Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. preventing undocumented labor inflows (Roberts, Alden, and Whitley 2013). Figure 10 plots the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents stationed at the U.S.–Mexico border and other entry points. In 2016, 85.9 percent of agents were stationed in the Southwest, a share similar to that in 1992. The expansion in personnel at the border—which increased by a factor of 4.8 by 2016—encompasses only part of the buildup. There have also been substantial investments in infrastructure at the border and changes in how those caught attempting undocumented entry are treated. To comprehend the dimensions of these changes, consider how the environment along the San Diego–Tijuana segment of the U.S.–Mexico border today compares with that in 1992, before the modern enforcement buildup began. In 1992, there were 1,009 Border Patrol agents assigned to the San Diego region, which stretches from the Pacific Ocean for about 60 miles east, among the 3,555 agents stationed along the entire U.S.–Mexico border. Barriers at the border itself were insubstantial, consisting in many areas, including those adjacent to the heart of urban Tijuana, of no more than a chain-link fence, in which large holes were frequently cut. In 1992, the Border Patrol apprehended 545,000 individuals in the San Diego sector, representing 542 apprehensions per agent. Across the entire U.S.–Mexico border, there were 1,134,000 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �118 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 apprehensions, representing 319 apprehensions per agent. Agents spent much of their time chasing down migrants as they attempted to run into the United States and find cover in San Diego neighborhoods. More than 95 percent of those apprehended were Mexican nationals, and nearly all were subject to “voluntary removal,” under which they face no legal sanction for being apprehended. After capture, most were bused across the nearest border crossing, leaving them free to attempt entry again soon thereafter (Hanson 2007). Thus, as of the early 1990s, the U.S.–Mexico border was porous, the enforcement presence was unsophisticated and lightly resourced, and sanctions against migrants attempting illegal entry were weak. Today, the San Diego–Tijuana border, as with much of the U.S.–Mexico border, is a much different place. The number of Border Patrol officers in San Diego has grown to 2,325, among the 17,026 stationed along the entire border. San Diego and Tijuana are now separated by multiple layers of border barriers, which include rows of closely spaced, vertically mounted steel beams that reach 18 feet in height. These barriers constitute part of the 650 miles of fencing along the U.S.–Mexico border, 600 miles of which were constructed between 2006 and 2010 (Roberts, Alden, and Whitley 2013), which cover nearly all the U.S–Mexico border that does not coincide with the Rio Grande, a river that spans the near entirety of Texas’s border with Mexico. The San Diego–Tijuana border is patrolled by Border Patrol agents in SUVs, who traverse groomed roads constructed between each layer of border fencing, with manned and unmanned aircraft surveilling from above. Night-vision-capable video cameras posted every few hundred yards provide a continuous feed to Border Patrol stations nearby. In 2015, apprehensions in the San Diego sector were down to 26,000 (11 apprehensions per agent) and down to 337,000 for the U.S.–Mexico border as a whole (29 apprehensions per agent). Whereas, in the past, the Border Patrol spent much of its time physically apprehending migrants, today its job is to serve as a deterrent force against those who would consider illegal entry. In fiscal year 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security spent an estimated $7 billion on salaries and benefits for Border Patrol agents and Customs and Border Protection officers (whose employment numbers are roughly equal); $3.6 billion on Coast Guard efforts to maintain the security of U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal areas; $2.9 billion on the detention and removal of deportable aliens; and $410 million to maintain infrastructure and purchase communications equipment related to border security (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2016a). This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 119 Sanctions against undocumented immigration have also changed. The era of voluntary removal is over, replaced by a Consequence Delivery System (Argueta 2016). The disposition of those apprehended is conditional on their previous crossing activity and other circumstances. Since 2000, nearly all those apprehended at the border (meaning within 100 miles of a border and 14 days of entering the United States) have been fingerprinted and recorded in a digital database. Consequences depend on whether the apprehension is the first ever or a repeat event. Since the early 2010s, the large majority of those apprehended (more than 85 percent) have been subject at a minimum to “expedited removal” (or “reinstatement of removal,” if they have been removed before), which is a formal and immediate removal order that carries the considerable penalty of making the individual ineligible for legal U.S. immigration during the subsequent 10 years (enforceable via an individual’s fingerprint record). Those with multiple prior apprehensions may be subject to a “warrant of arrest” and misdemeanor prosecution. Roughly one-third of those deported are now repatriated to a port of entry far from their attempted crossing point, which disrupts smuggling operations in which individuals pay smugglers for multiple attempts to cross the border (as a hedge against the risk of apprehension).22 Since the enactment of the Consequence Delivery System, recidivism rates have dropped. During the 2005–07 period, 25 to 30 percent of those apprehended were caught within the same year. Recidivism began to decline in 2009, when the consequence program was rolled out, and in 2015 it stood at 15 percent. The intensity of immigration enforcement has also increased in the U.S. interior.23 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the government agency tasked with locating and removing “deportable aliens” in the U.S. interior, meaning all immigrants whose criminal activities— whether related to immigration or nonimmigration infractions—warrant deportation. By working more closely with local law enforcement agencies, ICE agents have expanded the deportations of individuals accused of minor infractions, including those driving without a license or driving 22. The Alien Transfer Exit Program repatriates Mexican nationals through geographic areas different from their attempted point of entry (Argueta 2016). 23. Changes in interior enforcement are important, in light of the fact that about twofifths of undocumented immigrants may have entered the country on legal visas, which they subsequently overstayed (Passel and Cohn 2016). By increasing border and interior enforcement simultaneously, the Department of Homeland Security may reduce incentives for border crossers to become visa overstayers. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �120 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 under the influence of alcohol or other substances (Thompson and Cohen 2014). These changes in part account for the increase in the deportations of noncriminal aliens (that is, those whose nonimmigration crimes alone do not warrant deportation) from 112,000 per year during the first three years of the George W. Bush administration (2001–03) to 223,000 per year during the first three years of the Barack Obama administration (2009–11). Deportations of criminal aliens—those whose nonimmigration crimes do warrant deportation—has also increased, from 77,000 per year in 2001–03 to 164,000 per year in 2009–11, which may reflect a combination of an expanding population of criminal aliens and increased efforts by ICE to locate and remove these individuals when they finish their prison terms. The Department of Homeland Security’s ICE budget in fiscal year 2017 was $6.2 billion (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2016a). What have these changes in policy meant for undocumented immigration? One indication of the impact of border enforcement is movements in the price for smuggling services. Most of those attempting to cross the U.S.–Mexico border hire a smuggler, known as a coyote, to serve as a guide through the desert and mountain regions of Arizona and Texas, where most undocumented immigrants now attempt to cross the border. Measures of coyote prices are available from the Border Patrol, which asks a subset of those apprehended whether they hired a coyote and the price paid; from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), which surveys individuals in Mexico about their previous border-crossing experiences; and from the Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico (Encuesta sobre Migracíon en la Frontera Norte de México, EMIF Norte), which surveys migrants returning from the United States at bus stations and other transportation points in Mexico.24 None of these sources are free of measurement problems. Border Patrol data are only available from those apprehended and questioned about their behavior, while the MMP and EMIF Norte are based on the selected sample of migrants who have returned to Mexico. Although average coyote prices differ across these sources, their time trends are similar (Roberts and others 2010). Border Patrol data show smuggler prices rising from $1,000 in 1999 to $1,600 in 2008 (in 2007 dollars). Using data from the MMP, Christina Gathmann (2008) estimates that a 24. For the methodology of the Mexican Migration Project, see http://mmp.opr.princeton. edu/research/design-en.aspx; and for EMIF Norte, see http://www.colef.mx/emif/eng/bases_ metodologicas.php. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 121 10 percent borderwide increase in enforcement (measured in man-hours) increases the average smuggler price by 4.9 percent. Using this elasticity, the increase in Border Patrol manpower on the U.S.–Mexico border from 2007 to 2015 of 27.6 percent would have increased smuggler prices by 13.6 percent. The cumulative effect of the U.S. enforcement buildup is hundreds of miles of new fencing, the rollout of technologically sophisticated border surveillance, a near quintupling of Border Patrol agents since the early 1990s, and the criminalization of illegal border crossings since the late 2000s. These changes combine with the recent compression in income differences between the United States and major sending nations to weaken incentives for low-skilled labor inflows. II.C. Demographic Pressures for U.S. Immigration In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, macroeconomic shocks and relatively low incomes in Mexico and the rest of Latin America helped trigger labor flows to the United States. What sustained these flows over time was rapid growth in the relative labor supplies of these countries (Hanson and McIntosh 2012). Whereas the U.S. baby boom came to a halt in the early 1960s, Latin America’s baby boom did not abate until two decades later. Differences in the timing of the U.S. and Latin American demographic transitions mean that though the sizes of U.S. cohorts coming of working age began to slow in the early 1980s, they kept growing in Latin America until the 2000s, fueling pressures for emigration. The relationship between labor supply growth and changes in U.S. migration appears in figure 11, which charts, for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the percent change in migration rates to the United States from 1980 to 2015 against the percent change in national birth cohort sizes over this interval. A strong positive relationship is evident, with the R2 on the population-weighted linear fit equal to 0.45. As noted, the most important origin countries in terms of absolute number of current migrants residing in the United States are Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. Mexico stands out in this group, with roughly 10 times the number of U.S. immigrants in the 15–40 age group as the next largest origin country in Latin America (figure 12). Mexico also stands out in terms of having the largest drop in migration between 2010 and 2015. Although most countries in Latin America see some decrease in the number of immigrants in this age group between 2010 and 2015, the number of Mexican-born individuals age This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �122 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Figure 11. U.S. Labor Supply Growth versus U.S. Migration Changes from Latin America and the Caribbean, 1980–2015 Percent change in migration rate Honduras 1,250 Guatemala 1,000 El Salvador 750 500 Venezuela Dominican Antigua and Peru Mexico Trinidad and Republic Barbuda Haiti Tobago Nicaragua 250 Grenada Bolivia Paraguay Ecuador Guyana Bahamas Jamaica Colombia Belize Costa Rica Chile 0 Barbados Panama Uruguay –25 0 25 50 75 100 Percent change in birth cohort size 125 150 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey; United Nations, World Population Prospects. Figure 12. Migration Rates and Migration Counts for Age 15–40, 1980–2015 Migration rates Migration counts Percent Million El Salvador 6 5 15 Mexico 10 4 3 Guatemala 5 Honduras 1990 2000 Year Dominican Republic 2 1 2010 1990 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 2000 Year 2010 �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 123 15–40 residing in the United States fell by more than 1.1 million over these five years.25 The durability of the decrease in migration from Mexico to the United States depends strongly on the reason it occurred. If the slowdown is due primarily to earlier shifts in population growth (Hatton and Williamson 2011), then given projected near constant U.S.–Mexico labor supply ratios, we may expect large-scale Mexican emigration to be a thing of the past. If the recent border enforcement buildup plays a significant role in the immigration slowdown (Gathmann 2008; Amuedo-Dorantes, Puttitanun, and Martinez-Donate 2013), then the pace of immigration from Mexico may be effectively in the control of the U.S. government.26 Alternatively, if labor demand shocks are primarily responsible for the immigration slowdown (Villarreal 2014), the hiatus in high levels of immigration may end once the U.S. economy recuperates more fully. To understand the causes of the decline in Mexican migration to the United States, we turn to data from the Mexican population census. We exploit variation in labor supply and per capita GDP across Mexican states to explain emigration. This analysis updates the work of Hanson and Craig McIntosh (2010) to the 2000–10 period.27 We count the base size of Mexican state-age-gender birth cohorts when they are first seen in the data, and use successive censuses to count the number of individuals remaining in Mexico each year. Because more than 95 percent of emigrants from Mexico go to the United States (Passel and Cohn 2009), and because we study young cohorts in which mortality is low, these numbers provide a 25. Our data indicate that the total number of Mexican-born individuals in the United States of all ages fell by 272,000 from 2010 to 2015, roughly in line with the estimate from Gonzalez-Barrera (2015) using data from the Mexican National Survey of Demographic Dynamics (Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica, ENADID) that the United States lost 141,000 Mexican-born individuals from 2009 to 2014. This muted change relative to the population age 15–40 indicates both that the young are more sensitive to changes in conditions than the old, and foreshadows the results later in this section that the population of older Mexicans will continue to grow even once the number of younger individuals starts to fall (Giorguli-Saucedo, García-Guerrero, and Masferrer 2016). Due to how mortality increases with age, our measure of net migration (differences between migrant numbers and birth cohort size) becomes less reliable as cohorts become older. 26. Other factors driving migration from Mexico to the United States in recent decades include Mexican policy reforms in the 1990s that privatized land rights, which allowed rural residents to sell their land, or to leave for urban areas without fear of relinquishing their claim to communal land (de Janvry and others 2015). 27. Although the 2015 Mexican micro census Conteo de Población y Vivienda should permit a similar exercise to be conducted, we found the resulting population estimates to be too noisy to use. Hence, the analysis uses data only through 2010. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �124 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 usable estimate of net emigration to the United States from each Mexican state. To form our dependent variable, we aggregate individuals into threeyear birth cohorts, and then calculate decadal changes in the percentage of the cohort that has emigrated, as measured by the change in its size. To investigate the role of labor supply in emigration, we include as a regressor the log ratio of the Mexican state birth cohort size to the U.S. birth cohort size. We restrict the analysis to individuals age 15–40, which is the age range during which most migration occurs. The regression specification is (6) N   GDPic16  dmicgt = β 0 + γ 1 log  icgt  + γ 2 log  16   GDPUSc   NUSgt   GDPitC  + γ 3 log  + α i + µ g + ηc + ρt + ε icgt ,  GDPUStC  where dmicgt is the change in the emigration rate for Mexican state i, birth cohort c, gender g, and census year t. To focus on low-skilled immigration, we take the log of the ratio of the Mexican state birth cohort size Nicgt to the current U.S. native-born population with less than a high school education NUSgt. Because we may be concerned that education decisions among U.S. natives are endogenous to Mexican immigration rates, we instrument for this ratio using the log ratio of the Mexican birth cohort to the entire respective U.S. birth cohort. Labor demand shocks are captured by the log ratio of GDP per capita in a Mexican state to the United States in the year that a cohort was age 16, GDP16ic /GDP16 USc, as well as the log ratio of contemporary GDP per capita in a Mexican state to the United States, GDPitC / GDPCUSt. We select age 16 because it is a common year for entry into the labor market in Mexico; relative income in this year indicates prevailing economic conditions at a time when individuals first make choices about labor supply. To express labor demand factors in terms of deviations from trend changes in economic activity, we use residuals from a regression of the log ratio of Mexican state GDP per capita to U.S. GDP per capita on state-specific intercept and slope terms. To control for confounding shocks on migration, we include fixed effects for the Mexican state (ai), gender (µg), birth cohort (hc), and census wave (rt). The regression specification in equation 6 is motivated by the migration model of Borjas (2006), in which differences in relative labor supply combine with shocks to labor demand to create the incentive for the movement of labor between economies. Adjustment costs prevent This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �125 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Table 4. Analysis of Net Migration at the Mexican State Levela Decadal change in net migrationb Independent variablec Labor supply with less than a high school educationd Innovations to GDP per capita at age 16 Innovations to GDP per capita in census year No. of observations R2 (1) (2) (3) (4) Pooled Excluding 2010 Men Women 0.1441*** (0.010) -0.0197* (0.010) 0.022 (0.020) 3,328 0.122 0.1643*** (0.011) -0.0735*** (0.016) -0.0472 (0.039) 2,432 0.175 0.1733*** (0.015) -0.0262 (0.017) 0.0234 (0.034) 1,664 0.108 0.1190*** (0.013) -0.0134 (0.012) 0.0187 (0.024) 1,664 0.189 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, decennial census; Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, Mexican decennial census; authors’ calculations. a. The units of analysis are three-year birth cohorts. The log of the ratio for Mexican state birth cohort size to the U.S. birth cohort size is used as an instrument for the log of the ratio for Mexican state birth cohort size to the U.S. labor supply with less than a high school education. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by birth cohort and weighted by birth cohort size. Statistical significance is indicated at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent levels. b. The mean decadal change in net migration for the pooled sample is 0.0619, holding the Mexican state cohort size fixed at its initial value. c. Each independent variable is the log of the ratio for the Mexican state to the United States. d. The native U.S. labor supply with less than a high school education is measured contemporaneously. migration from quickly equilibrating wages between regions, meaning that initial differences in labor supply—in particular, at the time a cohort enters the labor market—contribute to continuing pressure for migration in subsequent periods as a cohort ages. Hence, the migration rate is a function of initial labor supply and labor demand conditions, as well as subsequent innovations to labor demand. The results of this analysis, presented in table 4, confirm a prominent role for labor supply in driving migration from Mexico to the United States. Column 1 shows the pooled results using all available census waves including 2010, column 2 excludes 2010, column 3 shows the results for males only, and column 4 shows the results for females only. In all cases, the log Mexico–U.S. labor supply ratio is positive and strongly statistically significant. The coefficient in the first column implies that a 10 percent increase in relative labor supply would translate into a 1.4 percentage point increase the decadal flow of net migration. The relationship is slightly weaker among women, with a coefficient approximately 70 percent as large as for men, but still very precisely estimated (t value of 9.1). The coefficient of 0.1441 in column 1 of table 4 combined with the doubling of This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �126 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 the labor supply ratio between Mexico and the United States from 1970 to 2000 can more than explain the rise in the decadal net migration rate from 2.5 to 8.3 percent during this period. Now that U.S. cohorts are growing more rapidly than their Mexican counterparts, our results suggest that the drop in the average log labor supply ratio for a Mexican state to the United States, from -3.82 in 2000 to -3.73 in 2010, is responsible for more than four-fifths of the observed decrease in the decadal average net migration rate to the United States during that time interval (from 8.3 to 6.6 percent). The effect of labor demand, as measured by the log ratio of GDP per capita for a Mexican state to the United States, is weaker and less stable. Contemporaneous GDP ratios are never significant and alternate in sign across specifications, while the GDP ratio at age 16 is consistently negative but significant only in the specifications that pool men and women. Surprisingly, it appears that this relationship becomes less pronounced during the Great Recession; when we exclude 2010, the fit becomes significant at the 1 percent level and the coefficient is almost four times as large in absolute value.28 The relatively large swings in Mexican GDP during this period, as well as the fact that the recession occurred close to the end of the decade, may have dampened the sensitivity of migration to shocks during this interval. Nevertheless, positive income shocks to Mexican states (or negative income shocks to the United States) clearly have the overall effect of slowing migration. How much of the migration slowdown can be attributed to the Great Recession? In trying to understand the labor demand effects of the Great Recession shock on migration, we conduct a simple simulation exercise. We use the marginal effect from the model estimated in column 2 of table 4— for the period preceding the Great Recession—to ask the out-of-sample question as to what would have happened to Mexico–U.S. migration if the United States had not experienced the Great Recession. We simulate the counterfactual log GDP ratios that would have occurred if the United States had remained on its long-term trend of GDP per capita. Because it is the GDP-at-age-16 variable through which income changes primarily affect migration, GDP shocks operate by altering the initial labor supply choices of individuals when they first enter the labor force: to seek work in Mexico or to move to the United States. The left panel of figure 13 shows the time 28. Villarreal (2014) also finds declining trend migration and a weak discontinuous effect of Mexican and U.S. GDP on migration during the Great Recession. His analysis suggests that migration tracks U.S. employment rates quite closely during this time period, but due to endogeneity concerns we do not pursue this control for economic conditions. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �127 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 13. Actual and Simulated GDP per Capita in the Absence of the Great Recession, 1960–2015a Log GDP per capita ratio, Mexico to United States GDP per capita Dollars 60,000 Ratio Quadratic fit 50,000 20,000 Simulated ratio –1.1 40,000 30,000 –1.05 –1.15 U.S. GDP per capita Actual ratio –1.2 –1.25 10,000 –1.3 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year 2002 2004 2006 2008 Year Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey; United Nations, World Population Prospects; International Monetary Fund; authors’ calculations. a. Data for the years preceding the Great Recession are actual; data for the Great Recession years are simulated by projecting the long-term trend. series projection of U.S. GDP in the absence of the recession, and the right panel shows the actual and counterfactual log labor demand ratios that would have resulted. The right panel shows that the difference in log GDP ratios from actual versus predicted in 2010 opens up to about 0.06 = 1.25 - 1.19 log points, or 6 percentage points. This indicates that the total predicted effect on the migration rate for cohorts turning 16 after 2007 is 0.0042 = 0.06 × 0.07 log points, or roughly a half percentage point decrease in the decadal migration rate. Using the 2010 age cohort sizes and migration rates, there were 22 million Mexican-born individuals between the age of 15 and 25, and we would have expected 1.9 million of them to migrate to the United States. Adjusting the decadal migration rate downward by 0.5 percent for the decade that transpired between the Great Recession and the 2015 ACS, we would have expected a decrease in the total stock of migrants of 109,000 arising from the labor demand shock to those exposed to the Great Recession shock when 16 or younger. Given the results in the previous section illustrating that the stock of migrants in this age group fell by more than 1.1 million between 2010 and 2015, it would appear that labor demand shocks as captured by GDP per capita can explain only a modest portion of the reversal in migration flows. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �128 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 To what extent are other factors, such as the ramp-up in enforcement at the border, responsible for the decreases in Mexico–U.S. migration between 2007 and 2015? We attempted to investigate the role of border enforcement using an instrumentation approach that first calculated the share of migrants from each Mexican state apprehended in each Border Patrol sector in the earliest available year, 1999. We then multiplied this sector- or state-specific enforcement incidence by an index of overall Border Patrol effort, the number of Border Patrol “linewatch” hours per year. The resulting instrument proved to be strongly positively correlated with Mexican state emigration rates, indicating that despite our effort to exogenize enforcement, it may be so strongly endogenous to migration that one cannot estimate a credible long-term impact of border enforcement on successful crossings. Our compromise, reduced-form approach described above omits direct measures of enforcement, whose effect on migration may therefore be absorbed by other covariates. How may the exclusion of enforcement affect our results? One possibility is that that enforcement responds endogenously to relative GDP ratios, in which case it is captured by the reduced-form relationship between GDP per capita and migration (Hanson and Spilimbergo 2001). A second possibility is that enforcement is orthogonal to our core explanatory variables, and hence remains in the residual. A third possibility is that omitted enforcement variation is incidentally correlated with changes in labor supply, in which case its effects load onto this variable. In any case, it appears clear that the push factors driving migration from Mexico to the United States have abated sharply during the past decade, and hence the marginal effectiveness of border enforcement spending in terms of prevented crossings is falling. Taking our results at face value, the analysis suggests that labor supply shocks play a major role in driving low-skilled immigration flows in the United States. This fact, combined with the relatively predictable nature of future population growth, provides an opening for predictive analysis. We therefore turn next to a forecasting exercise using data from all the Latin American sending countries to assess U.S. immigration pressures decades into the future. II.D. Summary From the early 1980s to the mid-2000s, there were robust pressures for low-skilled immigration in the United States. U.S. incomes for lowskilled workers far exceeded those in migrant-sending nations; the U.S. macroeconomy was considerably more stable than Latin America’s; and enforcement against illegal entry, though not entirely lax, permitted large This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 129 inflows to occur. These conditions changed abruptly after the Great Recession. Gaps in the level and volatility of income between the United States and migrant-sending nations have compressed, while there has been an extensive buildup in U.S. immigration enforcement. Despite these recent changes in the pattern of relative income growth, it appears that changes in relative labor supply growth have mattered the most for current trends in U.S. immigration. III. Low-Skilled Immigration in the Long Run It may be tempting to view the period since the Great Recession as a temporary pause in the U.S. immigration wave that began in the 1970s. After all, U.S. incomes for low-wage labor are still roughly twice those in Mexico, and are even larger when compared with those of other sending nations in Latin America. Should not high levels of immigration resume once the U.S. economy returns to a period of normal growth? Such a perspective downplays both the recent increase in U.S. enforcement and the demographic determinant of recent U.S. labor inflows from the Western Hemisphere. Looking forward, demographic pressures for U.S. immigration are set to weaken significantly. In this section, we construct a model of long-run changes in U.S. immigration, which we use to project U.S. labor inflows in coming decades. We then characterize how changes in low-skilled immigration may affect labor market conditions in the United States. III.A. �A Predictive Analysis of Future Migration from Latin America to the United States To evaluate the effects of future demographic change on U.S. immigration, we turn to the national level and incorporate the long-term population growth forecasts for countries in the Western Hemisphere provided by the United Nations’ World Population Prospects.29 We examine how immigration from Latin American countries may have changing effects on U.S. labor inflows in coming decades. Recognizing that future migration episodes will also be driven by unanticipated economic and political shocks, differential demographic growth estimates for the next 15 years provide one of the clearest lenses on the future that is available. Labor 29. To avoid circularity in studying how future population growth will drive migration from countries whose population will in turn be determined by migration, we use the UN’s “no migration” population forecast, which ignores as-yet-unobserved future migration in its projected population estimates. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �130 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Figure 14. Relative Labor Supply Ratios by Origin Country for Age 15–40, 1980–2050 Change in labor supply ratio, origin country to United States, 1980 = 1 3 Actual Projected Guatemala 2.5 Honduras 2 Mexico 1.5 El Salvador 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 Year Sources: United Nations, World Population Prospects; author’s calculations. supply provides a uniquely forecastable component of migration pressures: The cohorts that will enter the labor force in the next 16 to 20 years have already been born, and changes in cohort sizes for the next two decades can be predicted relatively accurately using current trends in fertility.30 A simple visual perspective on the issue is given in figure 14, which plots observed and projected population relative to the United States for major sending countries from 1980 to 2050, where we normalize 1980 values to 1. The most striking demographic transition is in El Salvador; having reached a peak in relative labor supply in 2010, its population relative to the United States is projected to decline rapidly in the future, reaching 1980 levels again by 2050.31 Mexico follows a similar temporal pattern, but with a slower future decline. Guatemala and Honduras have seen similarly steep increases in relative labor supply, reaching roughly 250 percent of their 30. Many migration episodes, such as the recent surge of Syrians into Europe and the arrival of Vietnamese immigrants in the United States in the late 1970s, were driven by shocks other than labor supply. Some shifts in labor supply, such as the rapid fertility decreases in Catholic Southern Europe and Latin America, were not forecasted. Nonetheless, given our lack of ability to anticipate future income shocks, demographic differentials remain an attractive way of predicting medium-term migration trends. 31. Because the U.S. population is growing, declines in these relative population size ratios do not imply absolute declines in the populations of origin countries. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 131 1980 values by 2015. The future experiences of these two Central American countries diverge strongly, with Guatemala’s relative labor supply continuing to grow almost linearly for another 25 years, whereas Honduras’s supply begins to decline immediately. Continuing robust labor supply growth in Guatemala may allow it to partially replace diminished U.S. migrant inflows from other Latin American countries. However, given Guatemala’s small size—its 2015 population was 16 million, compared with Mexico’s population of 127 million—its migrant-sending capacity is limited. To use population forecasts as the basis for a predictive model of future U.S. immigration, we first calculate five-year birth cohort ratios in the historical (census) and future (United Nations) data in the same manner, and project future GDP based on growth forecasts from the International Monetary Fund so as to be able to take log GDP per capita ratios. Using data for the 25 available countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, we estimate the model using observed migration rates from 1980 to 2015, and use the resulting parameters to project age-gender-country–specific migration rates through 2040. In order to capture the dramatic shift in immigration enforcement that occurred between 1990 and 2000, we estimate a trend-break model that fits piecewise linear time trends to the “low enforcement” era preceding 2000 and the “high enforcement” era starting in 2000.32 Because we want to estimate effects for the full age distribution of immigrants in the United States, we use all available age cohorts and not just those of young workers. The estimating equation is ( 7)  N   GDPit  micgt = β 0 + γ 1 log  icg  + γ 2 log  + α i + µ g + ηc  GDPUSt   NUScg  + ∑ α i δ 2 t + ∑ ϕ1t α i t1 + ∑ ϕ 2 i α i t2 + ε icgt . i i i Here, micgt is the net migration rate to the United States for source country i, age cohort c, and gender g, at the time of census wave t. Regressors include the log ratio of the origin-country birth cohort to the U.S. birth cohort (Nicg/NUScg) and the contemporaneous log GDP ratio of the origin-country’s GDP per capita to U.S. GDP per capita (GDPit /GDPUSt). We include fixed 32. These trend breaks (which we allow to be country-specific) are consistent with the inclusion of time period fixed effects in the first-differenced model in equation 6. We move from first differences in equation 6 to levels in equation 7 to accommodate forecasting immigrant stocks. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �132 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Table 5. Results of the Prediction Regressiona Independent variable Log birth cohort ratio for origin country to United States Log birth cohort ratio × under 40 years old Log GDP ratio for origin county to United States Log GDP ratio × under 40 years old Female Female × under 40 years old Covariatesb No. of observations R2 Net migration rate 0.7716 (0.760) 3.9292*** (0.734) 1.9581*** (0.518) -1.4201* (0.798) 0.3558*** (0.116) -0.7988*** (0.116) Yes 3,310 0.842 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey; United Nations, World Population Prospects; International Monetary Fund; authors’ calculations. a. The units of analysis are five-year birth cohorts. The analysis is conducted on 25 Latin American countries’ net migration rates to the United States over the years 1980–2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by birth cohort and weighted by birth cohort size. Statistical significance is indicated at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent levels. b. Covariates included but not reported are: (i) five-year age cohort dummies; (ii) country fixed effects; (iii) a country dummy for the year 2000 and later; (iv) a country-specific linear time trend for the lowenforcement era of 1980–90; (v) a country-specific time trend for the high-enforcement era of 2000–15; and (vi) the interactions between all these covariates and being under 40 years old. effects for the origin country (ai), the age cohort (hc), and gender (µg). We let time trends (and trend breaks) be specific to the origin country by allowing each country to have separate intercept and time trend terms within the low-enforcement and high-enforcement eras. First, we interact the country fixed effect with a dummy variable indicating the year 2000 and later (d2t), then we interact the fixed effect with a 1980–90 trend (t1), and finally with a second term picking up the high-enforcement 2000–15 time trend (t2). We predict over the interval 2020–40, meaning that we forecast for the same number of periods as are used to estimate the postenforcement trend. In using a broad set of age cohorts (age 2–67), we partition the regression to estimate separate coefficients for the young (age 2–37) and the old (age 42–67), given the divergent migration trajectories of these two groups. The parameter estimates for the central parameters in the cross-country regression for Latin America and the Caribbean are given in table 5, where we suppress the large number of country-level intercept and slope This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �133 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 15. Migration Rates by Origin Country for Age 15–40, 1980–2040 Percent Actual Projected El Salvador 15 10 Honduras Guatemala 5 Mexico 1990 2000 2010 Year 2020 2030 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey; United Nations, World Population Prospects; International Monetary Fund; authors’ calculations. interactions. The regression results contain several noteworthy features. First, the strong push factor of large cohort size is experienced entirely before age 40, after which there is no significant relationship between the log birth cohort ratio and net migration rates. Second, the effect of GDP ratios flips across ages; for the young cohorts, high income in the origin country has no effect on migration, whereas for the older cohorts, high origin-country income accelerates migration. This latter result is consistent with gravity model estimates of bilateral migration (Clark, Hatton, and Williamson 2007). It could be explained by migration costs being a greater constraint to migration across Latin America as a whole than in Mexico, with positive income shocks enabling migration by credit-constrained individuals (Mckenzie and Rapoport 2007). Having estimated the model on decadal changes in the migration rate, we then predict the net migration rate for future decades, using the International Monetary Fund’s GDP forecasts and UN population growth forecasts for future decades. We maintain the time trends estimated on data for 2000 and later, such that we presume the strong immigration enforcement regime stays in effect. The results are shown in figure 15. With this predicted future migration rate in hand, we multiply these by the UN-projected future birth cohort sizes to calculate predicted migrant counts for each cohort. These This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �134 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Figure 16. Stock of Foreign-Born Migrants by Origin Country for Age 15–40, 1980–2040 Millions 6 5 4 Mexico 3 Actual Projected 2 1 Guatemala El Salvador 1990 2000 2010 Year 2020 Honduras 2030 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey; United Nations, World Population Prospects; International Monetary Fund; authors’ calculations. values are then summed up to obtain migration totals for each country in each year. As seen in figure 15, this empirical structure predicts declining net migration rates from Mexico over the coming decades, with other major Latin American destinations seeing roughly constant rates. Figure 16 shows that Mexican-born migrant stocks in the key age 15–40 group are predicted to drop to less than half their current level by 2040. Rather than showing that the Great Recession has caused a temporary pause in an ongoing wave of immigration from Mexico, these long-term trends suggest that the 1990– 2007 housing boom may have caused a temporary surge in migration, arresting a demographically driven long-run slowing.33 Given the strong role that demographic factors play in our estimation model, convergence in fertility rates across the Americas removes a powerful factor pushing workers across borders. We find little support for the idea that Latin American immigration will surge again as the U.S. economy recovers. Our focus on the declining population of migration-age individuals overlooks an important role that Mexican-born individuals will play 33. Despite using a much longer panel and a different estimation structure than that used by Hanson and McIntosh (2016), these results confirm these previous predictions that new inflows of working-age Mexicans will drop substantially by the middle of the 21st century. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �135 GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH Figure 17. Age Frequencies of Mexican-Born Immigrants in the United States, by Year Thousands per five-year age cohort 2040, projected 2,000 1,500 2015 1,000 500 1980 10 20 30 40 50 Midpoint of five-year age cohort 60 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey; United Nations, World Population Prospects; International Monetary Fund; authors’ calculations. in American demographics. In a manner even more pronounced than for Mexico itself—which has recently undergone a rapid demographic transition (Tuiran and others 2002)—the U.S. Mexican-born population will age very quickly. We can draw frequencies of Mexican-born individuals in our data, starting with the observed numbers in 1980 and 2015, and then plot the predicted values in 2040, as shown in figure 17. Whereas the modal Mexican-born resident in the United States was 20 years old in 1980 and 40 years old in 2015, he or she will be almost 60 years old by 2040. Rapid aging arises from the confluence of declining fertility in Mexico and the demographic amplifier of emigration, which pushes a larger share of larger cohorts into the United States and therefore accentuates the implications of Mexico’s demographic transition for the age structure of the Mexico-born population on the U.S. side of the border. A large elderly population of undocumented immigrants is a policy challenge that the United States has hitherto not faced. Stepping back to examine the age distribution of all Latin American immigrants, we see broad evidence of an aging population in the United States. Table 6 illustrates that the total Latin American–born population under 40 in the United States by 2040 will be only 56 percent of its current size (4.9 million versus 8.8 million), while the foreign-born This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �136 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Table 6. Thousands of Foreign-Born Residents in the United States 1980 2015 2040 projecteda Country Younger than 40 Older than 40 Younger than 40 Older than 40 Younger than 40 Older than 40 Antigua and Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize Bolivia Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Total 2.8 7.8 16.5 10.0 9.6 24.5 101.5 101.5 115.1 61.3 74.5 4.6 49.3 37.0 63.0 25.3 123.3 1,574.7 28.6 39.4 2.2 38.8 46.9 8.8 2,485.5 0.8 4.0 8.3 3.6 3.5 10.3 40.2 40.2 43.8 24.0 17.8 2.2 12.6 11.6 25.2 10.1 59.9 452.3 12.1 16.6 0.7 15.6 17.1 4.7 805.1 4.4 13.7 8.9 15.3 30.3 32.2 253.0 37.3 439.0 186.7 650.2 5.5 557.1 81.1 256.0 369.0 227.0 5,299.0 95.0 25.5 7.0 157.4 73.8 13.7 8,838.1 10.9 18.5 33.1 25.4 36.6 54.4 374.6 40.0 536.9 222.3 655.7 19.1 346.1 164.7 349.9 211.7 391.8 5,663.8 138.0 60.2 7.0 248.5 131.6 23.3 9,764.1 6.8 4.5 1.1 3.7 -61.4 -29.4 -83.7 -38.0 402.1 22.8 594.1 0.2 813.5 55.9 205.0 488.0 151.0 2,707.0 -69.7 -35.4 -167.8 -81.0 22.8 -4.5 4,907.7 8.9 47.1 28.1 33.5 86.7 73.4 782.5 50.3 1,104.4 281.0 1,601.7 19.5 1,102.3 186.2 967.7 698.1 539.8 14,146.0 336.2 50.3 45.3 536.7 150.1 54.3 22,930.1 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey; United Nations, World Population Prospects; International Monetary Fund; authors’ calculations. a. Negative values are an artifact of the linear model used to forecast future flows, and are not possible in practice. See the text for interpretation, specifically note 34. population over 40 will be 235 percent of its current size (22.9 million versus 9.8 million). The model predicts a negative net migration rate for some counties of origin in 2040 (negative values are not possible in practice; but in our linear predictive model, they indicate a phenomenon that could be interpreted as net migration pressure out of the United States).34 The main 34. Negative net migration rates are an artifact of the linear model used to forecast future flows. Our model predicts only 14 percent of the dyads to have negative net migration in 2020, but future decreases in population growth in sending countries drive the share of predicted negative dyads to 24 percent by 2040. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 137 policy question posed by first-generation immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean thus appears likely to shift from one of the labor market effects of large-scale labor inflows to one of the cost of social programs and health care for an elderly immigrant population with relatively low incomes (and relatively low rates of naturalization when compared with high-skilled immigrants). III.B. �Changes in Low-Skilled Immigration and U.S. Labor Market Tightness We have seen that incentives for low-skilled immigration in the United States have changed markedly since the early 2000s, and have already manifested demographic pressures that are likely to compress migration inflows in coming decades. How will these developments affect the U.S. economy? A reduction in the relative supply of low-skilled labor, by putting upward pressure on wages for these workers, may operate directly by causing changes in the U.S. wage structure (Borjas 2003). Alternatively, wage pressures may induce firms to alter their production techniques in a manner that mitigates the wage effects of shocks to the relative labor supply by generating endogenous changes in labor demand (Lewis 2011). Whichever form labor market adjustments take, the magnitudes of these adjustments are likely to be determined by the implicit pressure of changes in immigration inflows on U.S. wages, which we analyze next. As a final exercise, we consider how the United States’ demand for and supply of labor have evolved over time and how the supply of low-skilled, foreign-born workers meshes with these changes. Our approach employs the methodology of Katz and Murphy (1992), as applied by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), to examine the relative earnings of more- and lessskilled workers. The exercise we perform allows us to translate the recent slowdown in low-skilled immigration into implied pressures on the wage premium enjoyed by skilled workers. Consider a production function with constant elasticity of substitution that takes as its arguments the employment of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, where within each skill group we treat native-born and foreignborn workers as perfect substitutes, as is consistent with recent evidence (Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson 2012).35 From the first-order conditions for 35. The fact that the CPS does not include measures of nativity until 1994 makes this assumption a necessity if we are to estimate equation 6 based on time series variation. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �138 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 firm profit maximization, we obtain an expression for the relative wages of high-skilled and low-skilled labor, (8 ) log ( wht ) − log ( wlt ) = γ 0 + γ 1 [ log ( N ht ) − log ( N lt )] + γ 2 X t + ε t , where log(wht) - log(wlt) is the log U.S. wage for high-skilled workers relative to the log U.S. wage for low-skilled workers, log(Nht) - log(Nlt) is the log U.S. supply of high-skilled workers relative to the log U.S. supply of low-skilled workers, and Xt is a vector of controls that capture labor demand shocks.36 Each skill group is made up of a combination of native-born and foreign-born labor. By taking the difference in earnings between skill groups in equation 8, we remove from the specification labor demand shocks that are common to high-skilled and low-skilled workers (for example, aggregate changes in labor demand associated with recessions, and growth in total factor productivity). Following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), within each skill group we measure wages as average weekly earnings—holding constant the age, gender, and racial composition of workers—and we measure employment in terms of labor supplies expressed in PEUs. High-skilled workers are those with at least a college education, whereas low-skilled workers are those with a high school education or less. We estimate equation 6 with annual data from the CPS for the period 1963–2007, and we use the results to predict relative earnings for the period 1963–2015, which includes the out-of-sample range 2008–15. In our baseline specification for equation 8, which includes a time trend as the only additional covariate, the coefficient estimate for g1 is -0.42 (with a t value of 9.9) when we define the low-skilled group to be workers with a high school education or less; and it is -0.18 (with a t value of 8.0) when we define the low-skilled group to be workers with strictly less than a high school education. Consistent with the theory underlying equation 8, increases in the relative supply of skilled labor drive down the wage premium for skill. These estimates change little when we expand the period from 1963 to 2015 or include the following additional covariates: a quadratic time trend, the aggregate unemployment rate, and the log real 36. This estimation approach makes the strong assumption that labor is freely mobile across occupations. See Burstein and others (2017) for an analysis that uses a Roy (1951) model in the analysis of how immigration affects labor market outcomes at the occupation level. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 139 Figure 18. Skill Premium for All Industries, 1963–2015 College and above versus less than high school Percent 1.1 0.9 Percent Counterfactual predicted wage gap Katz and Murphy (1992) predicted wage gap 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.5 College and above versus high school or less Observed wage gap 0.5 2007 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Year Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations. federal minimum wage.37 The first coefficient—for the impact of relative labor supply on the wage gap between college- and high school–educated workers—compares in value with the estimates given by Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) of -0.40 to -0.62, depending on the covariates included, for the period 1963–2005, suggesting that our coefficient estimates are at the low end of those obtained in previous empirical work. Figure 18, which presents the results, shows three series for relative earnings: the actual skill premium for the period 1963–2015; the projected skill premium for 1963–2015 based on equation 6, using coefficients estimated on data for 1963–2007; and a counterfactual projection of the skill premium, where we again use the estimation results for equation 8, but now replace the relative labor supplies we feed into the projection with a counterfactual series in which we assume that the number of low-skilled immigrant workers grows at the same rate from 2008 to 2015 as it does for 1994 to 2007. For the out-of-sample period 2008–15, the first projection is based on observed changes in the relative supply of skilled labor (which embody 37. The time trend carries a positive coefficient, indicating a positive trend in the relative demand for skilled labor; the unemployment rate carries a negative sign but is imprecisely estimated; and the minimum wage enters negatively, indicating that a higher minimum wage compresses the skill premium. The assumption that the time trend for relative labor demand is linear over the course of several decades is of course quite strong. Nevertheless, allowing for a quadratic time trend has minimal impact on the estimate of g1. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �140 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 actual changes in both high-skilled and low-skilled immigration), whereas the second projection is based on the observed labor supply through 2007 and the counterfactual supply thereafter (which suppresses the slowdown in low-skilled immigration). In constructing the counterfactual projection, it is worth noting that inflows of both low-skilled and high-skilled immigrants slowed after 2007. Our counterfactual labor supply series, by imposing continued growth for low-skilled but not for high-skilled immigration, thus understates the post2007 growth in the relative supply of skilled labor. The resulting counterfactual projection of the skill premium therefore corresponds to an artificial setting, which we view as useful for describing the magnitude of the lowskilled immigration slowdown in terms of wage pressures but not for evaluating the impact of immigration on earnings during this period.38 For low-skilled workers defined to be those with less than a high school education (the left panel of figure 18), the actual skill premium is flat from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, rises steadily from the late 1970s to the mid-2000s, and is flat again thereafter. During the within-sample period 1963–2007, the predicted skill premium rises more slowly than the actual skill premium in the mid-1970s, suggesting that the relative demand for skill rises more slowly than the linear trend would indicate, and rises more rapidly than the actual skill premium from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, suggesting growth in the demand for skill that exceeds the linear trend during this interval. Turning to the out-of-sample period 2008–15, the post-2007 slowdown in immigration tempers growth in the supply of low-skilled labor, causing the predicted skill premium to rise more slowly after 2007 than before. Replacing actual relative labor supplies with the counterfactual series that assumes sustained growth in low-skilled immigration (that is, a 2007–15 annual growth rate equal to the 1994–2007 annual growth rate), the projected path of the skill premium naturally lies above the projected path based on observed data. If low-skilled immigration had not slowed after 2007, the relative supply of skilled labor would have grown more slowly, which in turn would have mandated a larger increase in relative earnings for skilled labor. The difference between the two projected wage series in 2015 is 8.6 log points, which indicates that the magnitude of the slowdown in low-skilled immigration—holding all else equal, including high-skilled 38. For analyses of the impact of immigration on earnings, see Card (2001); Borjas (2003); Ottaviano and Peri (2012); and Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013). This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 141 immigration—is consistent with a decrease in the skill premium of 1.1 percent a year during the 2007–15 period. To put this magnitude in context, the observed increase in the wage premium for college-educated workers versus workers with less than a high school education during the 1980–2007 period of rapidly rising wage inequality is 1.6 percent a year. Again, we do not take this value to be the true change in wages due to the immigration slowdown (because we are not addressing changes in high-skilled immigration), but rather as an indication of the magnitude of the immigrationinduced change in the labor supply expressed in terms of wage pressures. When we instead define low-skilled workers to be those with a high school education or less (right panel of figure 18), the broad patterns for the actual skill premium are similar, though the flattening in the premium during the 2000s is less pronounced and the absolute premium is smaller. For the out-of-sample period 2008–15, it is again the case that the projected skill premium based on actual labor supplies lies above the observed skill premium, indicating an increase in the demand for skill that is less than the linear trend. Comparing this projected skill premium with that which obtains when using counterfactual labor supplies (involving no post-2007 slowdown in immigration), the latter exceeds the former by 6.1 log points in 2015, or a difference of 0.8 percent a year during the period 2007–15. To put this magnitude in context, the observed increase in the wage premium for college-educated workers versus workers with a high school education or less for 1980–2007 is 1.1 percent a year. Because low-skilled immigrants are a smaller share of the skill group with a high school education or less than of the skill group with strictly less than a high school education, the implied wage pressures of the immigration slowdown are weaker when we move to this more expansive definition of being low-skilled. Similar patterns are observed when we restrict the sample from all industries (figure 18) to low-skill industries (figure 19). III.C. Summary The U.S. immigration wave of the late 20th century was enabled to a substantial extent by the rapid growth of the labor supply in Latin America and the Caribbean relative to the United States. Because labor supply growth in migrant-sending nations is slowing and will continue to slow, the demographic push for U.S. immigration is abating. Abetting these demographic forces is the substantial increase in U.S. immigration enforcement, which thus far has been maintained. Absent economic or political crises in the Western Hemisphere that reignite international migration, standard migration models predict that migration rates from major U.S.-sending This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �142 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Figure 19. Skill Premium for Low-Skill Industries, 1968–2015 College and above versus less than high school College and above versus high school or less Percent Percent Counterfactual predicted wage gap 1.1 1.1 Observed wage gap 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.5 Katz and Murphy (1992) predicted wage gap 2007 1970 1980 1990 Year 2000 0.5 2010 1970 1980 1990 Year 2000 2010 Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations. nations will drop sharply in coming decades. Indeed, the weakening of these migration pressures began in the early 2000s, and may have been masked by the temporary labor demand boost provided by the U.S. housing boom. The resulting post-2007 slowdown in low-skilled immigration is of a magnitude consistent with a decrease in the wage gap between high-skilled and low-skilled U.S. labor of 6 to 9 percentage points. If, as predicted by demographic forces, low-skilled immigration continues to decline in future decades, U.S. firms—especially those located in U.S.–Mexico border states and in the immigrant-intensive industries of agriculture, construction, eating and drinking establishments, and nondurable manufacturing—are likely to face pressure to alter their production techniques in a manner that replaces low-skilled labor with other factors of production. IV. Looking Forward From the early 1970s to the early 2000s, the United States experienced an epochal wave of low-skilled immigration, which was the combined result of relatively high U.S. incomes, relatively stable U.S. GDP growth, relatively slow U.S. labor supply growth, and moderately permissive immigration enforcement. Since the mid-2000s, each of these drivers has attenuated. The U.S. macroeconomy is no longer so stable relative to migrant-sending countries; U.S. labor supply growth is now similar to that in much of the This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 143 Western Hemisphere; and the U.S. borders, having been heavily fortified, are much harder to cross without a visa. The future of low-skilled immigration thus appears to be less about streaming inflows of young workers from lower-income nations and more about the needs of an aging population of lower-income adults that is settled in the United States. Those within this group who are undocumented— somewhere between one-half and three-fifths—do not qualify for most federally funded welfare benefits, including Medicare and Medicaid. In recent decades, the primary fiscal effects of low-skilled immigration were the cost of primary and secondary education for the children of immigrants, and, to a lesser extent, for publicly funded health care for the subpopulation of this group that was born in the United States (Blau and Mackie 2016). Judith Treas and Zoya Gubernskaya (2015) document that 51 percent of the foreign-born population is covered by some form of public insurance, as compared with 35 percent of the native born, suggesting that the costs of caring for the foreign born are likely to fall disproportionately on publicly funded programs. Given our estimates of an increase of 13 million (134 percent) in the population of foreign-born immigrants over the age of 40 by the year 2040, there may be considerable growth in the demand for safety net programs as a result of past and future immigration. Under existing financing rules, U.S. states and localities would be the entities primarily responsible for shouldering these costs. In light of the changing demographics of migrant-sending nations, and the apparent effects of the existing immigration enforcement surge, the current emphasis of the U.S. government on further intensifying immigration enforcement is puzzling. One interpretation of the planned enforcement buildup is that it is driven by politics. Having lived through the great immigration wave of the last 35 years, some native-born voters may be upset by the laxity of past enforcement and willing to reward politicians who are seen as atoning for these transgressions. Supporting stronger enforcement may be a way for politicians to signal their disapproval of earlier policy choices. Such signaling would come at a substantial cost, however, given that the U.S. immigration enforcement budget now exceeds $20 billion a year. Another interpretation is that intensifying enforcement is an effort to forestall future claims on public resources. The aging of the low-skilled, foreign-born population means that by increasing deportations today—when many low-skilled immigrants are approaching middle age— the United States may avoid demand for social spending in the future. If U.S. voters oppose providing public benefits to low-skilled immigrants— and if the U.S. government cannot credibly commit to deny benefits to This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �144 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 low-income, elderly, foreign-born residents down the road—then expanding current deportations may reduce the expected drain on U.S. public coffers in later decades.39 The cost of these extra deportations—beyond the incremental spending on enforcement—includes reducing the supply of workers who are in their prime earning years, who have accumulated substantial U.S. labor market experience, and who are well established in their communities. Changes in U.S. immigration policy affect not just the U.S. economy but also the economies of migrant-sending nations. To the extent that immigration enforcement has played a dominant role in the recent slowdown in migration, improvements in the welfare of U.S. workers come in part at the cost of potential migrants who forgo higher wages, and their nonmigrant compatriots, who now face more crowded labor markets at home. Because the modal immigrant from Mexico would be a middle-income earner at home, expanding deportations and tightening border security would tend to expand labor supplies and depress earnings in the middle of Mexico’s wage distribution (and from higher quantiles of the wage distributions in other sending countries for migrants). From the perspective of those born in sending countries, wages take a hit from immigration restrictions whether or not workers decide to migrate. Mexico, by virtue of its status as a transit country for undocumented immigrants, is doubly exposed to changes in U.S. immigration enforcement. Many Central Americans planning to enter the United States traverse Mexico illegally on their way north. Stronger U.S. enforcement may have the indirect consequence of increasing the supply of undocumented Central Americans seeking to live and work in Mexico. Given that Guatemala is the one major U.S. migrant-sending nation in the Western Hemisphere that will continue to experience high rates of labor supply growth in coming decades, Mexico faces the real possibility that continued tightness in U.S. immigration policy would increase its supply of low-skilled, foreign-born residents. Taking immigration controls as a means to improve the plight of lowskilled U.S.-born workers, how would we expect the incidence of benefits to stack up against alternative policies? An increase in minimum wages may benefit those with jobs that pay equilibrium wages above a higher wage 39. This characterization of political support for immigration enforcement is roughly consistent with the framework used by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), in which enthusiasm for public spending is diminished by increased ethnic and racial diversity in a jurisdiction. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU, and CRAIG M c INTOSH 145 floor, at a cost to consumers who purchase labor-intensive goods and services and to workers excluded from the labor market. Investments in skill development and retraining may target native-born workers more finely, but the effectiveness of such programs is in question (LaLonde 1995). The attractiveness of immigration restrictions relative to these alternative policies also depends on the extent to which we take the welfare of the foreignborn into account. Immigration controls therefore appear to be a prolabor instrument that comes at a high cost to consumers and foreign-born workers relative to alternative potential policies. It may be premature to declare that the most recent episode of high U.S. immigration is over. Many factors could cause the population of lowskilled immigrants in the United States to begin growing again. Prime among these is increased economic or political instability in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, heightened insecurity in Central America, due in large part to violence associated with organized crime, appears to have increased recent labor outflows from the region. Mexico, for its part, has not had a financial crisis since 1995. The reform of the country’s electoral laws in 1997 created a political process that is competitive and free of the vote rigging that marred the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s 70-year rule during the 20th century. 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Forthcoming. “Recent Flattening in the Higher Education Wage Premium: Polarization, Skill Downgrading, or Both?” In Education, Skills, and Technical Change: Implications for Future U.S. GDP Growth, edited by Charles Hulten and Valerie Ramey. University of Chicago Press. Villarreal, Andrés. 2014. “Explaining the Decline in Mexico–U.S. Migration: The Effect of the Great Recession.” Demography 51, no. 6: 2203–28. Warren, Robert, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 1987. “A Count of the Uncountable: Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States Census.” Demography 24, no. 3: 375–93. This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:14:55 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Rise and Fall of U.S. Low-Skilled Immigration Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource GORDON HANSON, CHEN LIU and CRAIG McINTOSH Subject The topic of the resource Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Description An account of the resource From the 1970s the the early 2000s, the United States experienced an epochal wave of low-skilled immigration. Since the Great Recession, however, U.S. borders have become a far less active place when it comes to the net arrival of foreign workers. The number of undocumented immigrants has declined in absolute terms, while the overall population of low-skilled, foreign-born workers has remained stable. We examine how the scale and composition of low-skilled immigration in the United States have evolved over time, and how relative income growth and demographic shifts in the Western Hemisphere have contributed to the recent immigration slowdown. Because major source countries for U.S. immigration are now seeing and will continue to see weak growth of the labour supply relative to the United States, future immigration rates of young, low-skilled workers appear unlikely to rebound, whether or not U.S. immigration policies tighten further. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Brookings Institution Press Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Type The nature or genre of the resource Journal Article Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://shibbolethsp.jstor.org/start?entityID=https%3A%2F%2Fidp.scu.edu%2Fopenathens&dest=https://www.jstor.org/stable/90013169&site=jstor Language A language of the resource English https://dh.scu.edu/exhibits/files/original/90/2935/Mexican_Migration_to_the_United_States_A_Critical_Review.pdf e958007cbc35149ef39b31edfc5966d9 PDF Text Text Mexican Migration to the United States: A Critical Review Author(s): Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey Source: Latin American Research Review , 1992, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1992), pp. 3-42 Published by: The Latin American Studies Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2503748 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms The Latin American Studies Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Latin American Research Review This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: A Critical Review Jorge Durand, Universidad de Guadalajara Douglas S. Massey, University of Chicago Although social scientists usually do not speak in terms of laws, they believe they are at least able to make valid empirical generalizations. In studies of Mexican migration to the United States, for example, generalizations drawn from the research literature abound. Thus the problem is not that generalizations are lacking but that they are frequently inconsis- tent and contradictory. Often such inferences are simply invalid because they are based less on evidence than on the investigator's own preconcep- tions. As a result, the field of Mexican migration studies has been plagued by a fragmented debate that seems to go on and on without resolution. The intractability of this debate has been magnified by the inher- ently political nature of migration between two countries with very different cultures, histories, and levels of wealth and also by the fact that much of the movement is clandestine and therefore unobservable. Adding to these problems are the inevitably divergent interests, perceptions, and languages of researchers from north and south of the border, a combination that makes the lack of a clear consensus hardly surprising. We believe nevertheless that the inconsistency of research findings on Mexican migration to the United States is more apparent than real. In an effort to bring some order to this disparate body of research findings, we have undertaken a critical review and synthesis of research carried out in Mexico and the United States. We will begin by examining two particu- larly salient issues-the number of Mexican migrants to the United States and the quantity of their monetary remittances to Mexico-and will then suggest that once rhetoric is separated from fact and analysis from opinion, the various estimates are actually relatively consistent. We will also examine the growing number of case studies of Mexican communities that send migrants to the United States. These investi- gations have yielded apparently contradictory generalizations on a vari- ety of topics: the class composition of U.S. migration, the legal and demographic background of U.S. migrants, the economic effects of emi3 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review gration on the community, the effects of Mexican agrarian reform and agricultural modernization on U.S. migration, and the prevalence of dif- ferent strategies of migration. Most of the generalizations suffer the basic limitation of being based on isolated case studies. We will argue that such apparently inconsistent generalizations about Mexico-U. S. migration are not necessarily contradictory when they are examined in comparative perspective. Rather, diverse outcomes occur in various communities when common processes of migration are shaped and differentiated by structural variables operating at the community level. Because these structural variables exert their influence between communities rather than within them, such variables cannot be studied effectively through individual case studies. They must instead be observed and analyzed comparatively across communities. We have therefore undertaken a systematic and critical review of all the community studies that we uncovered in a survey of the research literature. Our goal is to identify the community-level factors that are most important in determining the expression of basic migratory outcomes. Our review suggests that only a few community factors account for the diversity of conclusions in different case studies: the age of the migration stream; the degree to which productive resources are equitably distributed; the quality of local resources, especially land; the niche in the U.S. industrial structure where the community's migrants first became established; and the geographic, political, and economic position of the com- munity within Mexico. In addition, our review suggests that life-cycle factors-particularly the relative numbers of workers and dependentsexplain much of the heterogeneity in outcomes at the household level. In undertaking this critical review, we are not recommending that community studies should be avoided-quite the contrary. We neverthe- less suggest that researchers should be sensitive to the peculiarities of the communities they are studying, particularly to the influence of the community-level factors identified above, before generalizing from a single case study. Ultimately, however, we argue for a research design that would incorporate the study of many different communities into a common analytic framework. Such a design would be capable of analyzing simultaneously the operation of variables at three levels-the individual, the household, and the community. It would also permit analyzing how community social and economic structures affect migration and how migration affects the social and economic organization of communities. THE NUMBERS GAME: HOW MANY MIGRANTS The debate over how many persons migrate between Mexico and the United States is obviously a key issue, but figures advanced by investigators on opposite sides of the border have always differed sub4 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. stantially. As early as 1930, Manuel Gamio noted the profound disparity between estimates prepared in Mexico and the United States. He sought to rebut the view widely held in the United States that more than a million Mexicans were living in the United States by 1929. He argued that it was impossible to determine the number of Mexican immigrants from the U. S. Census because it was then taken in July, when the number of Mexican migrants was at its peak. Because Mexican migration is highly seasonal, the number of Mexicans enumerated would have been substantially lower if the census had been taken in December (Gamio 1930a; 1930b). Gamio showed that monthly data on remittances declined sharply during the winter months, as the number of U.S. exit forms filed by Mexicans rose (Gamio 1930b). Gamio's contemporary in the United States reached a different conclusion, however. Paul Taylor argued that Mexican migration was largely "permanent" and that the winter decline in remittances was explained by the fact that there was less work during this season and migrants did not have the extra income to send home (1929, 237). Taylor examined national census figures, school statistics, and mar- riage registrations and also undertook special surveys in source and destination areas (P. Taylor 1930, 302-8; Taylor 1931, 48-56; Taylor 1933). This early "numbers debate" was never resolved. It was still being argued when the Great Depression caused the mass deportation of Mexicans from the United States. This event relegated the counting of immigrants to the background, as scholars began to worry instead about the counting of deportees, setting off yet another debate. According to Mercedes Carreras, 311,717 Mexicans were deported from the United States between 1930 and 1933 (Carreras 1974, 145). Ralph Guzman, however, believes that the figure was at least half a million, a number he considers conservative (Guzmain 1979). Abraham Hoffman put the figure at 319,673 between 1930 and 1933 and at 458,039 for the period from 1929 to 1937 (Hoffman 1974). The deportations also called attention to the large number of women migrants. Carreras (1974) reported that among Mexicans deported between 1931 and 1933, some two-thirds were women, a finding that questioned the prevailing stereotype of Mexican migrants as single males traveling alone. After a long hiatus during the depression years of the 1930s, Mexico-U.S. migration was revived in 1942 by the Bracero Program, a temporary worker program initiated by the U.S. government. Although it was begun as a temporary wartime measure, the program was successively extended by the U.S. Congress and did not end until 1964 (see Craig 1971). In contrast to the disputed estimates of the number of immigrants and deportees, widespread agreement exists as to the number of braceros. Because each bracero contract generated its own administrative record, official statistics are generally considered to be reliable by Mexicans as well as U.S. researchers. During the twenty-two years that the 5 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review program lasted, some 4.6 million braceros entered the United States (Morales 1981, 148). During the Bracero Program, however, another international flow arose that was much harder to measure and far more intractable as a subject of study: undocumented migration. From 1942 to 1964, official statistics indicate, nearly 5 million Mexicans were apprehended and deported from the United States, a fact widely reported on both sides of the border (see Samora 1971; Cornelius 1978; Morales 1981). Since 1964 an additional 17 million Mexicans have been arrested and expelled from the United State (U.S. INS 1989). But although observers may agree on the number of apprehensions, they disagree profoundly about the relationship between this figure and the number of illegal migrants. Because undocumented migration is by definition clandestine, it cannot be measured directly, a situation that has forced researchers to rely on indirect measures. The resulting estimates can be characterized as either analytic or speculative (Passel 1986). Analytic estimates are based on quantitative procedures whose assumptions can be scrutinized and whose biases can be systematically evaluated, whereas speculative estimates are based on little more than opinion or conjecture. In general, speculative procedures yield estimates that are much larger than those developed by using analytic methods, and they have therefore received far more attention from the U. S. press and from U. S. politicians. Speculative estimates generally put the number of undocumented Mexicans at 5 million or more. For example, Lesko Associates (1975) as- sembled a panel of 'experts" to guess the number of undocumented Mexicans in the United States in 1975 and averaged panel members' guesses to derive an estimate of 5.2 million undocumented Mexicans. In 1976 the Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Leonard Chapman, estimated that 10 percent of Mexico's entire population (about 6 million persons) were living in the United States illegally (Chapman 1976). He arrived at this number by adding up "lestimates" provided by INS district offices. Arthur Corwin put the figure at 7 million in 1981 (Corwin 1982), and Edwin Reubens estimated the total net flow of undocumented migrants to be 600,000 in 1978 (Reubens 1980). None of these figures were derived from analytic procedures, however, and they have been widely criticized on both sides of the border (Bustamante 1979; Cornelius 1979; Massey 1981; Passel 1986). These estimates are significantly larger than the ones derived by U. S. demogra- phers using quantitative methods. For example, Frank Bean, Allan King, and Jeffrey Passel estimated that the maximum number of Mexicans that could possibly be in the United States in 1980 was 3.8 million, and most of their estimates ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 million (Bean, King, and Passel 1983). Passel and his colleagues have demonstrated that 1.1 million undocumented Mexicans were counted in the 1980 U.S. Census taken on 6 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. 1 April (Passel and Woodrow 1984; Warren and Passel 1987). Subsequent research has suggested that only one-half to two-thirds of all undocumented Mexicans were enumerated in the 1980 census (Heer and Passel 1985), yielding a range of 1.7 to 2.2 million for the total undocumented Mexican population in the United States in April 1980. Passel's reanalysis of final data from the 1980 Mexican Census yielded a best estimate for 1980 of 1.9 million, far fewer than the 5 to 7 million put forth by more speculative observers (Passel 1985). Analytic methods have also yielded estimates of net flow that are well below the speculative figures of 500,000 to 600,000 per month. For example, Jeffrey Passel and Karen Woodrow estimate that during the early 1980s, the net flow from Mexico was about 200,000 persons per year, a rate that would yield a total U.S. population of 3.1 million undocumented Mexicans by 1986 (Passel and Woodrow 1987). An opportunity to confirm this number independently occurred with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. It offered legalization to all undocumented migrants who had entered the United States before 1 January 1982 and a special amnesty for those who had worked for ninety days in agriculture during the year preceding 1 May 1986. In all, some 1.2 million Mexicans applied for the general amnesty, and another 1.1 million sought the special amnesty (Bean, Vernez, and Keely 1989). The total of 2.3 million applicants represents 75 percent of the estimated total popula- tion of undocumented Mexicans in 1986, suggesting that Passel's analytic estimates were close to the mark and that more speculative estimates were far too large. Undocumented migration has also become a salient issue in Mexico, and Mexican investigators have made their own attempts to measure the phenomenon. As in the United States, movement across the international border is not captured well by official statistics (Garcia y Griego 1987), and Mexican investigators, like their U.S. counterparts, have had to rely on indirect methods of estimation. Juan Diez Canedo, for example, tabulated the total number of dollars sent to persons with Spanish surnames in Mexico via checks or money orders drawn on U. S. banks (Diez Canedo 1984). By assuming an average size of remittances (taken from North and Houstoun 1976), Diez Canedo estimated the number of undocumented Mexicans in the United States to be 481,000 in 1975. Other investigators have employed the Mexican Census in attempting to assess the magnitude of undocumented migration. By using data from a census question about foreign residence during the past year and making assumptions about the sex ratio among undocumented migrants, Rodolfo Corona derived a statistical model that permitted estimating the number of migrants who had returned from the United States (Corona 1987). He calculated that 64,000 to 83,000 undocumented Mexicans had lived in the United States for at least six months by June 1979 but had 7 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review returned to Mexico by May 1980. The rather narrow target population limits the utility of these estimates, however. Gustavo Lopez and Sergio Zendejas have concluded that the 1980 Mexican Census offers little basis for accurate estimation (Lopez and Zendejas 1988). Jorge Bustamante approached the problem from a different angle in his 1990 study. Three times a day, he took a photograph of undocumented migrants gathered at two staging points on the international border near Tijuana. He then counted the number of migrants captured on film and computed a daily total of gross undocumented migration that was subsequently tabulated by month. This approach, however, cannot measure the extent of return migration nor can it capture the flow along the entire border, limitations that undermine its utility in specifying the size or rate of change in the undocumented Mexican population. The best source of Mexican data on undocumented migration is a survey carried out during 1978-79 by CENIET (Centro Nacional de Informacion y Estadisticas del Trabajo), a branch of Mexico's Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision Social. Called the Encuesta Nacional de Emigracion a la Frontera Norte y a los Estados Unidos (ENEFNEU), the survey was commissioned to obtain "basic information that would be representative of the phenomenon in its entirety" (Bustamante 1979, 30). This survey administered a short questionnaire to a stratified prob- ability sample of 62,500 households in 115 localities during December 1978 and January 1979. The questionnaire asked about absent household members age fifteen and over who were working in the United States and about persons age fifteen and over who had worked there during the past five years but had returned to Mexico. The results indicated that 519,300 Mexicans were working in the United States as of January 1979 and another 471,400 had worked there between January 1974 and January 1979 but had returned before the survey was taken. Some 91 percent of the returned migrants reported that they had entered the United States without documents, and the combined population of absentee and returned migrants was 84 percent male (CENIET 1982; Garcia y Griego 1987). These percentages suggest that 472,000 undocumented Mexican workers were residing in the United States in 1978, of whom 443,700 were male. Although these figures appear to conflict with the 1.1 million undocumented Mexicans counted in the 1980 U.S. Census, they are not necessarily contradictory because the ENEFNEU sample excluded two important segments of the undocumented population covered by the U.S. Census estimates: persons under the age of fifteen and adult nonworkers, the latter category being composed primarily of married women. Robert Warren and Jeffrey Passel (1987) estimate that only 44 per- cent of the undocumented Mexicans counted in the U.S. Census were males over the age of fifteen, but the ENEFNEU survey yielded an un8 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. documented population that is 94 percent male, all over the age of fifteen. Moreover, the Mexican survey was carried out in December and January, when the undocumented population is at its minimum, whereas the U. S. Census took place in April, when seasonal migrants begin to return to the United States. Finally, the Mexican survey provided estimates for 1978, whereas the U. S. Census was carried out in 1980. Thus the ENEFNEU survey estimates the number of undocumented Mexican males residing in the United States as of January 1978, while the U.S. Census counts the entire undocumented Mexican population in the United States during April 1980. When these basic differences are taken into account, the two estimates turn out to be fairly close. The ENEFNEU survey indicates that there were 444,000 undocumented Mexican males age fifteen or over living in the United States in 1978, whereas Warren and Passel (1987) estimate that 484,000 such men were counted in the U.S. Census in 1980 (.44 times 1.1 million). Adjusting for underenumeration yields a total estimate of 836,000 undocumented Mexican men age fifteen and over in 1980 (.44 times 1.9 million). Depending on one's assumptions about net undocumented migration between 1978 and 1980, the two estimates either agree closely or differ modestly, but they are not wildly contradictory. If net undocumented Mexican male migration is assumed to be about 200,000 men per year, then the CENIET figure is slightly larger than the U. S. Census figure (844,000 versus 836,000). If net male migration was only 100,000 between 1978 and 1980, then the CENIET estimate is somewhat smaller (644,000 versus 836,000). Manuel Garcia y Griego and Francisco Giner de los Rios updated the CENIET estimates and suggest that by April 1984 there were 758,000 undocumented workers in the United States (1985, 230), a figure again within the range of estimates developed by Passel and his colleagues (assuming that "undocumented workers" refers mainly to men over the age of fifteen). Thus analytic estimates prepared in Mexico and the United States do not contradict one another and are consistently smaller than the speculative estimates put forth in the U.S. media. The U.S. estimates have one weakness not shared by the ENEFNEU data, however. Although Passel and his colleagues could estimate the composition of the undocumented population by age and sex, their indirect methodology did not permit analyzing other migrant characteristics. For this purpose, the CENIET data are considerably more useful because that survey asked returned U.S. migrants a detailed set of questions that enable describing them along a variety of dimensions. Several studies have taken advantage of these data to describe various aspects: the characteristics of undocumented workers (Ranney and Kossoudji 1983), the traits of undocumented women (Kossoudji and Ranney 1984), the process of border crossing (Kossoudji 1990), and the 9 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review process of labor-force adjustment (Kossoudji and Ranney 1986). Lamentably, however, data from the ENEFNEU survey have not been analyzed in depth within Mexico (see the final report, CENIET 1982). Apparently, a change in presidential administrations impeded the project's continuation within the Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision Social. Yet ten years later, the survey remains the most reliable Mexican source on undocumented migration to the United States (Garcia y Griego 1988, 134). Despite the progress achieved in estimating the number of undocumented migrants, the "numbers game" has once again become a public issue as a result of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The new debate is focusing on whether IRCA's enforcement provisions have reduced the net flow of undocumented Mexican migrants to the United States. On 15 January 1988, the New York Times published a report by INS Director Alan Nelson, who stated that the number of undocumented entrants had been lowered as a direct consequence of IRCA.1 Three days later, Jorge Bustamante questioned this conclusion in Excelsior because it was based on INS apprehensions during December, when the flow of migrants traditionally diminishes.2 A subsequent analysis by Bean et al. (1990) attempted to control for the seasonality of undocumented migration, economic conditions in Mexico and the United States, and the ongoing legalization process. This study concluded that IRCA had reduced the flow of undocumented migrants, but it has been contradicted by other researchers' data indicating that IRCA has had little or no effect (Cornelius 1989; Massey, Donato, and Liang 1990; Bustamante 1990). Thus the debate on the number of Mexican migrants has continued in one form or another for fifty years, often using the arguments and counterarguments first broached by Manuel Gamio and Paul Taylor in the 1930s. The debate reveals the limitations of social science in studying a subject that is by definition unobservable, and it also underscores the political nature of a process linking two countries with different interests, perceptions, and histories. Indeed, the debate frequently has had little to do with facts. As Frank Bean, Edward Telles, and Lindsay Lowell have noted, "the heated discussions during the [U.S.] Congressional debates of the last few years on immigration legislation have shown that the exagger- ated figures are often still taken seriously" (Bean, Telles, and Lowell 1987, 674). Likewise, voting by U.S. Congressional representatives on immigration issues is determined more by party politics than by a rational assess- ment of interests and effects (Lowell, Bean, and de la Garza 1986). Thus the 'numbers game" often resembles a dialogue among the deaf rather than a reasoned debate about facts. 1. "Administration Calls Law on Aliens Effective," New York Times, 15 Jan. 1988, p. A-32. 2. Jorge Bustamante, "Manipulacion de la Migra," Excelsior, 18 Jan. 1988, pp. A6-7 10 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. "MIGRADOLARS: REMITTANCES TO MEXICO Since Mexican migration to the United States began, investigators have attempted to measure the size and effect of migrants' remittances. At the turn of the twentieth century, money orders coming from the United States attracted the attention of Mexican journalists, who reported in various Mexican newspapers the arrival of large quantities of dollars in rural communities (see Durand 1986, 1988). The first systematic study of remittances was carried out by Manuel Gamio, who compiled information on the origins, destinations, and size of postal money orders sent to Mexico from the United States (Gamio 1930a). These data provided Gamio with a reliable indicator of the main destination areas in the United States and the major Mexican sending communities. Gamio also attempted to infer the number of migrants from the size and distribution of remittances, an undertaking requiring a number of tenuous assumptions that were strongly criticized by his contemporary, Enrique Santibaniez. The latter stated that "we do not doubt the existence of these postal money orders; but it is another thing to attribute them to the savings of Mexican workers, when they could have had other origins" (Santibaniez 1930, 98). Paul Taylor also studied remittances but focused his attention locally, on the town of Arandas in Los Altos, a region of Jalisco, where he counted 7,678 remittances by telegraph or postal money order between 1922 and 1931 (P. Taylor 1933). From the number and denomination of the checks, he computed the total inflow of dollars into the community and used this figure to quantify the economic effect of international migration. This estimate had one weakness, however: Taylor could not determine the number or size of remittances that arrived in private letters. He simply assumed that the remittances he counted represented the total arriving in the forms of telegraphs and money orders. As the dispute between Gamio and Taylor demonstrates, differences concerning the size of remittances frequently follow national lines. In general, Mexican researchers have tended toward sins of omission and U.S. investigators toward sins of commission. Reports from Mexico have systematically understated the quantity of U.S. remittances, and the Mexican government frequently ignores the subject entirely (apparently the current policy). This official reticence has not always been the case, however. In their final reports, Presidents Ruiz Cortines and Miguel Aleman both offered specific estimates of the foreign exchange contrib- uted by migrants (Morales 1981). In the United States, meanwhile, researchers have tended to exaggerate remittances by multiplying a large number of undocumented migrants (often derived by extrapolating ap- prehension figures) by an average remittance derived from some field study (which may or may not be representative). 11 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 0001 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review A recent example of the ongoing debate is that between Wayne Cornelius and his former student Juan Diez Canedo. Cornelius (1978) estimated that remittances to Mexico totaled more than 3 billion dollars in 1975, but Diez Canedo (1984) put the figure at only 317 million in the same year. Cornelius computed an average size of remittances based on his survey of migrants in Jalisco and then multiplied it by the number of Mexicans he assumed were working seasonally in the United States. Diez Canedo, in contrast, totaled checks or bank orders made out to persons with Spanish surnames in Mexico drawn on U.S. banks. Both estimates are open to criticism: that of Cornelius was made essentially by assumption whereas Diez Canedo's ignored remittances in the form of cash and goods. A more careful but heavily qualified estimate was prepared by Garcia y Griego and Giner de los Rios using data from both countries and information from the CENIET survey (1985, 236). They proposed a figure of 1.8 billion dollars in remittances for 1984. The analysis was replicated in a later article (Garcia y Griego 1988), which stated that "even though the estimates are not exact," they provide 'adequate" information to counter alarmist claims of millions of undocumented migrants entering the United States and billions of dollars leaving the country. Charles Keely and Bao Nga Tran used data tabulated by the International Monetary Fund on "unrequited private transfers" (IMF 1987) to examine trends in remittances for various countries from 1970 to 1985 (Keely and Tran 1989). They argue that these figures understate the funds remitted by migrant workers because they include only money trans- ferred through monitored channels and do not incorporate noncash remittances. The IMF data show that in 1975, 59 million dollars were privately transferred from the United States to Mexico, far less than the amounts reported earlier by Cornelius or Diez Canedo. But the amounts increased substantially during the late 1970s and again after the onset of the economic crisis in 1982. By 1984, private transfers totaled 2.3 billion dollars, exceeding the estimate of 1.8 billion put forth by Garcia y Griego and Giner de los Rios (1985). It is thus clear that migrant remittances represent a significant source of foreign exchange for Mexico, some 2 billion dollars in 1984. COMMUNITY STUDIES: FROM THE SPECIFIC TO THE GENERAL Given the problems encountered in estimating the number of migrants and the size of their remittances, researchers have turned to studying particular Mexican communities as a means of analyzing the social and economic processes that underlie the aggregate statistics. These basic processes are difficult to analyze using large-scale surveys for several reasons. First, processes of migration are developmental and longitu12 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. dinal, and surveys taken at a single point in time cannot capture this inherent dynamism. Second, migration is more than an individual or family decision: it is also a response to larger structural conditions in sending and receiving societies, factors that cannot be studied easily by using surveys of individuals or households. Finally, migrants and their families inevitably make decisions within a local setting. National, state, and regional conditions are important, but their effects are mediated through local social and economic institutions that are difficult to study by using survey data alone. Community studies provide a tool for analyzing the migration process in a way that is historical, developmental, and sensitive to the effects of local conditions as well as to those of the national political economy. Community studies suffer from one serious problem, however: it is difficult to generalize about broader patterns and processes of migration from a single isolated case. Yet this inherent weakness has not stopped most researchers, who find the temptation to generalize too great to resist. Thus the field is replete with general statements about the nature of Mexico-U. S. migration based on the experience of a single community. For example, Joshua Reichert considered his case of Guadalupe, Michoacan, sufficient to infer a "migrant syndrome" characteristic of the entire Mexican central plateau (1981). Similarly, although Cornelius points out that he refers only to his own study (1979), he frequently contrasts his findings with those of other investigators in order to make broader statements. Yet Cornelius does not provide the information needed to know whether the comparisons are appropriate: his sampling methodology, which communities he studied, or the overall sample size. He states only that the survey was carried out in Los Altos, Jalisco. At this juncture, a variety of community studies have been com- pleted and their findings introduced into the research literature. Table 1 lists seventeen case studies carried out within specific Mexican communities, and table 2 lists eight other comparative studies that have con- trasted several communities at once, yielding information on twenty additional settings. Together these studies provide data of varying detail and quality on thirty-seven separate Mexican migrant communities. The authors of these studies have put forth a host of generalizations about the nature of Mexico-U.S. migration. But most investigators have made few attempts to consider the peculiarities of their settings or to situate their studies within the broader research literature. As a result, inconsistent conclusions have proliferated on a variety of topics: which social classes migrate, the demographic and legal composition of the flow, the economic effects of emigration, the effects of Mexico's agrarian reform and agricultural modernization, and the relative importance of different strategies of migration. In the ensuing sections of this article, we will review findings on these issues and will argue that discrepancies between 13 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review TA B L E 1 Community Studies of Mexican Migration to the United States, 1929-1990 Community State Investigator Acuitzio del Canje Michoacan Wiest (1973, 1979, 1984) Aguililla Michoacan Rouse (1989) Arrandas Jalisco P. Taylor (1929, 1931, 1932, 1933) Alvaro Obregon Michoacan Trigueros and Rodriguez (1988) Copandaro Michoacan Rionda (1986, 1988) Gomez Farias Michoacan Lopez (1986a, 1986b, 1988) Guadalajara Jalisco Escobar, Gonzalez, and Roberts (1987), Escobar and Martinez (1990) Guadalupe Michoacan Reichert (1979, 1981, 1982), Reichert and Massey (1979, 1980) Jalostotitlan Jalisco Gonzalez and Escobar (1990) Jaripo Michoacan Fonseca (1988), Fonseca and Moreno (1988) Las Animas Zacatecas Mines (1981, 1984), Mines and de Janvry (1982) Los Altos villages Jalisco Cornelius (1976a, 1976b, 1978) Patzcuaro villages Michoacan Taylor (1986, 1987), Adelman, Taylor, and Vogel (1988), Stark and Taylor (1989) San Jeronimo Oaxaca Stuart and Kearney (1981) San Francisco del Rincon Guanajuato Durand (1989b, 1990) Santa Ines (Municipio Michoacan Fernandez (1988) de Villamar) Villa Guerrero Jalisco Shadow (1979) studies occur frequently because investigators fail to consider the impact of basic structural factors operating at the community level. Which Classes Migrate One of the most widely studied aspects of Mexican migration to the United States is the socioeconomic selectivity of migration-that is, the question of which social classes migrate. Various studies have reported on this issue, and the prevailing wisdom is that migrants come from the lower-middle segments of the income or wealth distribution (see Portes and Rumbaut 1990, 10-11). The rationale for this observation is that the rich have little incentive to migrate whereas the poor lack the resources to cover the costs and risks of a trip to the United States. For example, Gustavo Lopez concluded, based on his study of Gomez Farias, Michoacan, that "Imigration is most common among those owning irrigated land, in comparison with those who possess rain-fed fields; and among those in the first category, the more land they own, the 14 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. TA B L E 2 Comparative Community Studies of Mexican Migration to the United States Community State Investigator Jaral del Progreso Guanajuato Grindle (1988) Tepoztlan Morelos Union de San Antonio Jalisco Villamar Michoacan Gomez Farias Michoacan Cornelius (1990a, 1990b) Las Animas Zacatecas Tlacuitapa Jalisco El Bajio Guanajuato K. Roberts (1982, 1984) Las Huastecas San Luis Potosi Mixteca Baja Oaxaca Valsequillo Puebla Altamira Jalisco Massey, Alarc6n, Durand, Chamitlan Michoacan and Gonzailez (1987) Santiago Jalisco San Marcos (Guadalajara) Jalisco Guadalupe Michoacan Mines and Massey (1985) Las Animas Zacatecas Hecorio Michoacan Dinerman (1982) Ihuatzio Michoacan G6mez Farias Michoacan Goldring (1990) Las Animas Zacatecas Mexicali Baja California Selby and Murphy (1984) Mazatlan Sinaloa Tampico Tamaulipas Queretaro Queretaro San Luis Potosi San Luis Potosi Corralillos Jalisco Orozco(1990) El Refugio Jalisco Los Dolores Jalisco more they migrate" (Lopez 1986b, 574). His facts appear to coincide with those of Kenneth Roberts (1982), who found a connection between com- mercialized agriculture and migration, and with those of Richard Mines, who affirmed that migrants were more likely to own land than nonmigrants (Mines 1981). Likewise, Ina Dinerman reports that landowner- ship was more common among migrants in Huecorio than among nonmigrants (1982). Despite these studies confirming the prevailing wisdom, other investigators suggest considerable diversity in the class background of 15 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review U.S. migrants. Cornelius reports that in Los Altos, Jalisco, "those who migrate illegally are among the poorest residents of the community- especially the sons of landless workers and ejidatarios" (Cornelius 1976b, 7). He nevertheless allows that "those at the very bottom of the local income distribution are not likely to migrate because they lack . . . the resources to cover the costs of transportation and the fees charged by the coyotes... ." Likewise, although Raymond Wiest found that the very poorest households were unlikely to support a migrant, he could never- theless "state unequivocally from domestic group histories that nearly all the households involved in migration to the United States had incomes well below the median before sending members to the United States" (Wiest 1973, 197). Other researchers have located U.S. migration even more decisively among the poor and landless. In Guadalupe, Michoacan, Reichert (1979) argues, migration arose among the landless precisely because they had no other option but to migrate. James Stuart and Michael Kearney called migration "the only alternative to starvation" in San Jeronimo, Oaxaca, where 90 percent of the families did not possess enough land to support a family (Stuart and Kearney 1981). In two other rural communities (Altamira, Jalisco, and Chamitlan, Michoacan), U.S. migration was most prevalent among landless day laborers (Massey et al. 1987). Just to complicate matters further, one study reported finding no relationship between either income or wealth and the likelihood of U.S. migration among villagers living near Patzcuaro, Michoacan (E. Taylor 1986). Relatively few studies have examined international migration emanating from urban areas, and their results are also inconsistent. Agustin Escobar and Maria Martinez indicate that U. S. migration is quite common among manual workers in Guadalajara: 17 percent of those in their sample had worked in the United States, but the percentage was higher (up to 25 percent) among workers in small firms, suggesting that emigration was most common among the poorest and least stable segments of the working class (Escobar and Martinez 1990). In contrast, Henry Selby and Arthur Murphy surveyed five Mexican cities and found that migrants consistently came from households that were better off than others (Selby and Murphy 1984). Two other surveys carried out in Guadalajara and Santiago (a nearby factory town) found that U.S. migrants were concentrated among skilled manual and service workers rather than among unskilled laborers (Massey et al. 1987). Thus depending on which study one consults, U.S. migrants are drawn either from the landless or the landed, from the skilled working class or unskilled laborers, from the stable middle class or the poorest segments of society. One study has even suggested that class plays no role at all. It is therefore difficult to make sense of these diverse findings without knowing more about the communities involved because factors 16 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. operating at the community level play a large role in determining which classes migrate and when. Several of the studies listed in table 2 have undertaken a comparative analysis of communities in an effort to determine which factors affect the socioeconomic selectivity of international migration. These studies sug- gest that class background is not a fixed characteristic of migrants that invites simple generalization. Rather, the class composition of migration at any point in time is a variable determined by two key community characteristics: the age of the migration stream and the degree of inequality in the distribution of productive resources. The first factor recognizes that migration is a dynamic, developmental process in which decisions made by migrants at one point affect the course and selectivity of migration in later periods. For example, in their comparative study of four migrant communities, Massey et al. (1987) documented that U. S. migration generally begins in the middle segments of the local occupational or wealth distribution (consistent with the common wisdom) but that over time it becomes progressively less selective and eventually incorporates all segments of the socioeconomic hierarchy Ultimately, the flow becomes dominated by the poorest class of landless campesinos and unskilled workers rather than by the middle class of small property owners or skilled laborers. A similar conclusion was reached by Mines and Massey (1985) in comparing Guadalupe, Michoacan, with Las Animas, Zacatecas. The changing selectivity of migration results from the growth and elaboration of migrant networks, which are composed of ties of kinship, friendship, and paisanaje (shared community origin) between migrants and nonmigrants located in the United States and Mexico. The first migrants who leave for the United States have no social ties to draw on, and for them migration is very costly and risky, especially if they have no legal documents. As Cornelius (1976b) and others have argued, these costs and risks tend to exclude the poorest segments of society. After the first migrants have arrived in the United States, however, the costs of migration are substantially lowered for friends and relatives living in the same community of origin. Because of the nature of kinship and friendship structures, each new migrant creates a set of individuals with social ties to the United States and its labor market. Migrants are invariably linked to nonmigrants through bonds of kinship and friendship, and the latter draw on obligations implicit in these relationships to gain access to employment and assistance at the point of destination, thus reducing their costs substantially. Once the number of network connections in an origin area reaches a critical threshold, migration becomes self-perpetuating in creating the social structure needed to sustain it. Every new migrant reduces the costs of subsequent migration for a set of friends and relatives. Some of those 17 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review left behind are induced to migrate, which further expands the set of persons with ties abroad, which in turn reduces the costs and risks for a new set, causing some of them to migrate, and so on. Over time, migration becomes progressively less class-selective and ultimately a mass movement. Thus depending on when migration began and how developed the networks have become, the class composition of migration from a community may be dominated by the middle class, the poor, the landless, or the landed. That is to say, the effect of migrant networks is quite powerful and ultimately comes to dominate class factors in predicting migration, as has been demonstrated by quantitative studies carried out at community and national levels (Massey 1987; Massey and Garcia EspaAa 1987). The reason that Edward Taylor found no relationship between economic class and migration in his 1986 study was because he controlled for the effect of networks, which dominated all other variables in his statistical models. The age of the migration stream is important because it indicates the maturity of migrant networks but also because widespread migration has the power to transform the class distribution itself. In rural com- munities, money earned through U.S. wage labor can finance acquiring farmland, thus enabling migrant families to move from the class of landless workers to small landowners. If enough families acquire land through migration, it may appear at some point that migration results from landownership. It is therefore crucial to sort out the temporal sequence of migration and class membership, given that U.S. migration is a primary avenue of social mobility in Mexican sending communities. Unfortunately, however, when reporting a positive association between landownership and U.S. migration, many studies do not undertake this task. For example, in the two Michoacan communities of Gomez Farias and Huecorio, Lopez (1986a) and Dinerman (1982) report an apparent correlation between landownership and U. S. migration and conclude that the former causes the latter. It is nonetheless likely that the order of causality is reversed. Studies done in two neighboring Michoacan communities, Guadalupe and Chamitlan, showed that migration often preceded landownership, the likelihood of landownership rose sharply as migrant experience increased, and it was tied directly to U.S. earnings (Reichert 1981, 1982; Massey et al. 1987). The association between migration and landownership is also affected by the degree to which land is available for purchase. This linkage illustrates the effect of a second community-level factor: the structure and distribution of local productive resources. In communities where land is unequally distributed and held in large tracts by a few landowners, the possibilities for acquiring farmland are limited, reducing the likelihood of class mobility through migration (Reichert 1981; Grindle 1988; Gonzalez and Escobar 1990). Moreover, even at the outset of migration, class selec18 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. tivity is strongly shaped by land-tenure arrangements. For example, Reichert's town of Guadalupe was made up entirely of landless families when recruitment for the Bracero Program began in 1942, thereby guaranteeing that all migrants were landless day laborers (Reichert 1979). Luin Goldring has compared Las Animas, Zacatecas, and Gomez Farias, Michoacan, to illustrate the important role played by land tenure in determining the class composition of migrants (Goldring 1990). In Las Animas, land from a nearby hacienda was gradually sold to townspeople beginning at an early date, creating a property distribution dominated by small landowners. In Gomez Farias, however, land remained under the control of the hacienda of Guaracha until the late 1930s. Although the agrarian reform movement eventually provided small plots to a minority of households, they were generally insufficient to support families and were quickly leased to absentee landlords in nearby cities (Cornelius 1990a). Thus when the United States began recruiting migrants during the 1940s, these two Mexican communities sent very different classes of workers, not because processes of migration differed in the two communities but because common processes of recruitment drew on divergent class structures. The Demographic and Legal Composition of Migration Another common topic of generalization concerns the age, sex, and legal composition of Mexican migrants to the United States. Studies carried out during the 1920s revealed that migrants were demographically diverse, incorporating not only single men but women, children, and frequently entire families (Gamio 1930a, 1931; P. Taylor 1932; Carreras 1974). This heterogeneous pattern was effaced by the Great Depression and the mass deportations that followed. When the migration stream began again under the aegis of the Bracero Program, it was renewed principally as a male phenomenon. Very few braceros were female (Hancock 1959; Galarza 1964; Samora 1971). The prevailing view about contemporary patterns was established in the mid-1970s by Cornelius (1976a, 1976b), based on his study of rural communities in Los Altos, Jalisco. He found that U.S. migrants were overwhelmingly males of working age. Although most were single when they migrated for the first time, the migrant population generally was made up mostly of married men who traveled without their wives and children. The vast majority were undocumented. This view of Mexican migration has apparently been confirmed by studies of migrants apprehended by the INS, which reveal a great preponderance of men among Mexicans (Samora 1971; North and Houstoun 1976). This profile persisted remarkably among politicians, researchers, and the public. Thus when CENIET designed its 1978 national survey of 19 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review emigration, it did not ask households about persons in the United States but about workers age fifteen and over (CENIET 1982). The survey was therefore guaranteed to confirm the stereotype of Mexican migrants as males of working age, despite the fact that the undocumented population counted in the 1980 U.S. Census was 45 percent female and 21 percent under the age of fifteen (Warren and Passel 1987). Community studies reveal great diversity in the demographic and legal background of migrants, although enough individuals adhere to the classic stereotype of undocumented male workers to confirm its basis in fact. Field studies carried out in several rural communities (Acuitzio, Michoacan; San Jeronimo, Oaxaca; Huecorio, Michoacan; and Alvaro Obregon, Michoacan) report that virtually all U.S. migrants are males of working age who go without documents (see Wiest 1973; Stuart and Kearney 1981; Dinerman 1982; Trigueros and Rodriguez 1988). Yet other investigations of different communities (Guadalupe, Michoacan; Las Animas, Zacatecas; Altamira, Jalisco; Chamitlan, Michoacan; Santiago, Jalisco; Santa Ines, Michoacan; Tlacuitapa, Jalisco; Jalostotitlan, Jalisco; and Gomez Farias, Michoacan) report substantial participation by women and children and large numbers of legal migrants (see Reichert and Massey 1979; Mines 1981; Massey et al. 1987; Fernandez 1988; Cornelius 1990a; Gonzalez and Escobar 1990; Goldring 1990). This contradiction stems from the effect of two key factors: the age of the community's migration stream (which determines the maturity of the networks and the particular U.S. immigration policies to which migrants were exposed) and the niche in the U.S. occupational structure in which the community's migrants first became established. The operation of these two community-level factors create from a common process of labor migration a multiplicity of demographic and legal compositions. Communities sending large numbers of women and children in- variably have long histories of migration. When migrants are grouped according to the date they left on their first U.S. trip, the participation of women and children typically grows over time (see Reichert and Massey 1980; Massey, Donato, and Liang 1990; Fonseca and Moreno 1988; Gon- zalez and Escobar 1990). The first migrants are invariably men, and for a long time the flow continues to be dominated by males visiting the United States temporarily for limited periods of wage labor. At this stage, migration is dominated by economic motivations and imperatives. Over time, however, social processes come into play. As migrants acquire increasing experience in the United States, gain familiarity with U.S. employers and settings, and expand their network connections to other migrants, the costs and risks of migration progressively drop. Al- though men are at first reluctant to expose their wives and children to the hazards and hardships of migration, the life of a solitary migrant worker eventually becomes difficult to sustain. As the costs and risks drop with 20 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. the expansion of the networks, men increasingly bring their wives and children into the migratory process and the demographic base of migration broadens. The incorporation of women and children often happens rapidly. In Guadalupe, Michoacan, for example, virtually no women or children participated in U.S. migration during the twenty-five years from 1940 to 1965. But in the next fifteen years, the flow came to be dominated by women and children, and in the most recent period (1975-1978), 53 percent of new migrants were women and 67 percent were younger than fifteen (Reichert and Massey 1980). Thus in communities with a long migratory tradition, the average age of migrants tends to fall over time and the proportion of women rises (Massey, Donato, and Liang 1990; Gonzalez and Escobar 1990). The emergence of family migration is facilitated by another process in the development of migrant networks: the formation of branch communities in the United States. As migrants increasingly specialize in U.S. labor to the exclusion of other economic pursuits, the constant shuttling back and forth becomes more difficult to sustain, and some migrants ultimately settle in the United States, typically in urban areas. The settlement of other migrants from the same Mexican town greatly strengthens the networks and focuses migration increasingly on specific destinations, making subsequent settlement by additional townspeople more likely and considerably easier. This process provides a secure, Spanish-speaking environment in which dependents can adjust and adapt to life in the United States. The age of the migration stream also determines one more factor that influences the demographic and legal composition of the flow: the rules and regulations governing the acquisition of legal papers in the United States. In general, U.S. immigration policy has evolved in the direction of making it increasingly difficult for Mexicans to acquire legal status in the United States (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990). Prior to 1965, Mexican immigration was not restricted numerically, and until 1976, Mexico had no specific quota, being subject only to the overall hemispheric ceiling of 120,000 immigrants. After 1976 all nations in the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, were placed under a quota of 20,000 immigrants each (exempting immediate relatives of U.S. citizens). Then in 1978, the age at which a child could sponsor the immigration of his or her parents was raised to twenty-one, and hemispheric quotas were abolished in favor of a single worldwide ceiling of 290,000. In 1980 the ceiling was reduced to 270,000. All these changes reduced the number of U.S. immigrant visas available to Mexicans. The increasing restrictiveness of U. S. immigration policy means that communities with older migration streams are more likely to be dominated by legal migrants because applications for visas were made 21 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review under more liberal policies. In general, communities that began sending migrants during the bracero years (1942-1964) are characterized by flows that now contain a high proportion of legal migrants (Reichert 1979; Mines 1981; L6pez 1986a; Massey et al. 1987). When it became clear that the Bracero Program was going to end, U.S. employers began to actively sponsor legalization of their workers under the liberal provisions prevailing in U.S. immigration before 1965 (Reichert 1979; Mines 1982). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, much of the legal migration that occurred consisted of wives and children of former braceros and undocumented migrants who had received their documents in the 1950s and early 1960s. Until the IRCA amnesty was declared in 1986, flows from communities that began to send migrants during the 1970s were domi- nated by undocumented migrants, and the later a community's entry into the migration process, the more its flow was dominated by working-age men. Early investigations indicate, however, that the IRCA legalization program may have far-reaching effects in changing this situation. During a brief period, IRCA legalized the status of more than 2 million formerly undocumented migrants (Bean, Vernez, and Keely 1989). One community study indicates that this amnesty caused a pronounced shift in the legal composition of the flow to the United States (Cornelius 1989), transforming it from a stream dominated by illegals into one composed mainly of legals and rodinos, as those receiving amnesty are popularly called (being beneficiaries of the Simpson-Rodino Law cosponsored by Senator Alan Simpson of Montana and Representative Peter Rodino of New Jersey) (Durand 1989a). Although it is not known how many women and children were legalized under the terms of the amnesty, another field study suggests that rodinos have been overwhelmingly male (Goldring 1990). But even if they are mainly men, the amnesty will inevitably be followed by a wave of subsequent legalizations as wives, children, and other relatives use the family reunification provi- sions of U.S. immigration law to obtain their own documents. Thus the composition of migration to the United States is critically determined by the age of the migration stream. Communities that began sending migrants early now contain large numbers of women and children and a high proportion of legal migrants. Yet even among communities that began participating in U.S. migration at the same time, flows can display substantial differences in demographic and legal composition. For example, although migration began at about the same time in Las Animas, Gomez Farias, Guadalupe, and Tlacuitapa, only 31 percent of Animenos between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four are legal migrants whereas 42 percent of Guadalupenos possess documents (Mines and Massey 1985). Similarly, although 35 percent of all migrants are female in Gomez Farias, only 23 percent of U. S. migrants in Las Animas are women (Goldring 1990). And whereas 57 percent of all women between the ages 22 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. of twenty-five and twenty-nine have migrated to the United States in Gomez Farias, only 38 percent have done so in Tlacuitapa (Cornelius 1990a). These differences among communities with similar histories of U.S. migration suggest that other community-level factors come into play. Goldring suggests, based on her comparative analysis of Las Animas and Gomez Farias (1990), that one of the most important is the location of migrants within the U.S. occupational-industrial structure. The centrality of this factor is frequently overlooked by field researchers, who tend to focus on conditions in Mexico and ignore those in the United States (see, for example, the studies by Wiest 1973, 1979; Stuart and Kearney 1981; Dinerman 1982; E. Taylor 1987, 1988; Trigueros and Rodriguez 1988; Fernandez 1988; Escobar and Martinez 1990). In contrast, the earliest studies of Mexico-U.S. migration clearly recognized the importance of U.S. social and economic conditions and gathered data on both sides of the border (see P. Taylor 1929, 1930; Gamio 1930a, 1930b; Fabila 1929). Santibaniez stated, "To treat with any seriousness the issue of Mexican migration to the United States, it is absolutely necessary to consider it in its bilateral condition, since we Mexicans cannot understand it unless we study it in context and take into account U.S. interests. Likewise, the United States cannot determine anything more than what is convenient to its interests if it does not take account of the circumstances that have fatally determined the human current that leaves Mexico . . ." (Santibaniez 1930, 16). In considering the effect of U.S. employment on the demographic and legal status of migrants, the crucial distinction lies between agri- cultural and urban occupations, with the former leading to legalization and participation by women and children and the latter being associated with undocumented migration by working-age men. To a large degree, this choice is a matter of chance-of being in the right place at the right time. But once a few migrants from a community become established in a particular occupational-industrial niche, they acquire the ability to obtain jobs for friends, relatives, and other townspeople. Over time, therefore, migration from particular communities tends to focus not only on specific geographic destinations but on particular niches in the U.S. occupationalindustrial structure: busboys and dishwashers in a certain restaurant; janitors in a certain building; operatives in a particular factory; workers in a certain car wash; fruit pickers for particular growers. For example, migrants from Santiago, Jalisco, went to a specific neighborhood in Los Angeles because one townsman became the union representative in a lamp factory there. Migrants from Chamitlan, Michoacan, focused on two other California cities where a townsperson had obtained the position of foreman on a ranch and a paisano had became headwaiter in a restaurant (Massey et al. 1987). 23 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review Goldring (1990) compares the cases of Gomez Farias and Las Animas to demonstrate the role played by the U.S. occupational niche in shaping the composition of the migrant streams. Around 90 percent of migrants from Gomez Farias work in the strawberry fields in Watsonville, California, living mainly in one labor camp, because several Gomenios developed early connections with particular growers based in that city (Lopez 1986a; Cornelius 1990a, 1990b; Goldring 1990). In contrast, migrants from Las Animas go to urban destinations because one Animeino owns a construction business in Orange County and several others have acquired stable jobs and settled in South San Francisco and Los Angeles (Mines 1981; Cornelius 1990a, 1990b). As a result of these occupational differences, the migrant stream is primarily legal and family-oriented in Gomez Farias but is diverse and weighted more toward undocumented males in Las Animas (Goldring 1990). For various reasons, agricultural labor is more conducive to a pattern of migration by families than is urban employment. First, farm labor has historically provided a more secure path to legal status, which is then passed on to family members to enable their migration without risk. Over the years, growers have worked hard to ensure the continued flow of Mexican labor, often by arranging for legalization of their farm workers. Growers were responsible for initiating and perpetuating the Bracero Program, which gave migrants legal work permits. When this program ended, growers actively sought permanent resident status for their work- ers. As legal status became increasingly difficult to acquire, growers fought to maintain the "Texas Proviso," which exempted them from prosecution for hiring illegal workers. When growers lost this battle in 1986, they successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress for a "Special Agricultural Worker" amnesty that was made available to farm workers on extremely generous terms. Through the growers' efforts, IRCA also arranged for a "Replenishment Agricultural Worker" program to admit additional workers "to prevent farm labor shortages" (Martin 1990). As a result of these efforts, farm workers have consistently been more able than urban workers to obtain legal status for themselves and their families, making seasonal family migration an attractive and viable strategy The diversity of farm work also provides a range of light and heavy tasks that all family members can undertake to earn income. Moreover, growers often provide temporary housing at very low cost (sometimes even free), lowering the costs of family migration. Thus family migration for U.S. farm labor represents a rational strategy for maximiz- ing family income (Reichert 1979). In virtually all cases where a pattern of "legal shuttle" or "recurrent" migration has emerged, workers are employed primarily in agriculture (Reichert 1979; Mines 1981; Lopez 1986a). In contrast, urban employment discourages, although it does not prevent, legalization and family migration. Urban employers generally do 24 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. not act collectively to ensure their labor supply and have not made intensive efforts to secure legalization for their workers. Rather, they rely on the self-reinforcing nature of network migration to provide them with undocumented workers. In general, therefore, it has been significantly more difficult for urban-based migrants to acquire legal papers. Urban workers never had a Bracero Program, and the general amnesty program was far more restrictive in its criteria of eligibility than the special agricultural worker program. Consequently, many families who have resided for years in urban areas of the United States are ineligible for amnesty (Chavez, Flores, and Lopez-Garza 1990), while farm workers who only recently crossed the border have qualified, often with credentials of dubious validity (Martin 1990). Undocumented status, in turn, discourages family migration because of the hazards and costs associated with crossing the border and living clandestinely in the United States. Aside from such legal problems, urban employment discourages the migration of women and children in other ways. In most entry-level urban jobs, wages are low and city rents are expensive. Housing is rarely, if ever, subsidized or arranged by the employer. Moreover, in urban areas children are less able to work and contribute to family income. Thus the migration of wives and children, rather than maximizing family income, tends to lower net earnings and make it harder to accumulate savings quickly (Massey et al. 1987). In the long run, however, solitary migration is difficult to sustain, and as the length of stay and the number of trips increase, family migration eventually occurs, leading to greater diversity in the composition of migrant streams directed to urban areas. The Economic Effects of Emigration Probably the most widely studied aspect of migration to the United States is its effect on local economic development within Mexico. Community studies are remarkably unanimous in condemning international migration as a palliative that improves the material well-being of particular families without leading to sustained economic growth within migrant communities. Thus Reichert refers to migration as an illness or "syndrome" whereby migration undermines local development. Wiest (1979) calls migration an "addiction" that townspeople must satisfy to fulfill their need for consumer goods and an elevated standard of living. Stuart and Kearney (1981) consider U.S. migration to reflect a "dangerous dependence." The description of emigration and its effects in these ominous terms stems largely from the finding that U.S. earnings are spent overwhelmingly on current consumption, leaving little money for productive investment. Community studies consistently report that U. S. remittances 25 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review and savings are directed to a few nonproductive ends: family maintenance and health; the purchase, construction, or remodeling of homes; and the purchase of consumer goods. For example, in Huecorio, Michoacan, Dinerman (1982) found that 67 percent of U.S. income went to one of these ends. In Jalostotitlan, Jalisco, the figure was 93 percent (Gonzalez and Escobar 1990). Similarly, in the three communities studied by Cornelius, 92 percent of remittances and 66 percent of savings were spent in these ways (1990a, 1990b); and Lopez reports that 83 percent of U.S. earnings went to family maintenance, housing, health care, or parties (1986a). Although additional studies do not report specific figures, similar spending patterns were reported by Shadow (1979), Reichert (1981), Stuart and Kearney (1981), Mines (1984), Fernaindez (1988), and Wiest (1979, 1984). As a result, most observers have concluded with Reichert that "although out-migration has generated higher per capita income and increased rates of consumption, it has not led to the development of the town economy in ways that have stimulated production or generated new employment opportunities" (Reichert 1981, 63). Richard Mines and Alain De Janvry also point out that in rural areas, successful migrants "buy up village lands and businesses when they become available, [but] they have little incentive to invest time or money in improving their investments since a semi-skilled job in the U.S. provides much more income . (Mines and De Janvry 1982, 452). Despite the apparent unanimity of opinion about the ill effects of migration to the United States, several studies provide counter-examples that question the mainstream view. In the town of Alvaro Obregon, for example, Paz Trigueros and Javier Rodriguez report that 30 percent of U. S. earnings were spent on land, tools, or livestock (Trigueros and Rodriguez 1988). Escobar and Martinez (1990) surveyed manual workers in Guadala- jara and found that 31 percent of migrants used their savings to set up a business. In their survey of one neighborhood in Guadalajara, Massey and his colleagues found that 21 percent of migrants used their savings productively and another 10 percent spent their savings on something that could be considered productive under some circumstances (Massey et al. 1987). In addition, several community studies report that migrant earnings have been crucial in community efforts to improve local infrastruc- ture, providing a key infusion of capital to build roads, install electricity, extend sewer lines, provide potable water, and restore public buildings. For example, even as Reichert (1981) lamented the "migrant syndrome" in Guadalupe, Michoacan, he reported that contributions by legal migrants accounted for 84 percent of all funds contributed by townspeople toward six capital improvement projects. Likewise, in Chamitlan, Michoacan, migrant earnings represented a "significant portion" of private contribu26 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. tions to recent public works (Massey et al. 1987). Goldring indicates that townspeople in Las Animas and Gomez Farias have generally been in a better position to make capital improvements than inhabitants of surrounding communities because of the high concentration of U.S. migrants, who are expected to contribute dollars for community improve- ment projects (Goldring 1990). Thus although most studies find a lack of development and high consumer spending resulting from U.S. migration, a few report productive investment and local economic growth. This discrepancy suggests caution in accepting generalizations about a "migrant syndrome" of dependency without considering the characteristics of the communities involved. In fact, most places that have been studied exhibit a geographic location and structural position in the Mexican political economy that are unsuitable for productive investment. Typically, the sending communities are isolated rural villages that are removed from natural markets; they frequently lack basic infrastructure like paved roads, electricity, telephones, running water, and sewage; and they often lack ready access to an appropriate labor force. Even in the realm of agriculture, many communities are poorly suited for investment because of poor quality land, lack of water, a fragmented land tenure system, and highly unequal prop- erty distribution. Under these circumstances, productive investment is not only unlikely but unwise because the chances of business failure are extremely high. Even so, most communities contain some business enterprises, and when the effect of U.S. migration is examined from the viewpoint of businesses rather than from the perspective of migrants, U.S. earnings are found to play a much more important role. For example, among businesses that Cornelius identified in his survey of three rural communities, 63 percent were owned by migrants and 61 percent were founded with U.S. earnings (1990a, 1990b). Of 19 enterprises in Guadalajara studied in detail by Escobar and Martinez, 32 percent were owned by migrants and 10 percent were capitalized with U.S. earnings (1990). The Massey team uncovered 162 business ventures in their survey of four communities, of which 39 percent were owned by migrants and 12 percent were established with U.S. earnings. Migrant-owned businesses accounted for 39 percent of business employment in these communities (Massey et al. 1987). Rather than concluding that migration inevitably leads to depen- dency and a lack of development, it is more appropriate to ask why productive investment occurs in some communities and not in others. In general, a perusal of the above communities suggests that the highest levels of business formation and investment occur in urban communities, rural communities with access to urban markets, or rural communities with favorable agricultural conditions. The effect of such structural factors 27 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review cannot be studied in the isolated case but can only be examined across a range of different communities. Douglas Massey and Laurence Basem developed a multivariate statistical model to analyze investment in four Mexican communities (Massey and Basem n.d.). They found that one of the strongest determinants of productive investment was the community to which one belonged, although the limited number of communities prevented them from identifying which community factors were specifi- cally responsible for differences in the tendency to invest productively. In addition to neglecting the effect of structural factors operating at the community level, studies of spending patterns generally do not take into account the life-cycle stage of the households involved. Active U.S. migrants are heavily concentrated in the age group of twenty to thirtyfour years of age, a time when most people are marrying, forming families, and raising children. During this phase of the life cycle, demands for family maintenance, housing, and medical care are greatest, and it is not surprising that migrants channel most of their earnings into current consumption. As migrants progress through the life cycle, however, spending on consumer goods falls off sharply and productive investment rises (Massey et al. 1987). Moreover, as families age and their migrant experience grows, they become increasingly likely to invest in agricultural inputs that raise productivity, such as machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, and improved seeds (Massey et al. 1987). Finally, patterns of migrant spending also depend in part on historical conditions that present different opportunities for investment in different eras (Durand 1988). The purchase of land was feasible up through the 1930s but became increasingly difficult thereafter, as private land was increasingly redistributed as state-sponsored ejidos. Competition for the remaining private parcels brought about a rapid inflation of prices that precluded further investment in land for most migrants. During the 1940s and 1950s, those who had received land under the government's redistribution program had the opportunity to invest in inputs such as machinery and fertilizers to make their parcels produce, but this avenue of investment too was eventually exhausted. At last, during the 1970s and 1980s, the extension of urban infrastructure and services to rural areas and the increasing congestion of urban metropolises made industrial investment attractive in the countryside and initiated a new wave of rural industrialization (Arias 1988; Durand 1989b, 1990). Thus although most observers have concluded from Mexican com- munity studies that U.S. migration leads to dependency and a lack of development, we argue that this conclusion does not account adequately for the structural, life-cycle, and historical factors that operate to constrain individual patterns of spending and investment. A careful look at the evidence suggests not that a "migrant syndrome" or an "addiction" exists but that under structural circumstances where productive investments are 28 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. likely to be met with success and during phases of the life cycle when current needs are at a minimum, spending for production is quite likely An important task for future research is to identify more specifically those community and household characteristics that are conducive to the productive use of income earned abroad. The Effect of the Reparto Agrario and Agricultural Modernization During the regime of President Lazaro Cardenas in the 1930s, Mexico embarked on an ambitious program of land reform and redistri- bution known as the Reparto Agrario (Yates 1981, 140-43). During this period, millions of hectares formerly held by wealthy landowners in large haciendas were broken into smaller plots and given over to the campe- sinos who traditionally had worked the lands. This fundamental shift in the political and economic organization of Mexico touched virtually all rural communities, and most historical case studies have considered the effects of the agrarian reform movement on U.S. migration. In general, the prevailing view is that the Reparto Agrario dis- couraged migration for several reasons: faced with the prospect of acquiring land, potential migrants stayed to fight for their allocations; the rules of the Reparto Agrario required that land remain in production, forcing campesinos to stay and care for it; and the acquisition of land provided a means of support to rural families that obviated the need for international migration. Consistent with these reasons, several studies indicate that the Reparto Agrario indeed acted as a brake on migration abroad (Lopez 1986a; Fonseca 1988; Fonseca and Moreno 1988). A broader survey of studies, however, reveals that agrarian reform had diverse effects in different communities, depending upon local social, economic, and political conditions. In the towns of Altamira, Jalisco, and Chamitlan, Michoacan, for example, the Reparto Agrario provided an incentive to migrate rather than the reverse. In these communities, campesinos were given land but not the capital or credit they needed to acquire tools, seeds, fertilizers, and other productive inputs. The only pragmatic solution for many families was U.S. migration, a traditional source of ready cash (Massey et al. 1987). This solution was facilitated by the Bracero Program, which arranged for recruiting, transporting, and housing migrants beginning in the 1940s. In other communities, it was the absence of an agrarian reform program that led to widespread emigration. Such was the case in Guadalupe, Michoacan, where townspeople under the influence of a local priest opted for entrenching against agrarian activists. Because of their actions, the town did not receive an allocation of ejido lands from the neighboring hacienda, even though other nearby communities got generous allot- ments. Because they had no land, men from Guadalupe were forced to 29 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review migrate at an early date and soon built relationships with U.S. employers that allowed them to acquire legal status. U.S. earnings provided them with markedly higher incomes than the ejidatarios in surrounding communities, and gradually they began to acquire lands from neighboring ejidos. In the end, families from Guadalupe gained control of most of the land in the area. In Copandaro, Michoacan, an even more peculiar outcome followed the Reparto Agrario (Rionda 1986, 1990). Here a group of peasants bought parts of the hacienda before the reform began and became small landowners with an interest in preserving private property. With the advent of the agrarian reform movement, these new landowners were destroyed politically and economically by agrarian activists who came to political power under President Lazaro Cardenas. The ruined property owners found relief from their travails only through U.S. migration. Years later, however, the agrarian activists who had expropriated the lands found the small plots insufficient to support their families and were ironically forced to borrow money from the U. S. migrants whose property they had taken earlier. Thus U. S. migration became widespread in Copandaro despite an active agrarian reform program. In the hacienda of Jalpa, Guanajuato, yet another sequence of events transpired when U.S. migration preceded the Reparto Agrario and obviated the need for it. In this community, an enlightened hacienda owner launched his own private agrarian reform program and sold a large part of his property to local campesinos and to poor families in neighboring municipios. According to Paul Taylor, many migrants from neighboring Arandas bought land from the hacienda with U.S. earnings (1933, 34). An ejido was never formed, and the process of buying and selling land stopped only when U.S. remittances declined with the onset of the depression in the 1930s. In sum, it is impossible to conclude from the study of any single community how the Reparto Agrario affected the process of migration to the United States because its effects were contingent on community factors that are difficult to analyze in an isolated instance. Judging from the studies accumulated so far, these structural factors include the extent of political divisions between agrarian activists and landowners, the dis- tribution of land prior to the reform movement, and the degree to which a community participated in U.S. migration before initiation of the Reparto Agrario. During the 1960s and 1970s, another upheaval affected rural com- munities when a wave of agricultural modernization introduced commercial crops, capital-intensive production methods, fertilizers, and mechanization to many areas of Mexico (Yates 1981; Barkin and DeWalt 1988). Community studies have generally shown that this wave of modernization set in motion a series of changes that displaced farm laborers and 30 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. increased the pressures for out-migration (Lopez 1986a; Massey et al. 1987; Fonseca 1988; Goldring 1990; Grindle 1988). Specifically, agricul- tural modernization consolidated property holding, substituted machines for hand labor, introduced capital inputs such as herbicides and fertilizers, and expanded work opportunities for women in factories and canneries. A few studies, however, have examined the effects of agricultural modernization across a range of different communities and have reached a more guarded tentative conclusion. Kenneth Roberts compared four communities in the states of Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi, Oaxaca, and Puebla and found that the effects of agricultural modernization depended greatly on the distribution of property and the quality of land within the community (K. Roberts 1982, 1984). When commercial crops and capitalintensive production methods were introduced into areas with good soil, irrigated land, and an even distribution of property, farm incomes rose and the risks to household income fell, thereby reducing the need for migration. But when commercialized agriculture was introduced under unfavorable agricultural conditions and an unequal distribution of land, farm incomes fell and risks rose, leading families to diversify their sources of support through internal and international migration. These results accord with those of Jesus Arroyo (1989). His study showed that the introduction of commercial agriculture into poorly developed rural areas was strongly linked to out-migration, but its application within welldeveloped rural areas and semi-urban areas did not yield large outflows of labor (see also Arroyo, de Leon, and Valenzuela 1990). Again, a uniform process can produce very different outcomes depending on structural characteristics of the local community. Migrant Strategies One last area of debate in the literature on migration concerns the relative importance of different strategies that migrants employ while working in the United States. Investigators have generalized from the experience of diverse case studies to develop various typologies that attempt to summarize the motivations and behaviors employed by migrants in traveling and working in the United States. In the early period of U.S. migration, for example, Gamio identified two kinds of migrantspermanent and temporary (1930a). More recently, Mines used migrants' legal status, duration of trip, and commitment to U.S. work to classify migrants into four basic types: undocumented shuttles, beginner permanents, long-term permanents, and legal shuttles (Mines 1981). Similarly, based on the frequency and duration of U.S. trips, Massey et al. (1987) defined three basic strategies of migration: temporary, recurrent, and 31 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review settled. Cornelius (1978) provided the simplest typology of all, dividing migrants into sojourners and settlers. Often these strategies are treated as if they were fixed characteristics of migrants and their communities (see Cornelius 1978, 1990c; Mines 1981). Some investigators, however, have argued that migrant strategies are not reified traits but fluid patterns of behavior that shift ov time in response to changing household circumstances and community conditions. For example, Goldring (1990) links the prevalence of different strategies of migration in Las Animas and Gomez Farias to the contrasting niches that their migrants occupy within the U.S. occupational-industrial structure. Those from Gomez Farias specialize in shuttle or recurrent migration because they are overwhelmingly employed in agriculture, which is more conducive to legalization and has a built-in seasonality that encourages moving back and forth frequently. Las Animas, in contrast, is dominated by migrants employing a settled strategy because their employment in urban areas and their undocumented status are more com- patible with longer periods of residence. Consistent with these results, Massey et al. (1987) found that migrants from rural communities tend to work in U.S. agriculture and employ temporary or recurrent strategies, whereas those from urban areas worked in U.S. cities and tended to employ settled strategies. In addition, Massey and his colleagues also found that strategies varied systematically over the life cycle. Early phases of the life cycle, before marriage and family formation, were associated with a settled strategy; middle phases of the life cycle, during childbearing and childrearing, were associated with a temporary strategy; and late phases of the life cycle, after most children are grown, were correlated with either a recurrent or settled strategy Finally, Massey et al. (1987) found that the choice of strategies shifted as households and communities accumulated increasing amounts of U.S. migrant experience. During early phases of the process, just after the initiation of migration, temporary patterns were most common; but as the amount of U.S. experience grew, recurrent and settled strategies increasingly predominated. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION In this article, we have summarized research-classic as well as recent-on a variety of salient issues related to Mexican migration to the United States. We have considered the sixty-year-old running debate about the number of Mexican migrants who enter and reside in the United States and reviewed the controversy about the size of their remittances. Disagreements on these issues stem primarily from the fact that much of the migratory flow is undocumented and hence unobservable. We have also considered results from two decades of community studies, which 32 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. provide detailed and reliable information on undocumented and legal migration to the United States. The main weakness of community stud- ies-and the source of much confusion-is that individual case studies do not readily sustain generalization to the whole of Mexico. Our review suggests that public debate over the number of undocumented migrants has been characterized by a great deal of rhetoric centered on highly speculative estimates and by considerable confusion over the terms of reference. When attention is restricted to estimates based on analytic methods and when one understands that some studies focus on undocumented workers while others consider undocumented migrants, the range of estimates is actually quite small. It leads to figures of under 2 million undocumented Mexicans in the United States in 1980 and just over 3 million in 1986. Similarly, migrant remittances appear to have totaled some 2 billion dollars in 1984. Community studies have attempted to analyze the social and economic processes underlying these aggregate statistics, but generalizations have been plagued by inconsistencies. These discrepancies indicate the hazards of generalizing from single cases. Yet the diversity of outcomes from different settings does not imply that it is impossible to generalize about U.S. migration. It simply reflects the fact that the pattern and course of U.S. migration are strongly shaped by factors acting at the community level. Generalizations can be made, but they must incorporate the con- tingent effects of community-level variables. These effects cannot be observed in single cases but only across a range of community types. Our review of findings from some thirty-two different communities suggests that four leading factors are crucial in determining patterns and processes of migration from Mexican communities to the United States. First, the age of the migration stream is crucial in determining the composition of the migrant flow. The length of time a community has been sending migrants to the United States determines the maturity of its networks, the immigration policies that applied to its migrants, and the total amount of migrant experience that has accumulated among its people. In general, the earlier that migration began, the more developed a community's networks will be, the more legalizations will have occurred, and the more experience community members will have accumulated in the United States. As a result, the longer a community has been involved in the migration process, the more likely that migrants will come from the poorest segments of the socioeconomic hierarchy, the greater the participation of women and children, the higher the proportion of documented migrants, and the greater the reliance on settled and recurrent migrant strategies. A second important community factor that shapes and conditions the process of migration is the niche in the U.S. occupational-industrial structure where migrants first became established. In general, agricultural 33 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review employment is associated with higher rates of legalization, greater participation by women and children, and a prevalence of temporary or recurrent migrant strategies. Although the occupational niche of the first migrants from a community is often a matter of chance, once migrants become established in a particular occupational-industrial position, they tend to channel other townspeople into the same structural location, thereby determining the character and composition of the subsequent stream. The position of a community within Mexico's political economy is also a crucial determinant of the composition and behavior of migrants to the United States. Obviously, rural agrarian communities will tend to send agricultural workers whereas urban communities send industrial or service workers, thereby conditioning the class composition of the migrant flow. But a community's position in Mexico's political economy also plays a strong role in determining migrant spending patterns. Migrants living in communities with access to urban markets, well-developed roads, accessible power supplies, good communications, and an even distribution of productive resources tend to spend larger shares of their U.S. earnings on productive ends than do migrants from isolated, poorly developed communities that lack this infrastructure. Finally, the distribution and quality of agricultural land plays a crucial role in shaping the processes of migration from rural communities. The degree of inequality in landholding obviously affects the class com- position of migration at the point of its initiation: recruitment from a community characterized by extreme inequality yields a stream of landless day laborers whereas recruitment from a town where land is more evenly distributed yields a flow of small landholders and ejidatarios. Inequality in landholding likewise affects the extent to which migrants are able to use their earnings to purchase land, and the quality of the land determines migrants' incentives for investing their earnings productively in farming. The local pattern of landholding also mediates the effect of structural shifts in the Mexican political economy, such as the Reparto Agrario, and strongly conditions the role they have played in generating migrants to the United States. The redistribution of land under the Reparto Agrario, rather than discouraging out-migration, actually encouraged international movement in most communities through several distinct mechanisms. In communities where land was owned by a large hacienda, the Reparto Agrario led to out-migration because it provided small parcels of land that were insufficient to support a family or gave land but no capital to enable farming. In communities where some households owned parcels but others owned nothing, the resulting political strife brought about the economic and political ruin of small landowners, who turned to U.S. migration as a means of supporting themselves. In other communities, 34 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE U.S. landowners and priests frightened townspeople into not applying for land under the Reparto Agrario, leaving them landless and open to re- cruitment by U.S. employers during the 1940s. The quality and distribution of land have also played important roles in conditioning the effects of the wave of agricultural modernization that swept Mexico during the 1960s and 1970s. Although the common wisdom is that adopting cash crops and capital-intensive production meth- ods led to greater out-migration via displacement of rural workers, comparative studies suggest that the process was more complex. Displacement did occur in communities with poor quality land and in places where land was unequally distributed, but in communities where land was of high quality and more evenly distributed among families, the advent of commercialized farming increased rural incomes, lowered risks to farm households, and thereby reduced the pressures for migration to the United States. The difficulty of generalizing about Mexico-U.S. migration has led many investigators to speak of "myths," "fallacies," "false assumptions," "exaggerations," or "games." The Colegio de Mexico published a book entitled Undocumented Migrants: Myths and Realities (1979). An article by David North discusses "five myths about illegal migration to the United States" (North n.d.). Cornelius (1979) speaks of the "new mythology of undocumented Mexican migration to the United States." Corwin calls estimates of undocumented migration a "numbers game" (1982). Garcia y Griego captions his book with the subtitle "Three False Assumptions about Emigration to the United States" (1988). Gustavo Verduzco com- ments on "the false assumptions about the Simpson-Rodino Law" (1987), and Margarita Nolasco refers to "the wishful calculations of returned migrants."3 Still others call for a "new focus" (Diez Canedo 1984) and a "new vision" (Garcia y Griego 1988). We have argued that this state of affairs follows from two factors: the political nature of the debate, which obscures the real consistency of facts about the number of migrants and the size of their remittances; and the fact that most case studies have failed to recognize the effect of structural variables operating at the community level, which strongly shape and condition the underlying process of migration. Our comparative analysis of communities suggests that a fruitful approach to developing more general statements about Mexico-U.S. migration is to focus on the ways in which community variables interact with individual and household processes to produce the manifold outcomes that we observe. 3. Margarita Nolasco, "Los alegres calculos de regresados," El Sol de Mexico, 4 July 1984, p. A-2. 35 This content downloaded from 24.4.24.213 on Fri, 04 Mar 2022 00:44:45 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms �Latin American Research Review REFERENCES ADELMAN, IRMA, J. EDWARD TAYLOR, AND STEPHEN VOGEL 1988 "Life in a Mexican Village: A SAM Perspective." Journal of Development Studies 25:5-24. ARIAS, PATRICIA 1988 "La pequefia empresa en el occidente rural." Estudios Sociologicos 6, no. 17:405-36. ARROYO, JESUS 1989 El abandono rural. Guadalajara: Editorial Universidad de Guadalajara. ARROYO, JESUS, ADRIAN DE LEON, AND BASILIA VALENZUELA 1990 Patterns of Migration and Regional Development in the State of Jalisco, Mexico. Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development, Working Paper no. 42. Washington, D.C.: Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development. BARKIN, DAVID, AND BILLIE R. DEWALT 1988 "Sorghum and the Mexican Food Crisis." LARR 23, no. 3:30-59. BEAN, FRANK D., BARRY EDMONSTON, AND JEFFREY S. PASSEL, EDS. 1990 Undocumented Migration to the United States: IRCA and the Experience of the 1980s. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press. BEAN, FRANK D., THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, MICHAEL J. WHITE, AND ROBERT F. DYMOWSKI 1990 "Post-IRCA Changes in the Volume and Composition of Undocumented Migration to the United States: An Assessment Based on Apprehensions Data." In BEAN, EDMONSTON, AND PASSEL 1990, 111-58. BEAN, FRANK D., ALLAN G. KING, AND JEFFREY S. PASSEL 1983 "The Number of Illegal Migrants of Mexican Origin in the United States: SexRatio-Based Estimates for 1980." Demography 20:99-109. BEAN, FRANK D., EDWARD E. TELLES, AND B. LINDSAY LOWELL 1987 "Undocumented Migration to the United States: Perception and Evidence." Population and Development Review 13:671-90. BEAN, FRANK D., GEORGES VERNEZ, AND CHARLES B. KEELY 1989 Opening and Closing the Doors: Evaluating Immigration Reform and Control. Santa Monica, Calif., and Washington, D.C.: Rand Corporation and the Urban Institute. BUSTAMANTE, JORGE 1979 "Emigracion indocumentada a los Estados Unidos." In CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 1979, 23-67. 1990 "Undocumented Migration from Mexico to the United States: Preliminary Find- ings from the Zapata Canyon Project." In BEAN, EDMONSTON, AND PASSEL 1990, 211-26. CALVO, THOMAS, AND GUSTAVO LOPEZ, EDS. 1988 Movimientos de poblacio'n en el occidente de Me'xico. Zamora: Colegio de Michoacan. 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Title A name given to the resource Mexican Migration to the United States: A Critical Review Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Durand, Jorge Massey, Douglas, S Subject The topic of the resource Immigration & society Mexican Immigration Latin America Description An account of the resource An examination of “two particular salient issues — The number of Mexican migrants to the United States and the quantity of their monetary remittances to Mexico” Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Latin American Research Review Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1992 Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Review Article Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource PDF Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context https://www.jstor.org/stable/2503748 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived JSTOR Language A language of the resource English https://dh.scu.edu/exhibits/files/original/86/2933/Vari_Newspaper.jpg ef048e9fcc369d14681d44ccb085c458 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. 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