Historiography

And now, for a brief historiography of the academic historical work surrounding the Vietnam War, including an explanation of what this project contributes that is fresh to the historical conversation. Seeing that the Vietnam War is such a relatively mainstream and fanatical topic in U.S. history, much conversation already exists surrounding the Vietnam War, both in academic spheres and more casual/pop culture spheres. Many Vietnam War/Cold War historians, including leading experts Pierre Asselin and Larry H. Addington, view the Vietnam War as an awfully costly and unnecessary undertaking by the U.S., leading to paradigm shifts within the U.S. and internationally. The research this project displays supports this perspective commonly adopted by U.S. historians and Vietnam historians alike. However, my research/project makes an attempt to broaden the lens through which we view the escalation of the war in Vietnam, looking to assign greater responsibility to a wider (and particularly earlier) range of U.S. presidents. With respect to this point, much of the historical scholarship surrounding the Vietnam War and the U.S.’s role in it begins with Eisenhower at the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954, where the 17th Parallel was set in stone. Some even omit Eisenhower from responsibility, maybe not purposefully, and instead examine the Vietnam War from Kennedy or even Johnson. My research looks to begin with Truman, where his and his administration’s ideas on foreign policy and actions at the onset of the Cold War laid the “foundation for action” that motivated the mindset of his succeeders and their choices regarding the war in Vietnam; In short, I look to further the historical perspective that in many ways, later presidents simply fell into following the status quo that Truman had established. Not many sources I consulted for this research made that point clear. Additionally, Johnson generally wears an immense amount of blame for the U.S.’s costly actions in the Vietnam War; this is especially true in less academic discussions surrounding the Vietnam War; in many ways, Johnson is even used as a pseudo-scapegoat for the U.S.'s involvement in Vietnam. While Johnson should certainly bear some of the blame for the U.S.’s mistakes in Vietnam and be held accountable for those actions, I would like this project to push Daniel Cohen’s perspective on Johnson regarding Vietnam, a perspective I see underrepresented in the general historiography of the Vietnam War. Cohen and I maintain the perspective that while Johnson certainly did not help the situation in Vietnam, he inherited a lot of problematic environmental situations from his predecessors, both abroad in Vietnam and within his own cabinet. I look, in this project, to push the idea that if Johnson pushed the boulder over the edge in regards to Vietnam, his predecessors certainly either assembled that boulder or gave it the necessary force of momentum to eventually find the edge and fall.